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THE CASE OF

BORK

MYERS,

III*

With the conclusion of rollcall vote number 348, the United States
Senate voted not to confirm the nomination of Robert H. Bork to be an
Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court. The vote was
forty-eight yeas to fifty-eight nays.' The presiding officer ordered the
notification of the President and thus the extended debate on the nomination of Robert Bork came to its predestined conclusion. 2 This article
examines the fulfillment of the Senate's constitutional duty of advice and
consent with regard to Judge Bork's nomination. Many of the senators
on both sides of the issue agreed that this debate was the most lengthy
and involved discussion of any Supreme Court nominee in history. It
likely will rank high as one of the most controversial and rancorous confirmation proceedings. Throughout the hearings in the Judiciary Committee and the debate on the floor of the Senate, as well as in the
popular press and among the citizenry in general, a good deal of discussion took place regarding the proper role of the Senate in providing its
advice and consent and whether it adequately fulfilled that duty. Much
of the debate focused on the judicial philosophy of the nominee. This
article will also examine the judicial philosophy ofJudge Bork, what conclusions may be drawn, and what questions have been raised with respect to the process of advice and consent, as illustrated by this
nomination.
I.

THE HISTORY OF THE SENATE IN PROVIDING ADVICE AND CONSENT

Several historical coincidences converged during the nomination of
Judge Robert Bork to be an associate justice to the Supreme Court of
the United States. Of minor interest, these Senate debates ensued during the centennial Congress. Of greater note was that the bicentennial
of the Constitution of the United States was celebrated during the
course of the judiciary Committee hearings. This fact was not lost upon
the senators or witnesses appearing before the Committee. The nomination served as a magnificent course in constitutional history and the
role of the Supreme Court in our nation.
* Legislative Counsel to United States Senator Alan K. Simpson (R-Wyo); A.B.
1977, College of William and Mary; J.D. 1981, University of Denver; Member of the Colorado, Wyoming and District of Columbia Bars. This article represents the author's reflections following the Senate consideration of the nomination of Robert H. Bork to become
an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, and the author's participation in
that process. The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author.
1. 133 CONG. REC. S15,011 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1987).
2. Id.
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Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution states that the President "Shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint . .. Judges of the Supreme Court. '

3

The Senate

had received 143 Supreme Court nominations up to and including President Reagan's nomination of Robert Bork. Prior to the Bork nomination, the Senate had refused to confirm twenty-seven nominees, twentytwo of these occurring during the eighteenth or nineteenth century. In
the twentieth century, prior to the Bork nomination, the Senate rejected
three Supreme Court nominations outright, filibustered a fourth nomination until it was withdrawn by the President, and declined to take action on a fifth nomination-that of Homer Thornberry in 1968. 4 Not
since the nominations of Clement Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell
in November 1969 and April 1970, respectively, has a nominee to the
Supreme Court been rejected.
With the exception of the Thornberry nomination by President
Johnson, which was withdrawn prior to the conclusion of the hearings,
Robert Bork is only the fifth nominee to be rejected in the twentieth
century. The first nominee rejected in this century was that of President
Hoover's in 1930, John J. Parker, the Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals. Parker was rejected by a vote of thirty-nine to fortyone 5 , based partially on the ground that he was a racist. The charge of
racism arose from the position taken by Judge Parker when he ran for
public office in South Carolina in 1920, at which time he said that blacks
should not be allowed to vote. As it turned out, Judge Parker remained
on the circuit court, and in a remarkable 1947 case, ruled that South
Carolina must eliminate all-white primaries, thus advancing voting
6
rights for blacks.
Following the rejection of Judge Parker, the next Senate vote for
rejection came with President Nixon's Supreme Court nominations of
Clement Haynsworth in 1969 and G. Harrold Carswell in 1970.7 The
legal profession considered Haynsworth to have questionable mental
ability. There were also charges that he had been a racist and there were
questions that were raised about his conduct which, although not criminal, showed certain character flaws and indiscretions. After Haynsworth's rejection, Carswell's name was sent up by President Nixon.
Carswell was considered to have even weaker legal ability than Haynsworth and his personal dealings were even more questionable. He, too,
3. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl.
2. The Constitution was adopted by a convention of the
states on September 17, 1787, and was subsequently ratified by the several states, with
ratification having been completed on June 21, 1788.
4. Congressional Research Service Report For Congress, No. 87-761 GOV at 1-2
(Sept. 14, 1987).
5. Id. at I n.3.
6. Hearings before the Committee on Judiciary, United States Senate, I 00th Congress, First Session, on the Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be AssociateJustice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, (Committee Print Draft) 100th Cong., istSess., pt. 2,at 1054 (1987) [hereinafter
Hearings] (statement of Forrest McDonald, Professor, University of Alabama).
7. Congressional Research Service, supra note 4, at I n.3.
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was rejected.8
The next rejection, that of Abe Fortas, was peculiar. President
Johnson nominated Fortas to ascend from Associate Justice to ChiefJustice as replacement for Earl Warren. However, at the time of the nomination, Chief Justice Warren had not yet resigned and a portion of the
Senate was offended by the sitting Chief Justice who had agreed to resign if the President nominated Associate Justice Fortas for the position.
As a result, the Senate engaged in a filibuster over the nomination and
eventually President Johnson withdrew the nomination without a vote.9
The Bork nomination was clearly different from any of these previous twentieth century rejections. There was no question during the
hearings or Senate debate whether Judge Bork had the mental ability or
qualifications as a legal scholar. Indeed, his qualifications were unassailable, Nor was there any question as to Judge Bork's personal dealings.
No inquiry by senators during the extended Judiciary Committee hearings touched upon the mandatory investigation of Judge Bork by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
On July 1, 1987, President Reagan announced his nomination of
Judge Robert Bork for the position vacated by retiring Associate Justice
Lewis Powell. Debate quickly ensued on the floor of the Senate as to
what their proper role would be in providing advice and consent on the
nomination. Each side in the debate looked to the early history of the
Constitution and to the Framers to determine what role the Senate
should play. Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware was one of the primary
participants in this debate. As Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, he assumed a key role in the review of the Bork nomination.' 0
During debate on the Senate floor, Senator Biden argued that the
Framers intended that the Senate take the very broadest view possible in
discharging its duty to provide advice and consent. I I Senator Biden
noted that the first Supreme Court nominee to be rejected was John
Rutledge, President Washington's nominee, in 1795. Biden stated that
the rejection was based specifically on political grounds due to Rutledge's opposition to the Jay Treaty of 1794.12 Senator Biden's claim
that the delegates to the Constitutional Convention intended the Senate
to play a broad role in the appointment of judges did not go unchallenged. Senator Orrin Hatch, the second ranking Republican on the Judiciary Committee, responded. The Senator stated on the floor that the
Constitutional Convention vested the nomination powers exclusively
8. Hearings, supra note 6, pt. 2, at 1054-55 (testimony of Forrest McDonald).
9. Id. at 1055.
10. Increased scrutiny was placed upon Senator Biden during the initial investigatory
phase of the nomination as well as during theJudiciary Committee hearings. Not only did
attention focus upon Senator Biden in his capacity as chairman of the committee, but he
also had announced his candidacy for the 1988 presidential election. During the course of
the Judiciary hearings, allegations surfaced regarding Senator Biden's law school record
and plagiarism. As a result, during the pendency of the hearings Senator Biden withdrew
his candidacy for the Presidency.
11. 133 Cong. Rec. S10,523 (daily ed. July 23, 1987).
12. Id. at SI0,525.
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with the President, specifically rejecting any notion that the Senate
should play a role in nominating justices.1 3 Senator Hatch, reading the
1787 debates, concluded that "ideological inquisitions and inquiries" of
14
the nominee by the Senate were without historical foundation.
With this debate between Senators Biden and Hatch, occurring
forty-six days prior to the start of the Judiciary Committee hearings, the
stage was set for a nomination drama that would pit opposing historical
analyses and conclusions against each other. In many ways, this initial
exchange illustrated the positions that would be taken on the proper
senatorial inquiry into Supreme Court judicial philosophy. The opponents to the nomination would conclude that the nominee should have
an expansive view of the Constitution and federal statutes just as the
Framers had an expansive view of the proper inquiry of the nominee.
The proponents of the nomination would conclude that a Supreme
Court Justice should have a more confined and historically bound view
of the Constitution and federal statutes just as, they believed, the Framers had intended a Senate review of the nominee that would not inquire
extensively into the nominee's judicial philosophies.
II.

THE BORK NOMINATION

On June 26, 1987, Associate Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. issued a
statement that he had elected to retire from the Court. This announcement came after fifteen and one half years of service on the Supreme
Court bench. Justice Powell's reasons for his decision were his age of
seventy-nine years, that he had not intended to serve for more than ten
15
years, and because his health had not been "robust."'
Shortly following the resignation ofJustice Powell, Senate Judiciary
Committee Chairman Biden issued a one page statement, calling the
resignation a "major loss to the Court and the nation... UJustice Powell]
understood the meaning of civil rights and liberties."' 1 6 He called Powell a "decisive vote in a host of decisions,"' 17 and expressed the hope
that President Reagan would nominate a replacement "in the mold of
Lewis Powell."' 8 The theme that Justice Powell had been a crucial
swing vote would be raised time and again during the course of the
nomination. Many senators wanted a nominee who would be an ideological approximation of Justice Powell, on the theory that the Court
had reached some delicate balance in its ideological makeup and any
new associate justice should maintain that balance. A good deal of debate was stirred by this concept. Though outside the scope of this article, the debate over "balance" remained a point of contention
throughout the nomination.
13. 133 Cong. Rec. S10,878 (daily ed. July 30, 1987).
14. Id. at S10,880.
15. Printed statement of Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,June 26, 1987, provided by the Supreme
Court Press Office.

16. Press statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., undated.
17. Id.
18.

Id.

ADVICE AND CONSENT ON TRIAL

19881

The President announced on July 1, 1987, that he intended to nominate Robert Heron Bork as Powell's replacement. Although the nomination was not officially received by the Judiciary Committee untilJuly 7,
both the opponents and proponents of the nomination immediately began to make public pronouncements. On the same day that the President announced the nomination, Senator Edward Kennedy of
Massachusetts took to the Senate floor and made the following vitriolic
remarks about the nomination:
Robert Bork's America is a land in which women would be
forced into back-alley abortions, blacks would sit at segregated
lunch counters, rogue police could break down citizens' doors
in midnight raids, schoolchildren could not be taught about
evolution, writers and artists would be censored at the whim or
[sic] government, and the doors of the Federal courts would be
shut on the fingers of millions of citizens for whom the judiciary is often the only protector of the individual rights that are
the heart of our democracy. 19
Senator Metzenbaum indicated his displeasure with the nomination
on several instances, including his opening statement on the first day of
hearings in the Judiciary Committee. The Senator stated: "Now it is
clear that the President wants to revise the Constitution through his appointments to the Supreme Court."' 20 Senator Metzenbaum also raised
the "preservation of balance" theme in his opening remarks by stating
that, "[t]he confirmation of this nominee is likely to tip the Court radically on key constitutional issues .... Those who know Robert Bork
know he is not Lewis Powell, nor I suspect, would he claim to be."'2 '
The Senator cited what he believed was the position of Judge Bork on
several substantive issues such as voting rights, Watergate, and privacy.
While other members of the opposition may not have spoken in such
passionate terms, the message was repeated in many fora and in many
forms. For instance, in an exchange between Senator Simon and Judge
Bork in the Committee hearings, Senator Simon told Judge Bork that he
had read the infamous Dred Scott 2 2 decision and that the majority opinion by Justice Taney "sounded an awful lot like Robert Bork ....,,23
Justice Taney believed it improper to read into the Constitution clauses
that were not found there and consequently the Court denied free
blacks the right to become citizens. Judge Bork took exception to Senator Simon's characterization that he was "an awful lot like" Justice Taney; however, Simon had made his point.
The proponents of Judge Bork failed from the outset to match the
opponents' rhetorical intensity and the nomination was immediately put
on the defensive. Both the nominee and his supporters in the Senate
were put in a position of denying or explaining away the charges made
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

133 Cong. Rec. S9,188 (daily ed. July 1, 1987).
Hearings, supra note 6, pt. 1, at 27.
Id. at 28.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
Hearings, supra note 6, pt. 1, at 291.
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by the opponents. Little time was left for an offensive push to state affirmatively the qualifications of the candidate. Rather, many of his proponents were relegated to the task of telling other senators and the
public that he wasn't as bad as some were saying. For example, in an
exchange between Senator Metzenbaum and former Attorney General
William French Smith, Senator Metzenbaum asked Mr. Smith to explain
why so many people seemed to be afraid of Judge Bork. In response,
Mr. Smith indicated that to the extent that those fears existed, it was due
in large part to the "misrepresentations," "distortions," and "propa24
ganda" that the opponents had circulated from July 1 forward.
Who then was this man nominated by the President to take the seat
of Justice Powell? He certainly seemed to have the perfect resume for
the job. 25 Indeed, no one seriously challenged Judge Bork's qualifications to be an associate justice based upon his previous experiences.
The overwhelming issue of the hearing testimony and the floor debate
centered on Judge Bork's judicial philosophy and his understanding of
the role of Supreme Court justices when interpreting the Constitution,
statutes, and case law.
The Judiciary Committee hearings on Judge Bork were, in their own
right, extraordinary. The amount of testimony by Judge Bork before the
Committee was unprecedented for a Supreme Court nominee.2 6 Judge
Bork testified for thirty hours over the course of five days. Another
seven days were spent considering the testimony of 1 11 other witnesses. 2 7 The hearings were held in the Russell Senate Office Building
Caucus Room-the site of both the Iran-Contra hearings earlier in the
session and the Watergate hearings in the early 1970's. The major television networks and radio carried much of Judge Bork's testimony live.
A large press corps representing all media attended the hearings.
Before the Committee paraded an impressive array of witnesses both
supporting and opposing the nomination, including former President
Gerald Ford, former Chief Justice Warren Burger, seven former attorneys general, present and former congressmen, numerous law school
professors and deans, former White House Counsel, Lloyd Cutler, and a
variety of representatives of interested groups.
Judge Bork's testimony before the Committee was extensive. The
Judge offered his opinion on a number of Constitutional issues and
Supreme Court decisions. His responsiveness to questions was praised
by many members of the Committee and was without parallel to other
24. Hearings, supra note 6, pt. 1, at 859.
25. See generally NOMINATION OF ROBERT

H.

BORK TO BE AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED
STATES SENATE, TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL, MINORITY, AND SUPPLEMENTAL VIEW. S. EXEC.

REP. No. 7, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 217 (1987) [hereinafter Report] (Phi Beta Kappa gradu-

ate from University of Chicago, Managing Editor of law review at University of Chicago
Law School, Order of the Coif, partner in large national law firm, Yale Law School professor, Solicitor General of the United States, Judge on the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit).
26. Report, supra note 25, at 215.
27. Id. at 2.
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recent Supreme Court nominations. During his nomination, Justice
Scalia often invoked the position that it would beimproper to make
statements about specific cases or fact patterns since that case or factual
situation could potentially come before the court following his confirmation. 28 Similarly, Justice Rehnquist refused to answer certain questions
which he believed might come before him after the hearings on his nomination to be ChiefJustice. 2 9 Judge Bork did not always answer the questions put to him. For instance, he declined to answer Senator Heflin's
questions on how the Judge would apply stare decisis to the decision in
Roe v. Wade. 30 But, as a general statement, Judge Bork spoke freely on
many matters. He apparently believed it inappropriate to decline to discuss the issues before the Committee after having put so many of his
thoughts in the form of articles, speeches or opinions. Paradoxically,
after providing so many hours of testimony, many of the Judge's statements under oath were not given full credibility by the opponents to the
nomination. For example, some senators insisted on describing Judge
Bork in terms of his positions taken over two decades ago which he had
subsequently repudiated, rather than accepting his sworn testimony
from the hearings. Former Attorney General Elliot Richardson commented on this, noting that many of the opponents continued their assault on the candidate as though he had not testified or that he had
31
testified in a manner undeserving of credibility.
Judge Bork's open-ended testimony forged a double-edged sword.
The testimony revealed the Judge's opinions on many important constitutional issues. Those senators who chose to read his entire testimony,
prior to a vote on the nominee, had 656 pages of direct evidence available. At the same time, page after page of testimony provided opponents with a bountiful source of citations from which to characterize
Judge Bork's opinions in a manner most useful to their cause. A good
example of this latter phenomenon was the criticism leveled at Judge
Bork for his response to Senator Simpson's question as to why Judge
Bork wished to be an associate justice of the Supreme Court. Bork provided two answers to the question. The first answer was that the experience would be "an intellectual feast. ' '3 2 This was the answer
emphasized by some senators hoping to make a point that Judge Bork
wished to ascend to the Supreme Court merely to satisfy his own intellectual desires. This implication survived because of the convenient
omission of Judge Bork's second answer to the question wherein he
stated, "[o]ur Constitutional structure is the most important thing this
nation has and I would like to help maintain it and be remembered for
28. See Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, on the
Nomination ofJudge Antonin Scalia, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the

United States, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, 57, 58 (1986).
29. See Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, on the
Nomination ofJustice William Hubbs Rehnquist to be Chief Justice of the United States,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 179, 189 (1986).
30. Hearings, supra note 6, pt. 1, at 267.
31.

Hearings, supra note 6, pt. 3, at 1681.

32. Hearings, supra note 6, pt. i, at 720.
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III.

JUDGE BORK'S JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY

The primary issue of the nomination was whether the Judge's judicial philosophy was acceptable to the majority of the 100 senators. Virtually every discussion-whether it was on an esoteric point of
constitutional law, a law review article written by the judge, a decision
handed down by him while on the court of appeals, or any other matter
in the hearing-could eventually be brought back to this focus on judicial philosophy. As Chairman Biden said in his opening statement, the
nomination was about more than Judge Bork as an individual. It required the Committee and the full Senate to pass judgement on Judge
Bork's philosophy and whether that philosophy was "an appropriate one
at this time in our history." 3 4 In his opening remarks, the Judge acknowledged the accuracy of Chairman Biden's statement. Judge Bork
then went on to set forth his judicial philosophy. It is worthy of quotation at length, in order to understand the Judge's position on this key
issue as well as the reason for both opposition to and support for the
nominee. The judicial philosophy of Judge Bork is, in part, as follows:
The judge's authority derives entirely from the fact that he is
applying the law and not his personal values. That is why the
American public accepts the decisions of its courts, accepts
even decisions that nullify the laws of the majority of the electorate or of their representatives voted for.
The judge, to deserve that trust and that authority, must be
every bit as governed by law as is the Congress, the President,
the state governors and legislatures, and the American
people....
How should a judge go about finding the law? The only
legitimate way, in my opinion, is by attempting to discern what
those who made the law intended. The intentions of the
lawmakers govern whether the lawmakers are the Congress of
the United States enacting a statute or whether they are those
who ratified our Constitution and its various amendments....
Where the words are general, as is the case with some of
the most profound protections of our liberties-in the Bill of
Rights and in the Civil War Amendments-the task is far more
complex. It is to find the principle or value that was intended
to be protected and to see that it is protected.
As I wrote in an opinion for our court, the judge's responsibility 'is to discern how the Framers' values, defined in the
context of the world they knew, apply in the world we know.'
If a judge abandons intention as his guide, there is no law
available to him and he begins to legislate a social agenda for
the American people. That goes well beyond his legitimate
power....
33. Id.
34. Hearings, supra note 6, pt. 1, at 66.
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The past, however, includes not only the intentions of
those who first made the law, it also includes those past judges
who interpreted it and applied it in prior cases. That is why a
judge must have great respect for precedence ....
Times come, of course, when even a venerable precedent
can and should be overruled. The primary example of a proper
overruling is Brown against Board of Education, the case which
outlawed racial segregation accomplished by Government
action....
I can put the matter no better than I did in an opinion on
my present court. Speaking of a judge's duty, I wrote: 'The
important thing, the ultimate consideration, is the constitutional freedom that is given into our keeping. A judge who refuses to see new threats to an established constitutional value
and hence provides a crabbed interpretation that robs a provision of its full, fair and reasonable meaning, fails in his judicial
duty. That duty, I repeat, is to ensure that the powers and freedoms the Framers specified are made effective in today's
circumstances.'
But I should add to that passage that when a judge goes
beyond this and reads entirely new values into the Constitution, values the Framers and the ratifiers did not put there, he
deprives the people of their liberty. That liberty, which the
Constitution clearly envisions, is the liberty of the people to set
their own social agenda through the processes of
democracy....
It is simply a philosophy ofjudging which gives the Constitution a full and fair interpretation but, where the Constitution
is silent, leaves the policy struggles to the Congress, the President, the legislatures 3and
executives of the fifty states, and to
5
the American people.
This philosophy of judging-known variously as "original intent,"
"positivism," "judicial restraint," "interpretivism" or "strict construction"--had been Judge Bork's philosophy for the past sixteen years.
The Judge indicated in testimony that he had no intention of moving
from this philosophy if confirmed by the Senate. 3 6 One ofJudge Bork's
earliest statements setting forth this judicial philosophy is found in an
article he wrote for Fortune magazine in 1971.37 ThereJudge (then professor) Bork argued that the Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren,
with its proclivity toward social change through Supreme Court opinion,
had "damaged" and "created disrespect" for the law by blurring the line
between judges and the legislatures. 38 Bork wrote that the Warren
Court had caused great harm to the prestige of the law by confusing the
theory of law with the power which the court held and used to produce
39
results it liked without any anchor in the Constitution or statutes.
35. Hearings, supra note 6, pt. 1, 75-77.
36. Hearings, supra note 6, at. 1, at 418.
37. Bork, We suddenly Feel That Law is Vulnerable,
38. Id. at 116.
39. Id.

FORTUNE,

Dec. 1971, at 115.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 66:1

Thus, to rephrase the ideological battle waged during the confirmation
hearings: Did the majority of the Senate believe that the next associate
justice should embrace the expansive, judicially active approach of the
Warren Court; or, should the nominee assume a more conservative approach by drawing a clear distinction between the role of the judiciary
and the legislature in creating new legal rights and setting the social
agenda?
Some senators who supported the nomination believed that the extensive discussion and debate over judicial philosophy was inappropriate; that, while judicial philosophy is important, it is only one aspect to
be considered in confirming a nominee. A key proponent of this approach was the Ranking Minority Member on the Committee, Senator
Strom Thurmond of South Carolina. Senator Thurmond believed that
the proper qualifications for a nominee included integrity, knowledge
and understanding of the law, compassion, judicial temperament, and
an understanding of our system of government and its separation of
powers. 40 For Senator Thurmond, a candidate's judicial philosophy
could be properly considered but it should not be the sole criteria for
rejecting or confirming a nominee. 4 1 Yet, with the acknowledgment by
Judge Bork that the hearings were "in large measure a discussion of
judicial philosophy,"' 4 2 little attempt was made by senators on the Committee to steer the line of questioning away from this central issue.
The hearings on Judge Bork's judicial philosophy quickly departed
from general theories of constitutional law. The opponents to the nomination concentrated on specific issues when they believed Judge Bork's
philosophy was contrary to that desired by the majority of Americans.
Ironically, Judge Bork's philosophy provides much greater assurance
than do opposing "activists" philosophies that the power of the legislature will not be infringed upon by the courts. Put simply, where the
constitution or statutes do not speak of a particular right, Judge Bork
would not create a right through judicial power but would instead refer
the matter into the hands of the executive and the legislature for consideration pursuant to the political processes and the will of the majority as
expressed by their elected representatives. One might logically conclude that the senators who were to vote on the nomination would embrace such an approach, thereby furthering the separation of powers
between the Judiciary and the Congress, with deference to the Congress
where the Constitution or the statutes are silent. This, however, was not
borne out by the committee and floor votes. For reasons which will be
discussed below, senators in opposition to the nomination worked
closely with each other and outside interest groups to create an image of
Bork's judicial philosophy which was readily transferable to thirty-second television ads, full page newspaper ads, and the brief moments
available on the nightly news. These media packaged issues fostered
40. Hearings, supra note 6,pt. 1,at 18.
41. Hearings, supra note 6, at 19.
42. Hearings, supra note 6, at 75.
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widespread concern throughout the American citizenry over this nominee. This was due in part to the reality that full explanation of complex
constitutional principles, crafted from years of precedent and debate, do
not lend themselves to brief news and ad copy explanation. Consequently Bork's writings and opinions were reduced to slogans and buzz
words. For example, as a Yale law professor, Judge Bork often criticized
Supreme Court decisions. These criticisms were reduced to writing in a
number of powerful articles published in both law reviews and popular
magazines. Opponents to the nomination would seize upon this professorial criticism of Supreme Court decisions and infer that "Justice" Bork
would adopt a similar approach toward established Supreme Court precedent. Senator Thurmond addressed this by asking Judge Bork how he
would draw the distinction between his writings as a professor and his
responsibilities as a Supreme CourtJustice. Judge Bork responded that,
as a professor, he was encouraged to engage in "theoretical discussion"
and he chose to attack Supreme Court decisions which he believed were
inadequately explained by existing constitutional and statutory principles. He went on to note that in the classroom, nobody is injured, while
in the courtroom someone always loses. Thus, a judge must engage a
much more cautious approach to the legal principles at stake than would
a professor when writing or delivering speeches. 43 This explanation of
his regard for precedent was reduced by opponents to declarations that
Judge Bork had no respect for Supreme Court decisions.
IV.

ISSUES FRAMING THE DEBATE

Certain constitutional issues quickly became central themes for discussion of Bork's judicial philosophy during the Judiciary Committee
hearings and in subsequent floor debates. As with any trial, the issues
were presented in dramatically opposing fashion by the two sides on the
nomination. Each had its own interpretation as to how Judge Bork, as
44
an associate justice, would address these issues.
The approach taken by the opposition senators on the judicial philosophy ofJudge Bork can be illustrated by comparing the statements of
some of these senators with the testimony ofJudge Bork in the hearings.
For instance, Senator Metzenbaum, in his opening statement, stated that
45
"Judge Bork categorically rejects any Constitutional right of privacy."1
This contrasts rather markedly with Judge Bork's testimony the next
day. In response to a question by Senator Simpson, Judge Bork affirmed that privacy is protected under the Constitution but that there
are some limits to that right. 4 6 For instance, there is a limit on the right
43. Hearings, supra note 6, pt. 1,at 101.
44. Senator Simpson set forth a list of issues which encompassed a majority of the
debate, including: sterilization, big business, equal protection for women and minorities,
civil rights, the role of precedent, sexual harassment, voting rights, Watergate, the right of
privacy, Congress versus the President, freedom of speech, and others. See 133 CONG.
REC. S14,8S5 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1987) (statement of Senator Simpson).
45. Hearings, supra note 6, pt. 1, at 28.
46. Hearings, supra note 6, at 217.
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of privacy if one is engaging in a private use of illegal drugs or if one is
privately engaging in incest. Clearly, the right of privacy does not extend to these matters. Yet, the attempt to place limits on the right of
privacy was criticized as extinguishing all rights of privacy. Judge Bork
specifically stated in his testimony that "no civilized person wants to live
in a society without a lot of privacy in it. And the Framers, in fact, of the
Constitution protected privacy in a variety of ways." '4 7 Judge Bork then
went on to cite the right of privacy in the first amendment which protects free exercise of religion and freedom of speech; the right of privacy
of membership lists and associations which are necessary to make that
right of free speech effective; the right of privacy in one's home and
office as protected by the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures; and the right of privacy against self in48
crimination as protected by the fifth amendment.
The issue of the right of privacy arose most often in the context of
Judge Bork's criticisms of Griswold v. Connecticut49 and Roe v. Wade.50 He
criticized the reasoning employed in these decisions and the court's failure to adequately define a constitutional right of privacy. Although
joined by many legal scholars as well as the dissenting justices in those
cases,Judge Bork's criticism of the cases continued to earn him condemnation through blanket statements that he found no right of privacy in
the Constitution. That theme was carried through to the end. Thus,
what began with Senator Metzenbaum's opening statement that Bork
rejected any constitutional right of privacy ended with a similar statement from the Committee report that, pursuant to Judge Bork's views,
"[t]here would be no right to privacy." '5 1 This type of unwavering declaration from commencement to conclusion of the hearings, without regard to the intervening testimony ofJudge Bork, occurred repeatedly on
numerous issues during the hearings. Opposition senators were not
alone in their effort to reduce some of Judge Bork's decisions on the
court of appeals to sensational declarations conveniently packaged for
the media. Several large lobbying organizations on both sides of the
nomination excelled in reducing Judge Bork's articles or decisions to
emotion laden, bold type phrases. The skill of the opponents, however,
surpassed that of the pro-Bork forces. For instance, the People For The
American Way Action Fund ran a full page advertisement in the New
York Times entitled "Robert Bork vs. The People."15 2 The ad set forth its
analysis of Judge Bork's views with such phrases as "Sterilizing workers," "No privacy," "Big business is always right," "Turn back the clock
on civil rights?" 5 3 The explanatory ad copy of the People For The
American Way ad regarding "Sterilizing workers" is worthy of further
47. Id.
48.

Id.

49. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
50. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
51. Report, supra note 6, at 97.
52. N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1987, at A21.
53. Id.
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examination. This ad ran on the day the hearings commenced. It characterized a decision written by Judge Bork in Oil, Chemical &Atomic Workers InternationalUnion v. American Cyanamid.54 The advertisement reduced
the opinion of the court to an eighty-three word description as follows:
A major chemical company was. pumping so much lead into the
workplace that female employees who became pregnant were
risking having babies with birth defects. Instead of cleaning up
the air, the company ordered all women workers to be sterilized or lose their jobs. When the union took the company to
court, Judge Bork ruled in favor of the company. Five women
underwent surgical sterilization. Within months, the company
closed the dangerous
part of the plant. And the sterilized wo55
men lost their jobs.
On the fourth day of hearings, Senator Metzenbaum picked up on
this issue of "sterilizing workers" when he told the Judge that the American Cyanamid decision was "shocking.''56 Senator Metzenbaum further
stated "I cannot understand how you as a jurist could put women to the
choice of work or be sterilized .... ,,57
Judge Bork fully explained the decision for Senator Metzenbaum.
The ad in the New York Times and the statements of Senator Metzenbaum
both implied that the decision of Judge Bork in the American Cyanamid
case subsequently led to sterilization of women. The less than sensational reality was that the five women who underwent voluntary sterilization did so in 1978, four years before judge Bork was even on the court
of appeals bench. It is also important to note that Judge Bork never
"endorsed" or "approved of" the employer's policy of requiring women
to undergo sterilization as a condition of employment. 58 If the full
opinion were to be distilled into a few paragraphs within this article the
author would be guilty of the same tactics used by the ad campaign. The
opinion of judge Bork speaks for itself. It should be emphasized, however, that Judge Bork was not alone in his decision. He wrote for an
unanimous panel including justice, then judge, Scalia and Senior District judge Williams. The unanimous court affirmed the decision of the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission which had affirmed
the decision of the Administrative Law judge. The Secretary of Labor,
foregoing his right, did not challenge the Review Commission's
59
decision.
When the chemical company was unable to reduce the lead levels in
its lead pigment department, it adopted a policy that only sterile women
54. 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
55. N.Y. Times, supra note 52.

56. Hearings,supra note 6, pt. 1, at 47.
57. Id.
58. Letter from Robert H. Bork to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (October 5, 1987)
(submitted by the nominee to the Chairman of the Committee in response to questions
from Senator Robert C. Byrd dated October 1, 1987, regarding the American Cyanamid
decision).
59. Oil, Chem. and Atomic Workers v. American Cyanamid, 741 F.2d 444, 445 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
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or women past childbearing age would be employed in the department.
The chemical company informed the women in this part of the plant that
the unhappy choices were: (1) loss of employment, (2) transfer to lower
paying jobs, or (3) voluntary sterilization. 60 It was this third alternative
that brought about the litigation. Had the chemical company fired the
women employees in that portion of the plant or transferred them to
lower paying jobs, the case would not have arisen. As Judge Bork stated
with a distressing choice.
in his opinion, the women were "thus faced
6
Some chose sterilization, some did not." '
Other examples of playing fast and loose with the facts and law of
decisions and articles of Judge Bork could easily constitute a separate
article. However, as illustrated by the right of privacy issue and the
American Cyanamid decision, the point needs no further elucidation.
Having illustrated the zeal of the opposition among some senators
and public interest groups, the question follows: What generated this
opposition? The answer once again leads back to the judicial philosophy of Judge Bork versus that of his opponents. Judge Bork had gone
on record as early as 1971 as strongly opposed to thejudicial philosophy
and consequent decisions of the Supreme Court under then-Chief Justice Earl Warren. 62 Senator Biden addressed the question of "why the
opposition?" During Senate floor debate, he responded to Senator
Armstrong of Colorado who, in Senator Biden's words, had raised the
issue of the "astonishing onslaught" 63 against Judge Bork. As Senator
Biden stated in his response:
So the reason why there was this astonishing onslaught is everybody understood what is at stake here. This, in a sense, is a
referendum on: Do we like what the Court did the last thirty
years? Or do we dislike it?
I would respectfully suggest that the vast majority of American people, liberal and conservative alike, say: We like what
the Court did. Oh, we disagree with pieces but we do not want
64
to turn back.
Those senators who politically and philosophically approved of the
decisions of the activist Warren Court thus opposed the nominee.
Those interest groups which believed their causes had been treated
kindly by the Warren Court era joined ranks with like-minded senators.
It could not be seriously argued that interest groups have not been
involved in persuading senators in previous Supreme Court nominations. Clearly they have. 6 5 The interesting point is the degree of participation. This nomination saw massive advertising and mailing
campaigns mounted by numerous interest groups who had a common
60.

Id.

61. Id.
62.
63.

Bork, supra note 37.
133 CONG. REC. S14,720 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1987).

64. Id.
65. Accord G. CALVIN MACKENZIE, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS 206

(1981).
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belief that Judge Bork would overturn or slow the "progress," as defined by these groups, of the Warren and Burger Courts. As the nomination progressed and more and more senators announced an intention
to vote against the nominee, interest groups supporting the nominee
increased their efforts along similar lines. This enormous campaign on
each side was a departure from previous Supreme Court nominations.
It has been suggested that overt, expensive lobbying efforts were held in
check in previous nominations because such efforts seemed inappropri66
ate for a judicial position which is, at least theoretically, non-political.
Both the supporters and detractors of the nominee had zealots
within their ranks who would resort to the most sensational phrase to
elicit both monetary and philosophical support for their cause. For example, the Moral Majority issued a fundraising letter from its leader,
Reverend Jerry Falwell, wherein he stated: "I am issuing the most important 'call-to-arms' in the history of the Moral Majority ...

President

Reagan has chosen Judge Robert Bork... a pivotal person in getting the
Supreme Court back on course ... I need your gift of $50.00 or $25.00
immediately. Time is short.''67 At the opposite end of the spectrum
were the efforts of the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation. Its
executive director sent a Western Union priority letter on August 31,
1987, including statements such as: "DETAILED RESEARCH
REVEALS BORK FAR MORE DANGEROUS THAN PREVIOUSLY
BELIEVED ... WE RISK NOTHING SHORT OF WRECKING THE
ENTIRE BILL OF RIGHTS . . . HIS CONFIRMATION WOULD
THREATEN OUR SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT. . . . TIME IS

SHORT.... URGE YOU TO RUSH EMERGENCY CONTRIBUTION
AT ONCE."' 68 It was this peculiar blend of both responsible and irresponsible definition of the issues by both sides which called out for a
more objective standard upon which to review the nominee.
V.

DEFINING ADVICE AND CONSENT

The brief statement in article II of the Constitution, which requires
the Senate's advice and consent to the President's nomination, provides
no guidance on how to fulfill that duty. As noted above, senators differ
on the intent of the framers of the Constitution as to the role which the
Senate should play in fulfilling this duty. As a consequence, the Senate
66. L. BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 33 (2nd ed. 1985).
67. 133 CONG. REC. S14,825 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1987).
68. Business reply letter from ACLU Foundation (Aug. 31, 1987). It was suggested
during Senate floor debate that the ACLU had more to gain from the rejection of the Bork
nomination than other public interest groups. Senator Simpson cited an article in Legal
Times for the proposition that the ACLU stood to gain from an eight member Supreme
Court because it had six cases pending before the court, five of which it had won in the
lower court. Any four to four tie vote on the Supreme Court would affirm the lower court
decision. 133 CONG. REC. S14,847 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1987). One of the six ACLU cases
pending before the court was Abourezk v. Reagan,785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Subsequent to Senator Simpson's comments, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment below
in the Abourezk v. Reagan case by an equally divided court, thus fulfilling the prophecy as to
that case. Reagan v. Abourezk, 108 S.Ct. 252 (1987).
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struggles anew with each Supreme Court nomination regarding how to
adequately provide advice and consent. Inevitably, there is conflict on
what is required. One might think that, after 200 years of Senate business, a more defined and predictable approach would have been developed, especially with respect to advising and consenting on the
nomination of a Supreme Court Justice. But this has not been the case.
The Senate is caught in an institutional dilemma. If the Senate is
too assertive in its review of a Presidential nominee, then criticism will
inevitably follow that it is an unjust interference with the right of the
President to nominate those whom the President believes most appropriate for the position. If, on the other hand, the Senate acts as a mere
"rubber stamp" of the Presidential nominee, then it is criticized for failing to perform its constitutional duty of responsible advice and consent.6 9 The rubber stamp objection was conspicuously absent during
the exhaustive review of the Bork nomination. However, this particular
nomination was not the norm for Supreme Court candidates. Associate
Justice Byron White was confirmed by the Senate twelve days after the
President announced his nomination. 70 Similarly, Associate Justice
John Paul Stevens was confirmed by the Senate nineteen days after the
announcement of the President of his nomination. 7' Generally, the
more controversial nominations have taken longer, including ninetyseven days for the Senate rejection of the Abe Fortas nomination to be
ChiefJustice in 1968 and ninety-five days for final rejection of the Hayn72
sworth nomination.
The balance of this section of the article will set forth criteria of
advice and consent according to various commentators. Senator Mitch
McConnell of Kentucky addressed the Senate on several occasions to
discuss his analysis of the appropriate criteria for advice and consent.
These discussions were rooted in Senator McConnell's involvement as a
legislative assistant to Kentucky Senator Marlow Cook during the Senate
consideration of the nominations of Clement Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell. 73 The McConnell criteria included: (1) judicial competence, (2) sufficient level of achievement or distinction, (3) judicial
temperament, (4) no violation of existing standards of ethical conduct,
and (5) a clean record in the judge's life off the bench. 7" Senator Biden,
on the other hand, reviewed the history of the confirmation process and
concluded that the Senate has preferred to ask three questions regarding Supreme Court nominations. Those questions, according to the
Senator, include: (1) does the nominee have the intellectual capacity,
69.

MACKENZIE,

supra note 65, at 186-87. See also

BER STAMP MACHINE: A

CESS

COMMON CAUSE, THE SENATE RUB-

COMMON CAUSE STUDY OF THE U.S. SENATE'S CONFIRMATION PRO-

IV (1977).

70. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS, No. 87-576 GOV, at
15 (July 7, 1987).
71. Id.

72. Id.
73.

McConnell, Haynsworth and Carswell: A New Senate Standardof Excellence, 59 Ky. L.J.

7 (1970).
74. Id. at 33.
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competence and judicial temperament required for a Supreme Court
Justice; (2) is the nominee of good moral character and free of conflicts
of interest; and (3) would the nominee faithfully uphold the
75
Constitution.
The issue may be approached negatively by examining the primary
reasons for refusal to consent to a nomination. Four primary reasons
may be presented, including: (1) opposition to the nominating President rather than the nominee, (2) lack of qualifications, (3) senatorial
courtesy (when a nominee runs afoul of one particular Senator and the
rest of the Senate chooses to side with or not oppose the senator's posi76
tion), and (4) ideological opposition to the candidate.
During the hearings, many opinions were expressed by senators
and witnesses-both pro and con-about the nominee without any attempt to define an underlying principle or standard of advice and consent. In virtually every instance, the speaker would express views on the
nomination, sometimes in highly complex legal terms, but with no relation to a standard or objective criteria. Consequently, every opinion was
allowed. No witness was cut off because his or her statement was considered outside of the scope of proper inquiry. A notable exception to this
wide ranging, open-ended discussion was the testimony of Professor
Daniel Meador of the University of Virginia Law School. Professor Meador highlighted the problem when he said: "[i]t seems to me important
that there be some kind of reasonably objective standards which can
guide senators in a principled way, and that can apply whatever the
political configurations may be."' 77 The standards set forth by Professor
Meador included: (1) whether the nominee is supported by a "substantial array" of lawyers and legal scholars from across the geographic and
legal spectrum of the United States; (2) whether the nominee's approach
to legal doctrine and constitutional interpretation has substantial support among the legal community; and (3) when the nominee is currently
a judge on a lower court, whether the judge has been a "lone wolf, an
eccentric continual dissenter with very little company among his judicial
colleagues." ' 78 Professor Meador's criteria could be summarized by asking whether the nominee is a "mainstream" jurist in his current judicial
position, among lawyers throughout the country and in his approach to
interpreting the Constitution.
The criteria of the American Bar Association ("ABA") and Judge
Bork himself also deserve consideration. The ABA has played an increasingly important role in controversial nominations for the federal
judiciary. While the ABA has no official capacity and the Senate Judiciary Committee does not have to entertain its opinions, the ABA is rou75. 133 CONG. REC. S10,527 (daily ed. July 23, 1987).
76. 133 CONG. REC. S10,881-82 (daily ed. July 30, 1987) (statement of Senator Orrin
Hatch). For a similar analysis of the controversial nominations, see CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO CONGRESS 101 (3rd ed. 1982).
77. Heanngs, supra note 6, pt. 2 at 996.
78. Hearings, supra note 6, pt. I at 996-97 (Professor Meador believed that the judge
was qualified pursuant to these criteria).
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tinely allowed to testify regarding its review of the nominee's fitness for
the bench. This is due largely to the ABA's pervasiveness and reputation in the legal community at large. According to the report submitted
by the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary regarding the Bork nomination, the committee based its investigation and evaluation of the judge upon his professional competence,
judicial temperament and integrity. 79 The ABA committee did not review the judge's political or ideological philosophy except to the extent
that it might bear on judicial temperament or integrity. Judge Bork expressed his criteria for advice and consent in response to a question
from Senator Grassley of Iowa. Judge Bork reiterated the ABA standards and added that it was appropriate to review a nominee's judicial
philosophy. 80 By including judicial philosophy, Bork did not intend for
each senator to make a decision based upon specific issues which may be
of importance to that particular senator. Rather, the Senate as a whole
should assure itself that the philosophy of the candidate was a "respectable one," worthy of representation on the high court. 8 1 Again, these
criteria could be examined by asking whether the nominee's judicial philosophy is within the mainstream, worthy of representation on the
Court.
If one accepts a definition of criteria for advice and consent as some
combination of the ABA criteria plus a review of judicial philosophywith an eye toward whether the nominee is within the mainstream of
judicial thought-then the next logical step would be the application of
these criteria to Robert Bork. As to the ABA criteria of competence,
temperament and integrity, there was little disagreement among senators and witnesses that Judge Bork was more than adequately qualified.
When the ABA issued its 1981 report on the nomination of Robert Bork
tG sit on the District of Columbia Circuit, it unanimously provided the
Judiciary Committee with its highest approval rating, that of "exceptionally well qualified." '8 2 Again, in 1987, after reviewing Judge Bork for
this nomination, the ABA provided its highest approval rating available
for a Supreme Court nominee,-"well qualified."
Putting aside then the issues of competence, temperament and in79. Letter from Harold L. Tyler, Jr., to Senator Joseph R. Biden,Jr. (Sept. 21, 1987),
reprinted in Hearings, supra note 6, pt. 1, at 954-60.
80. Hearings, supra note 6, pt. I at 235.
81. Id.

82.

Letter from Harold R. Tyler, Jr., supra note 79, at 6. More than a little controversy

arose out the ABA report on the nomination. This was the first time the ABA had a less
than unanimous vote for the "well qualified" evaluation. Ten members of the ABA committee voted for the "well qualified" evaluation. One committee member voted "not opposed" and four committee members voted "not qualified." Hearings, supra note 6, pt. 1,

at 902. This was deemed highly significant by the opponents because no Supreme Court
nominee had ever received a single "not qualified" evaluation from the ABA committee

and then gone on to confirmation by the Senate. Report, supra note 25 at 4. The proponents of the nominee charged the ABA committee with violating its own rules prohibiting

consideration of political or ideological philosophy. These Senators maintained that there
was no justification for the ABA committee's departure from its unanimous 1981 ratings,

especially following Bork's five and one-half years of service on the circuit court of appeals
bench. Report, supra note 25 at 221-22.
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tegrity, the inquiry is narrowed. Was Judge Bork in the mainstream of
judicial philosophy?
As with every other issue involved in this nomination, senators disagreed on whether Judge Bork was truly a "mainstream" jurist. There
was even disagreement on what was meant by this often used phrase.
These differences are clearly reflected in the vastly divergent majority
and minority views printed in the committee report. 83 There were, however, statements by witnesses and others interested in the nomination
which seemed both credible and compelling in their praise of Judge
Bork as a mainstream jurist-albeit on the conservative side of that
stream. Of particular interest to Bork supporters were statements from
former and sitting justices on the Court. In today's judicial climate, current and former justices refrain from speaking on such matters: when
they do speak, it is newsworthy. But, this current reluctance to talk has
not always been the case. Sitting members of the Supreme Court have
played active roles in nominations for many years. In this century, as of
1985, justices have sought to influence Supreme Court nominations on
84
sixty-five separate occasions.
Following the July 1 announcement by the President of his nominee, Justice John Paul Stevens went on public record that he regarded
Judge Bork as "very well qualified" and "one who will be a very welcome
addition to the Court. ' 8 5 Former Chief Justice Burger testified before
the Judiciary Committee in favor of the nomination. In response to the
suggestion that Judge Bork was not in the mainstream of jurists, Chief
Justice Burger said: "[i]t would astonish me to think that he is an extremist any more than I am an extremist." 8 6 ChiefJustice Burger added
that in the last fifty years he had not seen a Supreme Court nominee
whom he thought better qualified than Robert Bork. 8 7 Senator Thurmond further emphasized the point by noting that, while on the court of
appeals bench, Judge Bork had written over 100 majority opinions and
had joined the majority in almost 300 additional cases, bringing his total
of majority opinions, authored or joined, to over 400. None of those
opinions had been reversed by the Supreme Court. 8 8 Of course, only a
small percentage of those decisions were appealed to the Supreme
Court. ChiefJustice Burger further commented that the denial of certiorari in one or two cases meant little but the fact that none of over 400
cases had been overturned by the Supreme Court had "real
significance."

89

In determining whether Bork meets the criteria for a mainstream
83. Report, supra note 25.
84. BAUM, supra note 66, at 35.
85. Address by Justice John Paul Stevens, Eighth Circuit Judicial Conference (July,
1987), reprinted in Legal Times, Aug. 10, 1987, at 15.
86. Hearings, supra note 6, pt. 2, at 701.
87. Hearings, supra note 6, pt. 2,at 707.
88. Hearings, supra note 6,pt. 2, at 700-01.
89. Hearings, supra note 6, pt. 2, at 700. Since the confirmation hearings, Judge Bork
has been reversed in part by the Supreme Court. See Boos v. Barry, 108 S.Ct. 1157 (1988),
revg Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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jurist, it is useful to compare his tenure with that of Justice Scalia who
served simultaneously with Judge Bork on the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. One might confidently assert that Justice Scalia
was within the mainstream on that court since his Supreme Court nomination was confirmed unanimously by the Senate. Bork and Scalia
shared four years of service on the District of Columbia Circuit. They
sat together in eighty-six cases. In eight-four of those eighty-six cases,
or in ninety-eight percent of the time, they agreed on the decision. 90
Yet, Bork was labeled an extremist, while Scalia must have been a mainstream jurist, worthy of unanimous Senate support. This cannot be reconciled. Similarly, Justice Powell was praised, following his retirement,
for being a moderate on the Court who was often a swing vote on key
decisions. 9 ' While on the bench, Justice Powell had ten occasions to
review the opinions ofJudge Bork on appeal. In nine of those ten cases,
Justice Powell agreed with the position taken by Judge Bork.9 2 Consequently, if Justice Powell was a moderate, well within the mainstream of
the Court, and he agreed with Judge Bork's opinions in nine out of ten
instances, it logically follows that Judge Bork, as to those cases, was
within an acceptable range of Supreme Court jurisprudence. It has been
argued that these statistics are essentially meaningless because Judge
Bork was confined, as a lower court judge, to follow Supreme Court
precedents and that many of his cases on the circuit court arose out of
non-ideological cases which are rarely suited to Supreme Court review.
This does not, however, explain the favorable comparison to Justice
Scalia's tenure on the court of appeals.
In addition to the comments of and comparisons to former and current Supreme Court Justices, seven former attorneys general testified
during the hearings. Six of the seven favored the nomination. 93 None
of these impressive witnesses or statistics were adequate, in the final
analysis, to sway a sufficient number of senators in Bork's favor. Possible reasons for this reality are discussed in the next section.
VI.

FOR THE OPPONENTS,

Too

MUCH OF A BAD THING

Judge Bork was well qualified for his nomination based upon the
ABA criteria. Additionally, as shown above, there is some reasonable
basis to conclude that Judge Bork was within the mainstream of judicial
philosophy represented on the Supreme Court-a philosophy that had
been confirmed the previous year by unanimous Senate approval ofJustice Scalia. Apparently, the opponents to the nomination believed that
90.
91.
92.

Report, supra note 25, at 236.
See, e.g., supra note 16.
Hearings, supra note 6, pt. 1, at 31 (opening statement of Senator Simpson).

93. Report, supra note 25, at 101, 109, 112 Nicholas Katzenbach testified against Judge
Bork: Edward Levi, William Rogers, William French Smith, Elliott Richardson, Griffin
Bell, and Herbert Brownell testified in favor of the nomination. Mr. Brownell was Attor-

ney General under president Eisenhower and testified that he had seen no candidate for
the Supreme Court with better or more extensive experience. Hearings, supra note 6, pt. 3,

at 2,347.
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the addition of judge Bork to the nine-member Court would have created an intolerable degree of acceptance for the philosophy of interpretivism. Judge Bork's definition of interpretivism can be summarized by
his statement that this philosophy gives the Constitution "a full and fair
interpretation, but where the Constitution is silent, leaves a policy struggle to the Congress, the President, the legislature and executives of the
fifty states, and to the American people." 94 Judge Bork exemplified this
philosophy while on the court of appeals bench in his concurring opinion in Ollman v. Evans.9 5 He wrote:
Judges given stewardship of a constitutional provision-such as
the first amendment-whose core is known but whose outer
reach and contours are ill-defined, face the never-ending task
of discerning the meaning of the provision from one case to the
In a case like this, it is a task of the judge in this
next ....
generation to discern how the framers' values, defined in the
96
context of the world they knew, apply to the world we know.
Perhaps if Rehnquist had not been elevated to Chief Justice, or if
O'Connor and Scalia had not been added as Associate Justices, the concern of the opponents would not have reached the heights witnessed
during the Bork proceedings. Should the Senate consider the overall
tenor of the Supreme Court, assuming confirmation, when deciding how
to vote on an individual nominee? If the answer is yes, then in this instance, was the majority of the Senate well founded in determining that
too much judicial restraint, or "interpretivism" would be a bad thing? A
review of our constitutional system of separation of powers, Supreme
Court decisions, and alternative judicial philosophies suggests that it
was not. As noted in the minority report of the Judiciary Committee,
both James Madison and Thomas Jefferson expressed concerns about a
non-interpretivist approach to judicial reasoning. 9 7 The minority views
quote Jefferson as stating, "I had rather ask an enlargement of power
from the nation, where it is found necessary, than to assume it by a [judicial] construction which would make our powers boundless." 9 8 The
proper role of the judiciary within the newly formed constitutional system of government in the United States was discussed by Alexander
Hamilton in the revered series, The Federalist. Hamilton's The Federalist
No. 78 was published on May 28, 1788, approximately eight months following adoption of the Constitution and less than one month prior to its
ratification. He wrote:
It can be of no weight to say, that the courts on the pretense of
a repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the constiThe court must detutional intentions of the legislature ....
94. Hearings, supra note 6, pt. I at 77.
95. 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
96. Id. at 995.
97. Report, supra note 25, at 235 (quoting letter from T. Jefferson to Wilson C.
Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803)), Collected in 10 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 10-11 (P. FORD
ed. 1904-05) (as quoted in G. HASKINS & H.JoHNSON, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES 148 (1981) (Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise)).
98. Id.
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clare the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to
exercise will instead ofjudgment, the consequence would equally
be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative
body. 99
Hamilton's statements in The Federalist No. 78 have been repeated
often by prominent jurists. Judge Bork, during the nomination, was
merely the most recent and more visible proponent of that philosophy,
labeled as "interpretivism." Interpretivism may be further defined as a
principle ofjudging which relies on the express statements of the Constitution or those principles or values which can be fairly shown to be
intended to be included within the core of the constitutional provision
under review. 100
It is important to note that interpretivism does not require a timid
approach to judging or protecting constitutionally guaranteed rights.
As Judge Bork stated in the Oilman decision, a judge who fails to detect
threats to established constitutional principles fails in his duty by providing a "crabbed interpretation that robs a provision of its full, fair and
reasonable meaning."''
Judge Bork affirmed his opinion in Olman
during the hearings by noting that if the Constitution mandates social
change then the Court should be active in bringing out that social
change. He cited the case of Brown v. Board of Education as a perfect example of that duty.' 0 2 Thus, interpretivism is not synonymous with judicial restraint and may require judicial activism if mandated by the
Constitution. Judge Bork would label noninterpretivist judicial philoso03
phy as "judicial imperialism." '
Rarely during the Judiciary Committee hearings did the questioning
of Judge Bork clarify this basic conflict between interpretivism and
noninterpretivism. The best explanation of these opposing philosophies came about during an exchange between very conservative Senator Gordon Humphrey of New Hampshire and very liberal former
Congresswoman BarbaraJordan of Texas. Although unable to agree on
anything else, these two did mutually conclude that the issue was
whether the Supreme Court should act, through the extension of rights
and protections, when the legislative and executive branches refused to
do so. Ms. Jordan thought it should-viewing the Supreme Court as
"the last lifeline" when the legislature and the executive branch failed to
provide a sufficient remedy for some perceived injustice. Senator
Humphrey reached the opposite result-that where the Constitution
and the intent of the framers did not provide a remedy for an alleged
harm, then the aggrieved person should appeal to the legislature as the
best way to fashion a remedy through laws, in concurrence with the will
99. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 526 (A. Hamilton) (I. Cooke ed. 1961).
100. Hearings, supra note 6, pt. 1,at 75-77 (statement ofJudge Bork). Accord, Wallace,
Interpreting the Constitution: The Case for Judicial Restraint, 71 JUDICATURE 81, 82 (1987).
101. Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork,J., concurring).
102. Hearings, supra note 6, pt. 1, at 237.
103. Hearings, supra note 6, at 427.
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of the people as expressed through their elected representatives. 10 4
Senator Biden restated the philosophical dichotomy differently. In
opposition to the interpretivist philosophy of Alexander Hamilton,
Judge Bork, and others, Senator Biden stated early and often that the
rights provided to Americans flow not from the Constitution, not from
the Bill of Rights, and not by statute but rather because we "exist."

0 5

Senator Biden expressed this position in his opening statement on the
first day of the hearings. He continued this theme to the end, including
it in his final floor statement moments before the rollcall vote on the
nomination.1 0 6 It is the antithesis of interpretivism. When Biden stated
that he has certain rights just because he exists and that those rights
have "nothing to do with whether the state or the Constitution acknowledges I have those rights,"' 0 7 he was accurate in one sense, because he
was speaking of unalienable rights. Of course, the certain unalienable
rights with which we as Americans believe we are endowed arise not
from the Constitution, but from the Declaration of Independence.
Therefore, Senator Biden apparently derived much of his constitutional
philosophy not from the text of the Constitution, but rather from the
Declaration of Independence.
Of concern to Judge Bork and others who have adopted the interpretivist approach to constitutional construction is that Senator Biden's
philosophy is bounded only by what Senator Biden subjectively believes
his unalienable rights to be, in addition to those enumerated in the Declaration of Independence. The problem with this approach is obvious.
There is no objective standard upon which to judge what unenumerated, unalienable rights we have. That judgment requires the expression of each individual and is perfectly suited to the legislative process
and the ballot box. It is, however, inherently unworkable in a judicial
context. Each party coming before the court would have to surmise in
advance what the particular judge or justice believed were their unalienable rights. Without a written constitution in which to anchor these
rights, then the best litigants could hope for, whether in police court or
before the Supreme Court, would be the judicial equivalent to the benevolent dictator. This is particularly true in Supreme Court cases
where the justices have a life tenure. Except for the most outrageous
conduct, the justices are not subject to impeachment and are, therefore,
empowered with the ability to dictate interpretations of the law from
which there is no judicial appeal. Whether the mandates handed down
by the Court are considered "benevolent" would depend on whether
one put the question to the prevailing or the losing party. There would
surely be no predictability. The same point was made by Alexander
Hamilton almost 200 years ago when he stated: "[c]onsiderate men of
104.
105.

Hearings, supra note 6, pt. 1, at 794-98.
Hearings, supra note 6, pt. I, at 68; see also Hearings, supra note 6, pt. 1, at 729 and

pt. 3, at 1632 for additional statements by Senator Biden which set forth his theory of
rights.
106. 133 CONG. REC. S15,008-09 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1987).
107. Hearings, supra note 6, pt. 1, at 729.
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every description ought to prize whatever will tend to beget or fortify
[integrity and moderation of the judiciary] .. .in the courts; as no man
can be sure that he may not be tomorrow the victim of a spirit of injustice, by which he may be a gainer today."' 10 8
Senator Biden did not rely solely on the Declaration of Independence for the source of his unalienable rights and constitutional theory.
He and others looked to the ninth amendment to the Constitution which
simply states, "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."' 0 9 Judge Bork's explanation of the ninth amendment did not satisfy his opponents. He noted that no Supreme Court had relied upon
the ninth amendment except for the Griswold v. Connecticut I10 concurring
opinion by Justice Goldberg. The ninth amendment, according to Judge
Bork, seemed most plausibly intended to establish that the federal Bill
of Rights would not be construed to deny rights retained by the citizens
in their state constitutions.'I I In his dissent in the Griswold case, Justice
Hugo Black took exception to Justice Goldberg's use of the ninth
amendment as authority to strike down state legislation which violated
the "collective conscience" of the people. Black rejected the position
that the ninth amendment provided open-ended powers to the Supreme
Court to invalidate legislation found to be contrary to the morality of the
Court existing at the time of judgment.' 12
As stated above, the real danger with an expansive, noninterpretivist approach to constitute theory is that "no man can be sure that he
may not be tomorrow the victim of a spirit of injustice, by which he may
be a gainer today."' 13 In more concrete terms, there is no assurance
that a decision by a Supreme Court which has cut its anchor line to the
Constitution will, with any predictability, benefit the republic. As Bork
noted during the hearings, the Dred Scott 114 decision was perhaps the
first time the doctrine of substantive due process had been used by the
Supreme Court. ChiefJustice Taney used the due process clause to produce what is now considered a disastrous decision and, according to
Bork, helped lead to the Civil War.'15 Similarly, substantive due process was used by the Supreme Court to nullify a series of economic and
social legislation. Perhaps the best known decision was Lochner v. New
York 116 where the court invalidated New York laws limiting the number
of hours that a baker could work per week. "17 There are indications that
108. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 99, at 528.
109. U.S. CONST. amend. ix.

110. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 518-19 (1965).
11I. Hearings,supra note 6, pt. 1, at 103.
112. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 518-19.
113. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 99.
114. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
115. Hearings, supra note 6, pt. 1, at 291.

116. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
117. Report, supra note 25, at 230 (citing Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) and
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) as additional cases exemplifying the
use of substantive due process to strike down progressive social legislation).
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the Supreme Court has started to retreat from the generalized right of
privacy set forth in the Griswold and Roe v. Wade 118 cases, thus affirming
a need to base decisions in a neutral reading of the Constitution without
substituting the personal moral values of thejustices.119 In the Bowers v.
Hardwick 120 decision, Justice White wrote for the majority stating:
"It]he Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when
it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable
roots in the language or design of the Constitution."121 This is no more
than an acceptance of the principles laid down in Marbury v. Madison 122
and its holding that, "[t]he government of the United States has been
emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right." 123 Whenever the Supreme
Court departs from the laws, as embodied by the Constitution and the
statutes, and supplants the individual morals of the justices to furnish a
remedy because that justice merely "exists," then the laws no longer
form the basis for the remedy and the judiciary has become a government of men.
VII.

CONCLUSIONS ON THE PROCESS AND QUESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Because there is no established standard by which to judge the Senate's role in providing advice and consent on the Bork nomination, it is
impossible to state definitively whether the Senate properly fulfilled that
role. It may be useful to reflect on what has been added to or detracted
from the process, whether that is good or bad, and what-if any-effect
it might have on future Supreme Court nominations. As previously
noted, Judge Bork agreed that inquiry into judicial philosophy was appropriate. It is important to draw a distinction however, between inquiry into judicial philosophy and inquiry into political philosophy.
Judicial philosophy may or may not reflect the political philosophy of the
times, depending upon the individual judge or judicial nominee under
review. This article has asserted that Judge Bork's judicial philosophy
was well within the parameters of acceptable constitutional theory, worthy of representation on the Supreme Court. This nomination failed,
however, because Judge Bork's judicial philosophy, as defined by his opponents, did not have sufficient popular appeal. In other words, it did not
adequately reflect the political philosophy of the senators who voted
against it. In this instance, political philosophy might be defined asjudicial philosophy with mass appeal.
Is it improper for a senator to vote against a Supreme Court nominee whose judicial philosophy, although within the mainstream of legal
118. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
119. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (ruling that there is no constitutional right of privacy to engage in homosexual conduct).
120. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
121. Id. at 2846.
122. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
123. Id. at 163.
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thought, happens to be, for that senator, on the opposite end of the
philosophical spectrum? Asked differently, should a Supreme Court
nominee be confirmed if he or she is shown to have proper integrity,
judicial temperament, professional competence, and ideological support
in the Constitution, even though his or her ideology is not compatible
with the political ideology of the majority of the senators? There are
compelling policy reasons to answer those questions in the affirmative.
Those reasons include: (1) the strong prospect of retribution when "the
shoe is on the other foot," (when the opponents of the nomination no
longer have the votes to support their ideology and they are faced with
confirmation of a nominee based on a new majority ideology that was
previously in the minority); (2) even though a nominee may seem to
hold a particular political ideology at the time of the vote on confirmation, that nominee is often unpredictable once he or she is confirmed,
with respect to decisions rendered from the bench on specific cases;
(3) a senator's own ideology may change on an issue in the future;
(4) one justice cannot, without the concurrence of four other justices,
form a majority and thus any nominee has a limited capacity to cause
12 4
"harm" based on ideological grounds.
Similar concerns were expressed by witnesses during the hearings
regarding misdirected emphasis on the political acceptability of the
nominee. Former Attorney General Griffin Bell commented on the various public opinion polls which were conducted during the confirmation
hearings. Attorney General Bell noted the increasing proclivity of Congress in recent times to make decisions based upon polls or popular
referenda. He noted the Committee's obligation to the country to use
its best judgment, notwithstanding what the polls might say.' 25 Former
Attorney General Herbert Brownell voiced similar concerns. Requiring
a Supreme Court nominee to conform to the Senate's prevailing political ideology, he believed, would send the clear signal that the Court
should decide constitutional issues not on judicial and legal bases but
rather upon political bases.' 26 It is not likely that a senator would
openly argue that the Supreme Court should reflect the political whims
of a country-even though that may form the basis of a confirmation
vote. Of course, life tenure helps forestall a politicized judiciary. Moreover, the Congress and the Presidency were established specifically to
reflect the political will of the country. The judiciary must check and
balance the sometimes tyrannical power of the majority. That majority
is represented by the political process but has, in certain cases, no right
under our Constitution and statutes to suppress the rights of the
27
minority. 1
124. 133 CONG. REC. S14,817 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1987) (statement of Senator McConnell, citing a 1983 law review article by Richard D. Friedman printed in the Cardozo Law
Review).

125. Hearings, supra note 6, pt. 3, at 1368.
126. Hearings, supra note 6, at 2,345.

127. See, e.g., 133 CONG. REC. S14,718 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1987) (statement of Senator
Armstrong).
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Separating politics from judicial nominations is a difficult task for
senators and presidents. If one is to require of senators that they put
aside political philosophy when reviewing the judicial philosophy of a
Supreme Court nominee, then perhaps the same expectation should be
placed upon the President when he or she selects a nominee. By October 9, 1987, it was clear that the opponents to the nomination had a
sufficient number of votes to defeat it. The Senate adjourned on that
day for the Columbus Day weekend. Fifty-three senators had already
declared opposition to the confirmation and thirty-six had announced
support. 128 On that same day, Judge Bork issued a statement. He questioned the use of national political campaign tactics during the confirmation process because of the impact on the impartiality of the judiciary if
it is required to comply with national political ideals, noting the chilling
effect such compliance would have on judicial deliberations. He also
was concerned about the erosion of public confidence in the impartiality
of the courts and the danger to the independence of the judiciary. 1 29
President Reagan quoted Judge Bork's concerns with absolute approval
during a televised address delivered just five days later. Yet, in that
same address, President Reagan, again condemning the impact of political campaign tactics on his nomination, concluded with a request to the
audience that they let their senators know "that the confirmation process must never again be compromised with high pressure politics.'

30

In effect, President Reagan was asking Americans to put political pressure on their senators with this message: don't bow to political pressure
when voting on the Bork nomination.
In addition to Judge Bork's October ninth comments regarding the
chilling effect on judicial deliberations, it is worth noting that this nomination process may have a chilling effect on those who aspire to be future Supreme Court nominees. Judge Bork was questioned repeatedly
regarding articles which he had written over twenty years ago and which
he had long since rebuked as to their conclusions. He was interrogated
regarding informal speeches and statements made in the normal give
and take of questions and answers. His judicial opinions, solicitor's
briefs, professorial statements and writings were intently scrutinized for
evidence of this or that premise, depending upon the conclusion a senator was trying to draw. Anyone who might desire a federal judiciary
nomination may be dissuaded from expressing judicial philosophies or
academic theories outside of the currently accepted norm. 13 1 In any
event, such individuals would do well to heed the advice of Judge Bork
as expressed in the Olman 132 decision. Statements may be uttered
128. Cohodas and Willen, Angry, Defiant Bork Insists on Senate Debate, 45 CONG. Q

2,435, 2,436 (Oct. 10, 1987).
129. R. Bork, statement delivered at the White House (Oct. 9, 1987), reprinted in N.Y.
Times, Oct. 10, 1987, at 13.
130. Presidential television address to the nation, 23 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1171
(Oct. 19, 1987).
131. The author has considered this during the preparation of this article, wondering
whether some of the opinions herein may one day come back to haunt him.
132. 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
WEEKLY REP.
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about an individual which meet the legal standard for actual malice;
namely, reckless disregard for the truth of the matter asserted. However, if those statements are made in the political arena, they may well
be recognized as merely rhetorical hyperbole and must be endured by
the individual.' 3 3 To quote from the case: "[w]here politics and ideas
about politics contend, there is a first amendment arena. The individual
who deliberately enters that arena must expect that the debate will
sometimes be rough and personal." 134 Such was the experience of
Judge Bork. The fact that a judicial nominee is not a political person, as
was the appellant in the Olman case, will make little difference once the
nomination enters the jurisdiction of the United States Senate. It is a
political body. It should attempt to express non-political opinions regarding the non-political judicial branch but, in fact, it is rarely capable
of doing so.
It is also disturbing that the Senate had effectively rejected the nomination of Robert Bork before it had officially proceeded to consideration of the nomination. The Senate entered executive session to
consider the nomination on October 21, 1987. However, as mentioned
previously, enough senators had declared their opposition to the confirmation by October ninth to assure its defeat, barring a change in a publicly announced position of at least three of the opposing senators. It is
an essential and common occurrence within the Senate for members on
both sides of an issue to take head counts in order to determine what
legislative matters may be passed or rejected prior to an actual vote.
This method of legislative fortune telling was applied to the Bork nomination. As a consequence, the floor debate on the nomination had no
effect other than to allow opponents and proponents to publicly air their
positions. There was no practical opportunity for senators to persuade
or be persuaded, pro or con, by the exchange of ideas on the Senate
floor. By October ninth, two weeks before the final vote, only eleven
senators remained uncommitted. 135 Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania, the only Republican in the Judiciary Committee voting against
the nominee, made the same point. He noted the Senate's self-aggrandizing appellation of the "greatest deliberative body in the world" and
how that title had a rather hollow ring when the deliberations had no
practical effect on the confirmation process. As Senator Specter said,
departure from open floor debate on the nomination raised questions
about the relevance and significance of the debate and the fulfillment of
13 6
the Senate's role in providing advice and consent.
The Senate's handling of the Bork nomination raises some very serious concerns. These concerns are not specific to Judge Bork, himself,
and his brand of judicial philosophy. After all, judges of his ilk have
been confirmed for the federal judiciary previously and will no doubt be
133. Id. at 1005.
134. Id. at 1002.
135. Cohodas and Willen, supra note 128, at 2436.
136. 133 CONG. REC. S14,668 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1987).
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represented by future nominees as well. There should be great concern,
however, when the Senate is incapable of setting aside its political considerations in reviewing the judicial qualifications of a nominee. There
should be concern when that, in turn, results in distortion of the nominee's judicial philosophy in order to make him or her appear to be what
he or she is not, thereby "justifying" the opposition. There should be
concern when the testimony of a nominee is disregarded in order to
conveniently focus upon previous statements-perhaps decades oldwhich the nominee no longer holds. There should be concern that the
Senate has no objective criteria which it can apply to one of its most
important constitutional duties. There should be concern when the majority of the Senate believes that legislative power should be surrendered to the judiciary with the hope that the judiciary will benevolently
exercise those powers. There should be concern when the independence of the judiciary must be compromised in order to satisfy the political whims of the Congress or the President. There should be concern
when professors, lawyers, judges, or individuals who aspire to the judiciary are chilled from exploring every legal theory, even though it may be
considered novel or extreme, because they are concerned about the
political ramifications on their careers. And there should be concern
when the Senate is unable to engage in meaningful debate over the
nomination of the President because the outcome has been prejudged
sufficiently to either confirm or reject the nominee. Many of these concerns fade when the President, the majority of senators, and the nominee are in accord on basic political beliefs; but when that is not the case,
such as during the Bork nomination, then the foibles and imperfections
of the process are exposed. This exposure provides the Senate with the
opportunity to plot a new course, take a new tact. The alternative is to
miss the moment and continue on a course which will inevitably deny
this country of qualified and powerful voices on the Supreme Court
bench.

VESTED PROPERTY RIGHTS IN COLORADO:

THE

LEGISLATURE RUSHES IN WHERE ....
MICHAEL M. SHULTZ*

INTRODUCTION:

FLEXIBILITY AND CERTAINTY

Consider the plight of the developer who constructs a thirty-one
story tower. After relying on a flawed city zoning map, a court orders
the developer to remove twelve stories of the tower because "reasonable
diligence" by the developer would have led to the discovery of the
flawed zoning map.' Consider the developer who obtained all necessary
land use approvals for a high density development. Because proper procedures were not followed regarding the environmental impact assessment for the development, the developer must renew the approval
process. During that time, the local government downzones the property, reducing its value by more than ninety percent. The court informs
the developer that this is the risk of doing business. 2 These examples of
apparent hardship grab national attention and create the perception that
property owners require protection from the arbitrary and capricious
3
actions of local government officials.
There is an inherent tension between the interests of property developers and the public at large, who often think that development has a
negative impact. The trend in land use regulation is to individualize
land use approval processes, so that each proposed development can be
reviewed on its merits. 4 The extent of "dealmaking" between private

developers and land use professionals is ever-increasing. 5 Land use
*
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fully acknowledges the research assistance provided by M. Randall McRoberts and David
B. Young, both third-year law students, and Cynthia M. Harrington, second-year law student, at the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law.
1. See Parkview Assoc. v. City of New York, 1988 WL 11488 (N.Y.C.A.). See also Court
Rules Building Must Lose 12 Stories, Kansas City Times, Feb. 10, 1988, at Al.
2. See William C. Haas & Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117
(9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980).
3. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 655 n.22 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing the practice of local governments to amend the regu-

lations applicable to a development during the approval process).
4. See, e.g., Heyman, Innovative Land Regulation and Comprehensive Planning, 13 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 183 (1972) (examining innovative land use control systems that consider

development projects on an individual basis). Land use controls that incorporate performance standards are the most frequently used systems for individualizing project analy-

Generally, performance-based systems eliminate land uses as of right and permit
development only when the specific project proposal satisfies certain pre-determined critesis.

ria. See generally C. THUROW, W. TONER & D. ERLEY, PERFORMANCE CONTROLS FOR SENSITIVE LANDS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR LOCAL ADMINISTRATORS (Planning Advisory Service
Report Nos. 307-08).
5. See R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, LAND-USE CONTROLS 234-80 (1981) (extensive
analysis of dealmaking between landowners and the government). See also Fulton, On the
Beach with the Progressives, 51 PLAN. 4 (1985) (discussing dealmaking in Santa Monica,
California).
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professionals stress the need to maintain flexibility in regulatory
processes in order to ensure that development produces only a minimum level of hardship for the community. 6 The public often does not
see the need for development regulations until the need is brought to its
attention. By then, a specific project may already have received one or
more land use approvals.
Diametrically opposed to the public interest in regulatory flexibility
is the property developer's interest in certainty. 7 No business activity is
risk-free and businesses require a basic level of certainty before investments are made. The real estate development industry is subject to a
high level of market volatility, which makes the need for certainty in government regulations great.8 Developers point to the complex and uncertain government regulatory environment as the principal reason that
a lender will not commit to an otherwise worthwhile development. 9 The
developer's choices are few; either to fund the startup costs of the project, to pay excessively high interest rates on borrowed money, or to
defer the project altogether. Ultimately, according to the development
industry, it is the consumer who pays the cost of flexibility.' 0
The common law's answer to the conflict between flexibility and
certainty is the "vested rights doctrine." The doctrine states that the
government may not impose new or different regulations on the developer of real property after a developer has reasonably and detrimentally
relied in good faith on government approval.", The elements necessary
or sufficient to vest a right to develop property are the subject of an
ever-growing volume of case law. 12 However, many have been critical of
the judicial approach to vested rights, arguing instead for a statutory
6. See R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, supra note 5, at 213-14 (discussing the quest of
local officials for flexibility). The book mentions that numerous innovative land use controls have been developed to increase the flexibility of control over development; R.
FREILICH & P. LEVI, MODEL SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS: TEXT AND COMMENTARY 12-13 n.64
(1975) (identifying numerous zoning techniques that courts have held constitutional).
The most important innovative zoning scheme that state and local governments have
adopted is the "planned unit development." See also CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-67-101 to 108
(1982).
7. See Hagman, Estoppel and Vesting in the Age of Multi-Land Use Permits, 11 Sw. U.L.
REV. 545 (1979) (examining the problems that developers of real property face because of
multiple permitting systems which exist at several levels of government). See also Sigg,
California'sDevelopment Agreement Statute, 15 Sw. U.L. REV. 695 at 695 (1985) ("[O1n the one
hand, builders wanted assurances that after they invested substantial initial sums in a project, regulators would not change the rules . . .").
8. See Shultz & Kelley, Subdivision Improvement Requirements and Guarantees: A Primer, 28
WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 26-27 (1985) (discussing the risk of failure in a residential development because of consumer conduct).
9. Id. at 24-26 (discussing the role of the lender in the land development process).
As the authors indicate: "[I]n the name of 'sound lending,' the lender can dominate the
development process." Id. at 26.
10. See L. SAGALYN & G. STERNLIEB, ZONING AND HOUSING COSTS (1972); S. SEIDEL,
HOUSING COSTS & GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS (1978). As an example of increased development costs resulting from land use controls, Seidel notes on page 120 that lot development costs in northern Virginia increased 74.1% between 1969 and 1975. In Colorado, a
developer estimated that the cost of a finished lot in one development was $12,000.
Ditmer, lltiter: Pioneer in Open Space Planning, Denver Post, Feb. 19, 1984, at II.
!1. See infra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
12.

See generally C. SIEMON, W. LARSEN & D. PORTER, VESTED RIGHTS: BALANCING PUB-
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solution. 13
On August 27, 1987, the proponents of the statutory solution carried the day in Colorado when Governor Roy Romer signed into law
Senate Bill No. 219.14 After examining the common law's vested rights
doctrine, including its application in Colorado, this article describes the
new scheme of statutory vested rights embodied in S.B. 219, critically
evaluates the issues that the new legislation creates and finally, makes
recommendations regarding the contents of local regulations adopted
pursuant to S.B. 219.
I.

VESTED RIGHTS DOCTRINE

Since the right to develop property to its highest and best use is not
constitutionally protected, vested rights doctrines have evolved to protect a property developer from regulatory changes that interfere with or
restrict his government approved plans.' 5 Three basic analyses are alternately and concurrently relied on by different jurisdictions: (1) an
analysis involving common law equitable estoppel, (2) a due process
analysis, and (3) a "taking" analysis. 1 6 While all three theories overlap
to some degree, the distinctions between the first two theories becomes
7
blurred in practice.'
The doctrine of common law equitable estoppel holds that a party
who makes a representation may not repudiate that representation
which another has relied on to his detriment.' 8 Jurisdictions which subscribe to this doctrine conclude that because a developer has a "vested
right" to develop vis-a-vis the government's regulation, the government
LIC AND PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT EXPECTATIONS (1982) (providing a thorough, if not exhaus-

tive, review of case law).
13. See generally Witt, Vested Rights in Land Uses-A View from the Practitioner'sPerspective,
21 REAL PROP. PROB. TRUSTJ. 317 (1986).

14. Senate Bill No. 219 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-68-101 to 106 (Supp.
1987)) [hereinafter S.B. 219]. It may be an exercise of literary license to suggest that the
Colorado legislature has rushed into the vested rights controversy. The Colorado House
was unable to pass H.B. 1360 in 1985 (House Bill No. 1360, Fifty-fifth General Assembly,
First Regular Session, 1985). The Colorado legislature then passed S.B. 60 in 1987 (Senate Bill No. 60, Fifty-sixth General Assembly, First Regular Session, 1987). Governor
Romer vetoed S.B. 60, and the legislature came back with S.B. 219. Senate Bill No. 219
changed the definition of site specific development plan, decreased the vesting period
from five to three years and specified the measure of compensation if the government
interferes with a vested property right.

15. C. SIEMON, W. LARSEN & D. PORTER, supra note 12, at 9-10; Comment, Developers'
Vested Rights, 23 URB. L. ANN. 487-88 n.4 (1982). See Witt, supra note 13, at 317-19. See
generally F. BOSSELMAN, FEURER & C. SIEMON, THE PERMIT EXPLOSION (Urban Land Institute, 1976).
16. See C. SIEMON, W. LARSEN & D. PORTER, supra note 12, at 13; Cunningham &

Kremer, Vested Rights, Estoppel, and the Land Development Process, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 625, 64876 (1978); Sallet, Regulatory "Takings" andjust Compensation: The Supreme Court's Search for a
Solution Continues, 18 URB. LAw. 635, 635-45 (1986).
17. Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 16, at 648-76; Rhodes, Hauser & De Meo,
Vested Rights: EstablishingPredictability in a Changing Regulatory System, 13 STETSON L. REV. I,
1-4 (1983). See also Kudo, Nukolii." Private Development Rights and the Public Interest, 16 URB.
LAw. 279, 282-87 (1984).
18. Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 16, at 648-52.
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should be estopped from applying subsequently enacted regulations.19
Estoppel focuses upon whether, in light of the circumstances of each
case, it would be fundamentally unfair or unjust for the government to
apply a new set of rules to a particular parcel of property. 20 Generally,
two elements must be established before a developer may claim a vested
right by estoppel: (1) a reasonable and good faith detrimental reliance
upon a representation by the government, and that (2) such reliance
would cause an injustice to the developer if the government applied
21
contrary regulations.
The due process analysis, generally referred to as the "Vested
Right" theory or the "Vesting Rule, ' 2 2 focuses on whether the application of land use regulations to a developer's project bears a reasonable
relationship to the public health, safety and welfare. 23 The crux of this
substantive due process argument is that it may be unreasonable to allow the government to impose new or different conditions on development after previously granting approval for such development. Thus,
the developer has a "vested right" to develop his property in accordance
with the regulations which were in effect at the time of the initial approval. Although distinguished from estoppel theory's emphasis on
"fairness", the due process analysis essentially examines the same factors in determining whether a landowner has a vested right. 24 The doctrines are frequently confused, 2 5 and more often than not, will yield the
same result. 26 However, in those jurisdictions which may be unwilling
to estop the government from applying new regulations to a developer's
property on the grounds of basic unfairness, the question of whether7
2
such an application would constitute a due process violation may arise.
If a court will estop a government from changing development regula19. See id.; Hagman, supra note 7, at 548-51, 572-76.
20. See C. SIEMON, W. LARSEN & D. PORTER, supra note 12, at 13; Witt, supra note 13, at

320.
21. See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 16, at 648; C. SIEMON, W. LARSEN & D.
PORTER, supra note 12, at 13; Witt, supra note 13, at 320.
22. See C. SIEMON, W. LARSEN & D. PORTER, supra note 12, at 8-9; see also Whalers'

Village Club v. California Coastal Comm'n, 173 Cal. App. 3d 240, 251, 220 Cal. Rptr. 2, 8
(1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1111 (1976). In Whaler's Village Club, the homeowners of
Whaler's Village erected a rock revetment in front of 17 homes to prevent further coastal
erosion. However, the Regional Commission would only grant a permit to construct revetment if Whaler's Village would allow a public easement across beach property.
23. See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 16, at 660-76.

24. Godfrey v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Union City, 317 N.C. 51, 344 S.E.2d 272,
278-80 (1986) ("[A] determination of the 'vested rights' issue requires resolution of questions of fact, including reasonableness of reliance, existence of good or bad faith, and
substantiality of expenditures"); Clackamas County v. Holmes, 265 Or. 193, 508 P.2d 190,
192-93 (1973) ("[T]o have acquired a vested right to proceed with the construction, the
commencement of the construction must have been substantial, or substantial costs toward completion of the job must have been incurred").
25. See Comment, supra note 15, at 494 n. 41.

26. County of Kauai v. Pacific Standard Life Ins. Co., 65 Haw. 318, 653 P.2d 766, 777
(1982), appeal dismissed sub nom.; Pacific Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Committee to Save
Nukolii, 460 U.S. 1077 (1983) (court applied estoppel theory to determine if city could

revoke developer's license after it made substantial expenditures).
27. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172 (1985).
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tions, the court may have no occasion to reach the due process claim. 2 8
Additionally, the due process claim may entitle the owner to damages
and attorneys' fees which are unavailable with the estoppel claim.
Jurisdictions which employ a due process analysis often analyze a
developer's project under a non-conforming use theory. 29 Just as the
government may not immediately abolish a non-conforming use except
by the eminent domain power, under the due process analysis a developer with a vested right is entitled to just compensation if the regulation
30
constitutes a taking.
SA third and relatively recent concept applicable to a vested rights
claim is that a developer, who has been unreasonably deprived of the
"beneficial use" of his property by government regulations, is entitled
to just compensation pursuant to the fifth amendment's "taking clause"
for the period that such regulations were applied to his property. 3 ' The
Supreme Court has apparently settled the issue-at least theoreticallyby its decision in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles. 32 The Court held that a property owner is entitled to just compensation when a statute or ordinance effects a taking of property under
the fifth amendment. 33 While this area of the law remains complex and
uncertain, some factors remain constant.
A developer challenging land use regulations enacted pursuant to
the police power as a "taking" has an extremely difficult burden of
proof. First, the developer must show that the regulations deprive him
of all beneficial use of his property.3 4 Mere diminution in value does
not constitute a taking. 35 Second, regulations may even destroy all use
of the property if the regulations are necessary to protect public health,
safety and welfare. 3 6 Third, all administrative and judicial remedies may
have to be exhausted before a court will find that the government has
taken a property without just compensation. 37 Variances, waivers and
other potential state remedies must first be exhausted. These factors
28. Id. at 191-92 n.12.

29. Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 16, at 669-74.
30. See Sallet, supra note 16, at 637-45. See also Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468,
1474-75 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated, 477 U.S. 902 (1986).
31. See Hamilton Bank v. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n, 729 F.2d
402, 408-09 (6th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473

U.S.

172 (1985). See generatty Sallet, supra note 16.

32. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
33. Id. at 2388.
34. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (holding that the ordinance
did not prevent the best use of the land, and therefore, there was no taking).
35. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978) (New
York City's Landmarks Preservation Law did not constitute a "taking" of Penn Central's
property). See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1245
(1987) (state statute required coal companies to leave 50 percent of coal beneath certain
structures. The Court held there was no taking because they failed to show diminution in
value).
36. See also Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) (ordinance that prohibited the owner of a brick factory from operating the factory was constitutional under the
state's police power).
37. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'r v. Hamilton Bank ofJohnson
City, 473 U.S. 172, 186-94 (1986); Sallet, supra 172, note 16, at 648-50.
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discourage a regulatory taking claim. 3 8

A.

The Common Law Rule of Vested Rights

Generally, the common law rule regarding vested rights is that the
reasonable, detrimental reliance, which is made in good faith, "vests" a
property right in the developer if it would be unfair or unjust to deny or
restrict his right to complete development. 3 9 The rule consists of three
elements.
First, the government must make some sort of representation,
through zoning or issuance of a building permit, which formally authorizes a particular use of the owner's property. 40 Informal authorization, 4 ' past regulations that once applied to the land, 4 2 and unilateral
actions taken by the landowner 4 3 do not constitute such
representations.
Second, the reliance upon the governmental representation must
be reasonable and made in good faith. 44 Reliance may be deemed unreasonable if the government act preceded the reliance by too many
years, 4 5 or if the developer was aware that proposed or pending changes
46
in government regulations might alter its development.
Just as knowledge of pending regulations may preclude a finding of
reasonableness, that knowledge also may preclude a finding of good
faith. The developer cannot be found to act in good faith if he has misled the government or induced it to act illegally. 4 7 While factors indicating good faith and reasonableness are similar and are often merged
when a court analyzes them, 4 8 jurisdictions differ, and the two concepts
should be kept distinct.
Finally, the reliance upon the government's act must be to the de38. The development of the reasonable, investment-backed expectations strand of
federal takings jurisprudence does suggest that the theory may prevail in a federal court
which may be more conversant with this area of the law. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
467 U.S. 986 (1984).
39.

C. SiEMON, W. LARSEN & D. PORTER, supra note 12, at 13.

40. Id. See also Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 16, at 641-48.
41.

See C. SIEMON, W. LARSEN & D. PORTER, supra note 12, at 17.

42. See Curtis v. City of Ketchum, 111 Idaho 27, 720 P.2d 210, 214-15 (1986)
(although the City tentatively passed the condominium project, the plaintiffs could not in
good faith rely on this prior approval).
43. Furey v. City of Sacramento, 780 F.2d 1448, 1455 (9th Cir. 1986) (the plaintiff's
improvement to his land became useless when the City designated his land "open space").
44. McCarthy v. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 129 Cal. App. 3d 222,
241, 180 Cal. Rptr. 866, 873 (1982) (plaintiff was issued a permit prior to the adoption of
land use reglations; however, plaintiff's reliance on the permit was not in good faith).
45. P-W Investments, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 655 P.2d 1365, 1372-73 (Colo.
1982) (court held it was unreasonable for plaintiff to rely on City's representation made
approximately six years previously).
46. Boron Oil Co. v. Kimple, 445 Pa. 327, 284 A.2d 744, 746-47 (1971) (it was reasonable to deny plaintiff's building permit when there were regulations pending that
would prohibit the granting of the permit).
47. See City of Coral Gables v. Puiggros, 376 So. 2d 281, 284 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979), appeal after remand, 418 So. 2d 367 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Godfrey v. Zoning Bd.
of Adjustment of Union City, 317 N.C. 51, 57, 344 S.E.2d 272, 278-80 (1986).
48. C. SIEMON, W. LARSEN & D. PORTER, supra note 12, at 13.
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veloper's substantial detriment. 4 9 Substantial detriment may be determined by examining the developer's change in position, and by
considering such factors as the total amount of money expended, the
obligations incurred, 50 and the ratio of costs expended in relation to the
total proposed costs of the project. 5 1 The detriment must be actual,
52
valuable and real-not just imaginary.
B.

Variations on the Vested Rights Doctrines

Vested rights doctrines, which have been largely created by state
law, differ widely among jurisdictions. 53 California follows the general
common law rule that a property owner who has performed substantial
work and incurred substantial liabilities in good faith reliance upon a
government issued permit acquires a vested right to complete construction. 5 4 Under the "final discretionary approval test," a development
right may vest upon the last discretionary approval issued by the government agency. 55 In the frequently cited decision of Youngblood v. Board
of Supervisors of San Diego County,56 the California Supreme Court held
that if a final subdivision plat is in substantial compliance with all the
conditions imposed at the tentative approval stage, the granting of final
approval is only a ministerial act, and the development right essentially
"vests" with the tentative approval. 5 7 The right is only vested as to
subdivision regulations imposed by the local government and not
against regulations imposed by other government agencies. 58 The California legislature aided property owners by establishing that rights
under subdivision regulations may vest with tentative map approval and
that developers may enter into development agreements with the
59
government.
Utah follows an extremely pro-development vesting rule. Develop49. Delaney & Kominers, He Who Rests Less, Vests Best: Acquisition of Vested Rights in Land
Development, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 219, 222-24 (1979); Witt, supra note 13, at 322.
50. See Santa Monica Pines, Ltd. v. Rent Control Bd. of Santa Monica, 35 Cal. 3d 858,
868, 679 P.2d 27, 33, 201 Cal. Rptr. 593, 599 (1984); Industrial Nat'l Mortgage Co. v. City
of Chicago, 95 Ill. App. 3d 666, 669, 420 N.E.2d 581, 585 (1981).
51. See Town of Hempstead v. Lynne, 32 Misc. 2d 312, 316, 222 N.Y.S.2d 526, 531
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961).
52. C. SIEMON, W. LARSEN & D. PORTER, supra note 12, at 33.
53. See Part II of the article discussing the vested rights doctrine in Colorado, supra
note 9.
54. See Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal.
3d 785, 791, 553 P.2d 546, 550, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386, 389-90 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1083 (1977).
55. Aries Dev. Co. v. California Coastal (Zone Conservation) Comm'n, 48 Cal. App.
3d 534, 546, 122 Cal. Rptr. 315, 324 (1975); Pardee Constr. Co. v. City of Camarillo, 37
Cal. 3d 465, 475-76, 690 P.2d 701, 708, 208 Cal. Rptr. 228, 235 (1984) (Mosk,J., dissenting). See generally McCowan-Hawkes & King, Vested Rights to Develop Land. California'sAvco
Decision and Legislative Responses, 6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 770 (1978).
56. 22 Cal. 3d 644, 586 P.2d 556, 150 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1979).
57. Id. at 655-56, 586 P.2d at 562, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
58. See Avco, 17 Cal. 3d at 795, 553 P.2d at 552, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
59. See CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 65865 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987) (development agreements); Id. §§ 66498.1-66498.6 (West Supp. 1988) (vesting on approval of tentative
maps).
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ment rights vest upon proper application for either a subdivision approval or a building permit. The Utah Supreme Court, in Western Land
Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan,60 fashioned a test that requires only: (1) that
a substantially conforming development plan was submitted prior to a
change in the law; (2) that the application of the change is not necessary
to protect public health, safety and welfare, and (3) that the change was
not pending when the developer filed his plan. 6 1 Thus, the right to develop may vest without any substantial investment or initiation of construction by the developer. On the other hand, the prospect that the
government may prohibit development under the guise of public health,
safety and welfare-even if substantial and significant detrimental reli6 2
ance has occurred-may be troublesome.
Maine's view of vested rights is slightly different from Utah. In
Maine, a development right may vest when the government takes the
63
threshold step of acting on an application for subdivision approval.
The Maine Supreme Court formulated this rule based on a state statute
which prevented the application of newly-enacted regulations to plans
pending final approval. However, more than mere submission of the
plan was necessary to cause the plan to be "pending." 6 4 Thus, the court
distinguished between presentment and acceptance of a plan.
C.

Vested Rights and the Subdivision Approval Process

The extent to which a developer acquires a vested right against
changes in subdivision regulations varies considerably, and may be determined by statute, common law, or a combination of both. 65 This section examines the acquisition of vested rights against changes in
subdivision regulations at three stages of the subdivision approval process: preplatting, preliminary plat approval, and final plat approval.
Generally, a developer has no claim to a vested right in subdivision
regulations before he has obtained government approval for the project. 6 6 The mere ownership of land, absent actions intended to establish
use, does not create any vested right to that use. 6 7 Enabling legislation
for subdivision approval usually authorizes a two-step process: first pre60. 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980).

61. Id. at 396.
62. Shultz & Kelley, supra note 8, at 37 n.182. See also Ben Lomond, Inc. v. City of
Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 595, 448 P.2d 209 (1968); Smith v. Winhall Planning Comm'n, 140
Vt. 178, 436 A.2d 760 (1981); Valley View Indus. Park v. City of Redmond, 107 Wash. 2d
621, 733 P.2d 182 (1987) (all adhering to doctrine that a vested right is established upon a
substantially conforming application).
63. Littlefield v. Inhabitants of Lyman, 447 A.2d 1231, 1235 (Me. 1982) (planning
board failed to process plaintiff's request for subdivision approval before the zoning ordinances were amended).
64. Id. at 1235.
65. Shultz & Kelley, supra note 8, at 74.
66. See Curtis v. City of Ketchum, Ill Idaho 27, 720 P.2d 210, 214-15 (1986) (mere
acquisition of land gave developer no right to claim subdivision approval simply because
the city had once approved a similar plan for the site).
67. See Sherman-Colonial Realty Corp. v. Goldsmith, 155 Conn. 175, 230 A.2d 568,
572 (1967) (the filing of maps for proposed subdivision without any expenditures to improve the land does not vest right); Town of Vienna Council v. Kohler, 218 Va. 966, 244
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liminary, and then final plat approval. 68 Yet many local governments
use a three-step process. The first step requires the subdivider to file a
sketch plat which serves as a guideline to acquaint government officials
with the proposed development and allows them to familiarize the developer with pertinent regulations. 69 Where the approval process proceeds in three stages, rather than two, neither statutory regulation 70 nor
case law 7' appears to support the idea of a vested right resulting from
first stage approval. The purpose of the sketch plat is primarily informational, and providing information about existing ordinances does not
amount to a government representation warranting detrimental reliance. 7 2 Similarly, preliminary engineering studies 73 or architectural
plans 74 prepared for a developer's own use generally do not create
75
vested rights because they do not warrant reasonable reliance.
In most jurisdictions, the first stage in subdivision approval is the
submission of a preliminary plat for consideration by the planning commission. 76 The planning commission generally examines the detailed
plat to ensure that street, park, school and other public use declarations
are adequate, to ensure that state and local land use regulations will be
met, and to impose new dedication requirements. 77 Public hearings,
consultations with state and local agencies and the establishment of a
reasonable record are necessary before approval. Often, all the agencies
which have been consulted must give approval before the planning com78
mission or local legislature grants preliminary approval.
S.E.2d 542, 548 (1978) ("mere purchase" of land creates no vested right). See also Delaney
& Kominers, supra note 50, at 224-29.
68. Shultz & Kelley, supra note 8, at 35-38.
69. D. CALLIES & R. FREILICH, CASES & MATERIALS ON LAND USE 334 (1986).
70. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-49 (West Supp. 1986) (developer receives protection
from changes in government regulation only after formal approval process).
71. See City of Ketchum, supra note 66.
72. See Colonial Investment Co. v. City of Leawood, 7 Kan. App. 2d 660, 664, 646
P.2d 1149, 1152-53 (1982) (replies to matter-of-fact inquiries do not constitute an act or
omission on which a developer may rely).
73. See Smith v. Juillerat, 161 Ohio St. 424, 429, 119 N.E.2d 611, 615 (1954).
74. See Gosselin v. City of Nashua, 114 N.H. 447, 449, 321 A.2d 593, 596 (1974)
(plaintiff did not have a vested right to complete his proposed shopping center; therefore,
the new zoning ordinance prohibited the construction of the shopping center).
75. See Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 8 Cal. 3d
785, 797, 553 P.2d 546, 554, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386, 394 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083
(1977) (developers' expenses for their own planning would not serve to establish a vested
right absent government inducement or approval).
76. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55D-5-47 (West Supp. 1986). In some jurisdictions, the
approval process for minor subdivisions-those involving a minimal number of lots, requiring no new streets or extensions of off-tract improvements, and not having the characteristics of a planned development-may be subject to an abbreviated approval process. A
minor subdivision approval may require no public hearing, and the approval process may
move directly from the sketch plat to the final plat stage.
77. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-463.01(C) (Supp. 1987); CAL. GOV'T. CODE
§ 66475.4 (West Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 30-28-133(4) (1986).
78. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, para. 11-12-8 (Smith-Hurd 1962 & Supp. 1987);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 58.17.100, 110 (Supp. 1987). In Underhill v. Board of County
Comm'rs of Boulder County, 39 Colo. App. 185, 186, 562 P.2d 1125, 1126 (1977), county
officials properly denied plat approval on the basis of reports from the state engineer and
the state geological survey. The government may, in fact, grant preliminary approval conditional on the reports of referral agencies.
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Some jurisdictions require consideration of the plat in accordance
with the zoning ordinances and land use regulations in effect at the time
the plat was submitted, whether as a matter of common law, 79 or as a
matter of interpretation of state statutes designed to prevent the retroactive application of substantive legislation. 80 To avoid the expense and
frustration of needless delay, many states will approve a plat if the local
government does not act within a specified time after it is submitted. 8 1
Thus, a developer may obtain approval of its plat at a relatively early
stage, despite dilatory conduct by a government agency. 82 The merits
83
of such "deemed approved" statutes are debatable.
Preliminary plat approval does not create a vested right to final subdivision plat approval or the right to develop and sell lots. Frequently,
state statutes require the developer to submit a final plat for approval
within a specified time after preliminary approval. 84 Some jurisdictions
hold, however, that substantial expenditures made in reliance on preliminary plat approval, such as grading or the installation of utilities, creates
in the developer a vested right to final plat approval and a building
permit. 8 5
Many jurisdictions use the preliminary plat as a benchmark for approving the final plat. 86 Some states provide, by statute, that a local
79. See Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388, 395-96 (Utah
1980) (developer may claim approval as a right if his plat conforms to ordinaices in effect
when it was submitted). On its facts, Western Land pertains to receiving final plat approval
after preliminary approval, but the holding is more sweeping.
80. Littlefield v. Inhabitants of Lyman, 447 A.2d 1231, 1234 (Me. 1982) (construing
state statute); Smith v. Winhall Planning Comm'n, 140 Vt. 178, 179, 436 A.2d 760, 761
(1981) (construing state statute).
81. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 4811 (1983) (plat deemed approved if no decision within
40 days); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, para. 11-12-8 (Smith-Hurd 1962 & Supp. 1987) (90 days);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-48 (preliminary approval deemed granted if no decision within
45 days); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 276(4) (McKinney 1987) (plat is approved if no decision with
45 days); see generally 4 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 25.16 (3d ed. 1986).
82. See Pekar v. Town of Veteran Planning Bd., 58 A.D. 2d 703, 704, 396 N.Y.S.2d
102, 103 (1977) (developer entitled to plat approval when board took no action within 45day statutory period). See also Griffis v. County of Mono, 163 Cal. App. 3d 414, 428, 209
Cal. Rptr. 519, 528 (1985). In Griffis, the developer was entitled to plat approval when he
appealed from planning commission to county legislature, which failed to act within statutory deadline. Since "deemed approved" statutes are for the protection of the developer,
the developer may waive the deadline. But see Carmel Valley View, Ltd. v. Maggini, 91 Cal.
App. 3d 318, 321, 155 Cal. Rptr. 208, 210 (1979) (the subdivider consented to the extension; therefore, it did not violate the statutory 50 day period for approval).
83. For an excellent discussion of the policy considerations involved in granting developers such protection see West Main Assoc. v. City of Bellevue, 106 Wash. 2d 47, 720
P.2d 782, 785-86 (1986); see also Shultz & Kelley, supra note 8, at 93-94.
84. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 24, para. 11-12-8 (Smith-Hurd 1962 & Supp. 1987) (one year);
see NJ. STAT. ANN. § 40.55D-49 (Supp. 1987) (three years).
85. See Florida Companies v. Orange County, 411 So.2d 1008, 1010-11 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1982) (mortgagee acquired vested right by lending money on the basis of preliminary
plat approval); Knutson v. State, 239 Ind. 656, 668-69, 160 N.E.2d 200, 201-02 (1959)
(where the plaintiff laid streets and alley with government approval, the government could
not later reject the plat after the work was completed).
86. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 10508(4) (Purdon Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 58.17.170 (Supp. 1987). Conversely, under such statutes, a final plat may be rejected if
it does not conform to the preliminary plat and the conditions imposed on it. See Andorra
Nurseries, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors of Whitemarsh, 24 Pa. D. & C.3d 260 (1980), aff'd,
71 Pa. Commw. 480, 454 A.2d 698 (1983).
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government may not impose new land use or subdivision requirements
upon the development if the final plat substantially conforms to the approved preliminary plat. Other states offer even more protection by
prohibiting final plat rejection if new regulations were not in effect at the
time of preliminary plat approval. 8 7 At least one case has held that approval of a final plat, which is in substantial conformity with the approved preliminary plat, is a ministerial act. 88 Thus, although the
development right does not technically vest with preliminary plat approval, substantial compliance with the approved preliminary plat may
create a right to have the final plat approved in accordance with regulations in effect when the preliminary plat was approved.
Final plat approval does not necessarily create a vested development right. Although some jurisdictions mandate that a final plat may
not be rejected if it substantially conforms with the preliminary plat, 8 9
and others shield a developer who has obtained final plat approval from
subsequent changes in land use regulations for a limited time, 90 most
jurisdictions require that the developer actually rely to his detriment on
the approval of the plat before he can claim a vested right. 9 1 The construction of a retaining wall, 9 2 public improvements 93 and the conveyance of property or dedication of improvements 94 have all been held to
constitute sufficient reliance on final plat approval to create a vested
right to develop.
Not all jurisdictions, however, recognize that detrimental reliance
on the final plat creates a vested right to develop. In jurisdictions that
recognize a vested right only when the final discretionary permit or approval is issued or granted, reliance on the final plat will not shield a
developer from new land use controls. 95
D.

Limitations on the Effect of a Claim of Vested Rights
The concept of vested rights is qualified by two basic limitations.
87. N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-49.
88. Youngblood v. Board of Supervisors of San Diego County, 22 Cal. 3d 644, 586

P.2d 556, 150 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1978).

89. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.

90. See PA.

STAT. ANN.

tit. 3, § 10508(4) (Purdon Supp. 1986);

WASH.

REV.

CODE ANN.

§ 58.17.170 (Supp. 1987).
91.

See Preseault v. Wheel, 132 Vt. 247, 315 A.2d 244 (1974) (merely because regula-

tions change, reissuance of a building permit cannot be denied when the plaintiff complied
with conditional plat); Town of Lima v. Harper, 55 A.D.2d 405, 390 N.Y.S. 2d 752 (1977)
(as long as permits were acted upon before the new ordinance, the plaintiffs could have a
nonconforming use permit), aff d sub noma., Harper v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 43 N.Y.2d
980, 404 N.Y.S.2d 597, 375 N.E.2d 777 (1978).

•92. ,Preseault, 132 Vt. at 247, 315 A.2d at 244 (1974).
93. Harper, 55 A.D.2d 405, 390 N.Y.S.2d 752.

94. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Crane, 277 Md. 198, 352 A.2d 786 (1976);
Waid v. City of New Rochelle, 20 Misc. 2d 122, 197 N.Y.S.2d 64 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959),
aff'd., 9 A.D.2d 911, 197 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1959), affd., 8 N.Y.2d 895, 204 N.Y.S.2d 144, 168
N.E.2d 821 (1960).
95. See Santa Monica Pines, Ltd. v. Rent Control Bd. of Santa Monica, 35 Cal. 3d 858,
679 P.2d 27, 32-33, 201 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1984) (approval of a tentative subdivision map did
not confer upon the developer a vested right).
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First, the state's police power to protect the public health, safety and
welfare may override any vested right that a developer may claim. Second, obtaining a vested right against one level of government or agency
does not necessarily confer a vested right against other levels.
Many statutes 9 6 and court decisions 97 guard against granting any
protection to a development that would constitute a public or private
nuisance. 98 To claim that an approved development creates a nuisance
or hazard, the courts must carefully examine the facts underlying the
alleged nuisance, balancing both public and private interests. 99 Thus,
while one court permitted interference with an approved development
which would cause downstream flooding,' 0 0 another upheld an approved development against new regulations despite the assertion that
the septic tanks would pollute the area water supply.' 0 '
Another major limitation on vested rights claims is that the representations of one agency do not necessarily bind another. Developers
claiming reliance on local government approval may not always be protected against state agencies representing substantially different concerns. 10 2 Yet some courts have recognized that actions of an inferior
local authority may bind a state agency if the two are acting in privityrepresenting the same concerns and standing in a quasi-principal/agent
relationship.' 0 3 Still, even within the same level of government, reliance
on the normal subdivision approval process may not create a vested
right against newly-established agencies with newly-expanded
04
powers. 1
E. Large-Scale, Phased Development
Vested rights issues become more complex in large-scale, phased
development projects. Although preliminary approval for all phases of a
96. See, e.g., CAL. GoV'T. CODE § 66498.1(c) (West Supp. 1987) (tentative vesting map
will not confer any rights on any development which would endanger public health or
safety).
97. See, e.g., Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388, 396 (Utah
1980). In Western Land Equities, the court considered the city's argument that fire protection would be undermined if the permit was granted. The court ultimately rejected the

argument.
98.
99.

C. SIEMON, W. LARSEN & D. PORTER, supra note 12, at 38-40.
Id. See also Weldin Farms, Inc. v. Glassman, 414 A.2d 500, 502-03 (Del. 1980)

(court upheld the injunction below and rejected riparian rights argument. The court
adopted a reasonable user test that balances the interests of upstream and downstream
owners).
100. Glassman v. Weldin Farms, Inc., 359 A.2d 669, 671-72 (Del. Ch. 1976), modified,
414 A.2d 500 (Del. 1980).
101. Kasparek v. Johnson County Bd. of Health, 288 N.W.2d 511, 516-17 (Iowa 1980)
(the developer's vested interest outweighed Board of Health's concern that septic tanks
wold pollute the water).
102. South Cent. Coast Regional Comm'n v. Charles A. Pratt Constr. Co., 128 Cal.
App. 3d 830, 839, 180 Cal. Rptr. 555, 564 (1982).
103. R. CUNNINGHAM & D. KREMER, supra note 16, at 657-59; see also Department of

Public Works v. Volz, 25 Cal. App. 3d 480, 102 Cal. Rptr. 107, 112-13 (1972) (state highway department bound by actions of county highway department).
104. See Santa Monica Pines, Ltd. v. Rent Control Bd. of Santa Monica, 35 Cal. 3d 858,
679 P.2d 27, 201 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1984).
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development may come with the preliminary plat approval, final approval generally occurs one phase at a time. The developer does not
have to provide the infrastructure for the entire development, but only
for those portions which the government grants final approval. Since
preliminary plat approval may not confer a vested right, and the loss of a
right to develop any particular tract as planned may impair the value of
the entire project, the developer may incur substantial expenses and
complete several tracts only to face the possibility that the project may
10 5
turn out to be unprofitable.
In response to this predicament, many jurisdictions support the
proposition that if a developer, acting in reliance on a government approval, dedicates land or improvements pertaining to the entire project,
the developer then has a vested right to complete the entire project,
conforming only to the regulations in effect when the government approved the first phase of the project. 10 6 Conversely, if a jurisdiction
holds that only the final discretionary permit or approval creates a
vested right to build, then no dedication of land will give a developer
any vested right to complete a sequential development unless it com07
plies with the new regulations. 1
F. Statutory Solutions to Vested Rights Problems
Although the courts are largely responsible for the creation of
vested rights doctrines, several state statutes-in order to provide a date
certain for the vesting of rights-grant a subdivider exemption from
new land use regulations if his plans have reached final plat approval.l 0 8
These statutes are designed to circumvent the uncertainties and complexities of the estoppel and due process analyses of vested rights. 10 9
Vesting statutes vary in the length of time for which they give protection, in the extent of the protection they provide, and in the nature of
the rights they vest. But they may provide little protection if the development is later found to pose a threat to the public health, safety, or
welfare.' 10

The best example of statutory vesting comes from Washington
state. In Washington, it is possible for a developer to acquire a vested
105. See Rockshire Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Mayor and Council of Berkshire, 32 Md. App. 22,
31, 358 A.2d 570, 579 (1976); Delaney, Current Issues in Land Use-Vested Rights, ALI-ABA
COURSE

OF STUDY,

COMPENSATION

LAND

USE

INSTITUTE:

PLANNING,

REGULATION

EMINENT DOMAIN AND

739, 748-49, 759-62 (1985).

106. See Preseault v. Wheel, 132 Vt. 247, 315 A.2d 244 (1974); Town of Lima v.
Harper, 55 A.D.2d 405, 390 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1977), aff'd sub noma., Harper v. Zoning Bd. of
Appeals, 43 N.Y.2d 980, 404 N.Y.S.2d 597, 375 N.E.2d 777 (1978). See also Delaney &
Kominers, supra note 50, at 241-47.
107. See Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Reg. Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d
785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), appeal dismissed &cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083

(1977).
108. See e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 40A, § 6 (West Supp. 1988); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
53, § 10508(4) (Purdon Supp. 1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 58.17.170 (Supp. 1987).
109. D. CALI.IES & R. FREILICH, supra note 69, at 197.
110. CAL. GOVT. CODE § 66498.1(c) (West Supp. 1988).
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right to develop under state statutory law.' l ' Section 58.17.170 of the
Washington Revised Code provides that final plat approval must be
granted if the plat satisfies the rules and regulations applicable at the
time of preliminary approval. 1 2 A developer has three years following
preliminary plat approval to obtain final approval."1 3 Further, local governments may modify regulations affecting subdivisions within five years
from final approval upon a finding that the public health, safety and welfare necessitate application of the modifications. 1 4 Thus, a developer
in Washington has statutorily vested rights against changes in rules and
regulations for a period of up to eight years following preliminary approval, regardless of the existence of detrimental reliance." 15
Local governments are now entering into contractual agreements
with developers at the time land use or subdivision approvals are
granted."l 6 Development agreements purport to limit or modify land
use regulations affecting a developer's property in exchange for the developer's concessions to government,." 7 In this way, both the developer and the local government can spell out the exact terms and
conditions of development for each party, including the vesting of
rights.' 18
Prior to S.B. 219, four states authorized local governments to enter
into development agreements. 1 9 Development agreements raise the issue of whether the government may contract away its inherent right to
exercise the police power. 120 One commentator has noted that, if limited to a reasonable period of time, courts will likely uphold development agreements. 12'
II.

A.

THE VESTED RIGHTS DOCTRINE IN COLORADO

A Colorado View of Property Rights

Before specifically examining the common law vested rights doctrine in Colorado, it may be helpful to examine how Colorado courts
111.

See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 58.17.150, .170 (Supp. 1987).

112. Id. at § 58.17.170.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115.
116.

Id. at § 58.17.150(1), (3).
See Kessler, The Development Agreement and Its Use in Resolving Large Scale, Multi-Party
Development Problems, 1 FLA. ST. U.J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 451 (1985).

117. D. Callies, Statutory Development Agreements: Analysis, Checklist, and Model
Agreement 4-10 (1987) (unpublished manuscript).
118. C. SIEMON & W. LARSEN, supra note 12, at 84.
119. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65864 to 65867.5 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 46-121 to -132 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 278.0201 to .0207 (1985); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 163.3220 to .3243 (West Supp. 1987).
120. Kaiser Dev. Co. v. City and County of Honolulu, 649 F. Supp. 926,949 (D. Hawaii
1986) (it is simply not within the City's power to contract away essential police powers,
such as the ability to make future zoning decisions); compare Geralnes B.V. v. City of
Greenwood Village, Colo., 583 F. Supp. 830, 841 (D. Colo. 1984) (local government
agreement not to rezone certain property for period of 25 years was not ultra vires, but
valid exercise of police power). See generally, Kramer, Development Agreements: To What extent
are They Enforceable?, 10 REAL ESTATE L.J. 29 (1981).
121. D. Callies, supra note 117, at 4.
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have viewed property rights. Their view has been shaped by the Colorado constitution, which provides that "[a]ll persons have certain natural, essential and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned the
122
right of ... acquiring, possessing and protecting property .
1. The Constitutional Theory of Property Rights
Despite the acknowledgement of certain "natural, essential and inalienable rights," the Colorado Supreme Court has long held that zoning
regulations are constitutional. In Colby v. Board of Adjustment, 123 the
court held that a zoning ordinance adopted by the City and County of
Denver was constitutional. 124 The court responded to a vested rights
claim of a party who had acquired property for a brickyard prior to
adoption of the zoning ordinance. The court reasoned that "a vested
interest on the ground of conditions once obtained cannot be asserted
against the proper exercise of the police power-to so hold would preclude development."' 1 25 The court explained further that "[t]he exercise of the police power extends to so dealing with conditions when they
arise as to promote the general welfare of the people."'1 26 More recent
Colorado cases have concluded that "[t]he exercise of the police power,
be it in the enactment of land use controls, or as here, in decisions enforcing those regulations, must bear a rational relationship to the health,
12 7
safety, and welfare of the community."'
A second constitutional provision that Colorado has considered relevant to the vested rights issue is the prohibition on the general assembly's adoption of any law "retrospective in its operation."' 2 8 The
122. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 3. Other specific protections afforded property rights include a prohibition on the taking or damaging of private property "for public or private
use, without just compensation," id. at art. II, § 15, and the prohibition against depriving a

person of property "without due process of law," id. at art. II, § 25. Regarding the due
process clause, the Colorado Supreme Court has stated: "Any legislative action which

takes away any of the essential attributes of property, or imposes unreasonable restrictions
thereon, violates the due process clauses of the Constitutions of the United States and
Colorado." City and County of Denver v. Denver Buick, Inc., 141 Colo. 121, 128, 347
P.2d 919, 924 (1960). The Denver Buick court took an expansive view of property rights:
"At the common law the owner of property has a vested right to make the fullest legitimate
use of such property." Id. Compare C.F. Lytle Co. v. Clark, 491 F.2d 834, 838 (10th Cir.
1974) ("due process and just compensation clauses of the state and federal constitutions
do not require that zoning ordinances permit a landowner to make the most profitable use
of his property").
The Denver Buick opinion should be given little precedential value. The Colorado

Supreme Court has overruled two different rulings in the case. See Service Oil Co. v.
Rhodus, 179 Colo. 335, 500 P.2d 807 (1972) (overruling Denver Buick regarding right of
government to terminate nonconforming uses); Stroud v. City of Aspen, 188 Colo. I, 532
P.2d 720 (1975) (overruling Denver Buick regarding right of government to require offstreet parking as condition of land use approval).

123. 81 Colo. 344, 255 P. 443 (1927).
124. Id. at 353, 255 P. at 445.
125. Id. at 353, 255 P. at 446.

126. Id. (citing Waltshor v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 289, 150 N.E. 120, 43 A.L.R. 651 (1926).
127. Tri-State Generation and Transmission Ass'n, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs,

42 Colo. App. 479, 481, 600 P.2d 103, 104 (1979); see also Ford Leasing Dev. Co. v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 186 Colo. 418, 528 P.2d 237 (1974).
128. COLO. CONST. art. 11,§ 1I.Although the prohibition addresses only the general
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Colorado Supreme Court, in reliance upon this provision, held unconstitutional an attempt by the City and County of Denver to retroactively
apply a zoning regulation. 129 The court explained that the prohibition
on retrospective laws was broadly defined (retrospectivity) as an act "...
which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or
disabilcreates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new 130
ity, in respect to transactions or consideration already passed.'
Within the framework of state constitutional protections for property rights and prohibitions on retrospective legislation, the Colorado
courts have established a vested rights doctrine that is independent of
any constitutional right. The courts clearly have made equitable estoppel, or estoppel in pais, the basis for a vested property right. An early
recognition of the applicability of equitable estoppel to government
land use regulations came in Pratt v. City and County of Denver. 13 1 In Pratt,
the building inspector issued a building permit for a parking garage.
One week later, the inspector revoked the building permit theorizing
that the garage was a public parking garage for which the city council
had to grant approval. The owner sued for injunctive relief to prevent
interference with the construction of the garage. The trial court held in
favor of the city and the owner appealed. The Colorado Supreme Court
held that the parking garage was not a public garage as the term was
defined under local law. 132 The court further held that the building permit was not revocable because there was "evidence that plaintiff, acting
in reliance on the permit, incurred considerable expenditures for work,
labor and material necessary for the construction of the building, prior
to the time of the attempted revocation of the permit."' 13 3 Thus, the
court determined that the city was "estopped to claim that the permit
[was] revoked . . .applying a well-settled principle."'

134

Interestingly,

assembly, the supreme court has held the prohibition applicable to local governments. See,

e.g., City and County of Denver v. Denver Buick, Inc., 141 Colo. 121, 347 P.2d 919 (1960).
129. Denver Buick, 141 Colo. at 140, 347 P.2d at 930.
130. Spiker v. City of Lakewood, 198 Colo. 528, 532-33, 603 P.2d 130, 133 (1979)
(emphasis in original) (quoting Moore v. Live Stock Co., 90 Colo. 548, 10 P.2d 950
(1932)). What constitutes a law with retrospective operation may be a matter of form over
substance. For example, if the local government adopts new requirements as conditions
precedent to the issuance of a building permit, it may not be able to impose the restrictions against owners who already have acquired permits. The government may adopt a
new permit system that requires a property owner to meet the same requirements that
were added to those necessary to obtain a building permit and obligate the owner to acquire the permit before the owner lawfully may use his or her property. Compare Colby v.
Board of Adjustment, 81 Colo. 344, 553, 255 P. 443, 446 (1927). Although the property

owner may claim a vested right to use his or her property free from the new regulations,
the owner could not, technically, argue that the new regulations were retrospective in operation. Indeed, in Colorado, the government may require a person who has obtained a
building permit under one set of regulations to obtain a new permit under amended regulations if there has been no detrimental reliance on the permit. See, e.g., Witkin Homes,
Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 31 Colo. App. 410, 414, 504 P.2d 1121, 1123 (1972).
131. 72 Colo. 51, 209 P. 508 (1922).
132. Id. at 51, 209 P. at 508.
133. Id. at 54, 209 P. at 509.
134. Id. The court then made a reference to licenses to construct irrigation ditches that
become irrevocable after reliance on the license. The court stated that an irrevocable license was tantamount to an easement. Id. Although a license granted by one private per-
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the court noted that the local ordinance had set forth conditions for revthat the government had not shown any
ocation of a building permit and
35
of those conditions to exist.'
2.

The Estoppel Theory of Property Rights

The equitable estoppel doctrine has two key elements: (1) a representation and (2) reliance upon that representation.' 3 6 Cases subsequent to Pratt have contributed to these basic elements. 13 7 The
Colorado Court of Appeals has stated that a factual predicate for the
invocation of equitable estoppel is "a communication or action by the
city by which the property owner is 'unmistakably misled.' "138 When
the government issues a permit, the court will examine the face of the
permit to determine the scope of the representation made to the property owner. 139 When a property owner is unaware of local laws, he cannot claim reliance on any representation.' 40 In addition to permits
issued by the government, the statements of local officials may give rise
to an estoppel. 14 1 In Underhill v. Board of County Commissioners,14 2 the
Colorado Court of Appeals explained that statements made by a county
commissioner could give rise to estoppel only if the owner detrimentally
son to another may be analogous to a government issued permit, the two situations may
have as many differences as similarities.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., City of Sheridan v. Keen, 524 P.2d 1390, 1393 (Colo. App. 1974) (not
selected for official publication).
137. See infra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
138. LaFollette v. Board of Adjustment of Lakewood, 741 P.2d 1262, 1263 (Colo. App.
1987). In LaFollette, the lessee of certain property annexed by Lakewood obtained a building permit for a storage barn in a CN-Conservation zoning district. The lessee subsequently stored construction equipment in the barn. After complaints by neighbors, the city
advised the lessee that he was in violation of zoning regulations. The lessee invoked estoppel against the government's contention that his use violated local zoning regulations.
The court focused on the scope of the permit issued to the lessee and held that the permit
was only to construct a storage barn, which presumably, would have been used for the
storage of agricultural equipment as allowed in a CN district. Thus, the court determined
that the government had not represented that the use of a storage barn for storing construction equipment was permissible under local law. Id. at 1263-64.
The LaFollette court's emphasis on a government representation or action may be an
overstatement. If one relies on existing zoning regulations, a vested right may accrue absent any representation by the government. The theory supporting the vested right may
not, however, be equitable estoppel. Compare City of Cherry Hills Village v. Trans-Robles
Corp., 181 Colo. 356, 509 P.2d 797 (1973).
139. See P-W Investments, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 655 P.2d 1365, 1371 (Colo.
1982) (city made no representation about future availability of water and sewer services
when it issued water and sewer tap permits); Crawford v. McLaughlin, 172 Colo. 366, 372,
473 P.2d 725, 730 (1970) (building permit authorized construction of apartment building
and not only a foundation for apartment building); LaFollette supra note 138 at 1263-64
(building permit authorizing construction of storage barn did not authorize the storing of
construction equipment in that barn).
140. See Webster Properties v. Board of County Comm'rs, 682 P.2d 506, 508 (Colo.
App. 1984) (owner could not claim reliance on local law when it became aware of zoning
resolution only after it platted land).
141. But see Witkin Homes, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 31 Colo. App. 410, 414,
504 P.2d 1121, 1123 (1972) (plaintiff may not have been able to demonstrate reliance
because no building permit had been issued)..
142. 39 Colo. App. 185, 562 P.2d 1125 (1977).
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relied on the statement.1 4 3 In other cases, the effort to invoke equitable
estoppel failed when the court could not find either a sufficient representation to bind the government or the consequent reliance on the
representation. "44
In addition to a representation by the government, equitable estoppel requires reliance or a change in position as a result of the representation.1 4 5 The reliance must be more than conduct preparatory to
actual development. 14 6 The Colorado Court of Appeals explained the
rationale for this rule in Ti-State Generation and Transmission Association,
Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners.1 47 The court stated that "[L]ogically
extended (the rule) would mean that developers, by spending money on
planning, could thereby prevent application of future land use controls
to their land."14 8 On the other hand, when the owner has incurred substantial out of pocket expenses for actual construction, the right to complete construction will vest, even under an erroneously issued building
49
permit. '
143. Id. at 188, 562 P.2d at 1127.
144. See Colby v. Board of Adjustments, 81 Colo. 344, 255 P. 443 (1927) (statement by
government official that new zoning ordinance would not apply to owner's property did
not estop the government from so applying the new ordinance); City of Sheridan v. Keen,
524 P.2d 1390 (Colo. App. 1974) (not selected for official publication) (statements made
to owner about use of property and right of owner to seek variance did not estop government from prohibiting use).
145. See generally Underhill, 39 Colo. App. 185, 562 P.2d 1125.
146. See Cline v. City of Boulder, 168 Colo. 112, 119, 450 P.2d 335, 339 (1969) (property owner who acquired building permit was in no more than "dream stage" concerning
construction of gas station); Colby v. Board of Adjustment, 81 Colo. 344, 348, 255 P. 443,
445 (1927) (purchase of land and expenditure of $5,000 did not vest right to build brickyard); Tri-State Generation and Transp. Ass'n, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 42 Colo.
App. 479, 600 P.2d 103, 105 (1979) (power company's preparatory work in acquiring easements and spending money on plans did not vest right to construct transmission lines); but
see Crawford v. McLaughlin, 172 Colo. 366, 377, 473 P.2d 725, 731 (1970) (work done
before issuance of building permit "should not be totally ignored" when determining level
of reliance).
147. 42 Colo. App. 479, 600 P.2d 103 (1979).
148. Id. at 481, 600 P.2d 105 (1979).
149. See City and County of Denver v. Stackhouse, 135 Colo. 289, 310 P.2d 296 (1957).
In Stackhouse, the owner received a building permit to construct an apartment building on
the mistaken assumption that his property was in a "C" zoning district, which required a
minimum lot size of 4,000 square feet to construct a four-plex. Later, the city determined
that the property actually was in a "B" zoning district and ordered the owner to stop work
because the minimum lot size for a four-plex was 12,000 square feet. In fact, the building
permit stated that it was for a parcel in a "B" district, but the owner alleged that he never
looked at the permit after it was issued. The court held that the owner's substantial reliance valued to be $18,000, and estopped the government from denying the validity of the
permit. Id. at 293, 310 P.2d at 298. See also Crawford v. McLaughlin, 172 Colo. 366, 376,
473 P.2d 725, 731 (1970). In Crawford, the court found that the government was estopped
for imposing new height restrictions on an apartment complex after issuance of a building
permit and reliance by the property owner. The owner had razed an existing structure on
the site, made further financial commitments and had obtained additional architectural
drawings. Id. The Crawford case reveals a rather simplistic view of the equitable estoppel
doctrine which is invoked to prevent manifest injustice. See Stackhouse, 135 Colo. at 293-94,
310 P.2d at 297. The Crawford court determined that imposing new height restrictions on
the developer of the apartment complex would create injustice because the building would
only be seven stories under the new regulations rather than fourteen. The court could
have determined whether the developer would have made the same investment if the original regulations had allowed only a seven story building. Similarly, the court might have
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At least one Colorado court has determined that the cost of obtaining additional approvals may vest a right under earlier approvals obtained from another level of government. 150 This holding is consistent
with the general doctrine that detrimental reliance on a permit may estop the government from changing development regulations, but it may
not be consistent with the rule that mere preparatory work will not vest a
right. 151 Of course, what is merely "preparatory" is a matter of perception, which may be affected by the fact that the government has approved a land use application.
Although case law in Colorado is sparse, there are indications that
reliance on a permit must be reasonable and made in good faith. In P-W
Investments, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 152 the court concluded that the developer's alleged reliance on a development agreement (or on water and
sewer tap permits) could not be reasonable because the government
never represented that water and sewer service would be available indefinitely. 1 53 Similarly, in Cline v. City of Boulder, 154 the court noted that it
could "infer from the evidence that the Clines obtained a [building] permit merely as a tactic."' 15 5 Finally, the Colorado Supreme Court has
held that an owner's reliance on a government official's apparent au56
thority is reasonable.1
Once it is determined that a property owner may acquire a vested
right under an equitable estoppel theory, the next issue concerns the
scope of that right. Despite any express holding by the Colorado
Supreme Court, the court of appeals has regularly suggested that equitable estoppel will not be invoked as freely against the government as
against private persons. 15 7 Certainly, nothing in the supreme court's
seminal decision in Prattv. City and County of Denver 158 suggests this limitation. When estoppel is available to a property owner, the doctrine will
apply even if development may threaten public health and safety and
there is no evidence that the government received new information foldetermined whether the new regulations would permit the developer a reasonable return
on its investment. See C.F. Lytle Co. v. Clark, 491 F.2d 834, 838 (10th Cir. 1974) (owner
has no right to most profitable use of its property).
150. Saur v. County Comm'rs of Larimer County, 525 P.2d 1175 (Colo. App. 1974)
(not selected for official publication). In Saur, the owner obtained a permit to operate a
quarry in an agricultural district. The owner then spent a substantial sum inseeking additional permits from the Department of Natural Resources and the State Air Pollution
Commission. The court held that this reliance estopped the government from changing
the owner's use to one permitted only by special review. Id. at 1176.
151. See supra note 147.
152. 655 P.2d 1365 (Colo. 1982).
153. Id. at 1371.
154. 168 Colo. 112, 450 P.2d 335 (1969).
155. Id. at 119, 450 P.2d at 339.
156. Franks v. City of Aurora, 147 Colo.25, 27, 362 P.2d 561, 563 (1961). Franks is not
a vested rights case, but deals with equitable estoppel and holds that an owner that altered
construction plans for a drainage culvert under instructions of a city engineer could not be
sued by the city when the inadequately sized culvert subsequently caused flooding
damage.
157. See, e.g., Fueston v. City of Colorado Springs, 713 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Colo. App.
1985), cert. denied (1986).
158. 72 Colo. 51, 209 P. 508 (1922).
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lowing its approval. 159 In fact, Colorado courts do not appear to weigh
hardships when determining whether an owner may invoke equitable estoppel against the government. 160
A property owner who acquires a vested right within one government jurisdiction may exercise that right even if another government
annexes the property. The Colorado Supreme Court made this apparent in Cline v. City of Boulder,' 6 1 although it ultimately determined that
the owners had not relied to their detriment on a building permit issued
62
by Boulder County. 1

Another Colorado court has suggested that estoppel may not be invoked against the government "where such estoppel would require violation of the law." 16 3 This limitation on the equitable estoppel doctrine
should not be read too broadly. In City and County of Denver v.
Stackhouse, t 64 the supreme court held that the government was estopped
from denying the validity of a permit that it had issued.' 6 5 Thus, the
court actually countenanced an illegal act - perhaps two: (1) illegal to
issue the permit and (2) illegal to use the property in the manner approved for. Similarly, in Underhill v. Board of County Comm'rs, Boulder
County 166, the court of appeals suggested that since approval was ministerial, the board might have had to approve a subdivision plat if the de67
veloper had relied on a misstatement of law made by a commissioner. 1
An issue that may arise occasionally is whether protectable vested
property rights exist for neighbors of property under a land use application. In Spiker v. City of Lakewood, 16 8 the supreme court declared that
159. See Williams v. Smith, 76 Colo. 151, 230 P. 395 (1924). In Smith, the government
could revoke a building permit based on a danger to public health and safety if there was
"additional information to that body showing some danger to health and safety, of which
its members were not informed at the time of the resolution [authorizing construction of a
filling station and directing issuance of a building permit]." Since the trial court did not
allow in evidence of reliance, the supreme court was unable to determine whether a development right had vested. Id. at 153, 230 P. at 397.
160. See, e.g., Crawford v. McLaughlin, 172 Colo. 366, 473 P.2d 725 (1970).
161. 168 Colo. 112, 450 P.2d 335 (1969) (involving property involuntarily annexed).
162. Cline, 450 P.2d at 339. See also City of Cherry Hills Village v. Trans-Robles Corp.,
181 Colo. 356, 509 P.2d 797 (1973), where the court held that the city could not modify
minimum lot size requirements after the developer had platted property under Arapahoe
County regulations and constructed infrastructure for the subdivision. Although TransRobles was decided on due process grounds, it may easily have been an equitable estoppel
case. The obvious difficulty with applying the estoppel against an annexing municipality is
that government did not make the representation on which the owner relied. See supra
notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
163. Fueston v. City of Colorado Springs, 713 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Colo. App. 1985) (cert.
denied 1986).

164. 135 Colo. 289, 310 P.2d 296 (1957).
165. Id.
166. 39 Colo. App. 185, 562 P.2d 1125 (1977).

167. Id. It is not necessary that a court hold that the government is estopped from
changing a representation that is made erroneously, whether it is a verbal expression or
permit. At most, the equitable estoppel doctrine might be applied only when the government correctly and legally represents to the owner of property what his or her development rights are. The answer, of course, is that injustice occurs when the government
alters its representation after detrimental reliance by the owner regardless of the accuracy
or legality of that representation.

168. 198 Colo. 528, 603 P.2d 130 (1979).
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neighbors had no "vested right, per se, in the maintenance of a particular zoning classification." 169 The court of appeals dealt with this matter
when the neighbors raised the equitable estoppel doctrine. In Bentley v.
Valco, Inc.,170 the court determined that equitable estoppel was not available to an owner who allegedly bought his property after the county had
denied a special use permit. The application was for a strip mine on
property which was adjacent to the plaintiff's, even though the county
approved a second application.171 The court concluded that either the
government had made no representation to the neighbor or that it was
unreasonable for the neighbor to believe that the government would
72
never grant the permit.1
The Colorado Supreme Court eschewed a vested rights equitable
estoppel theory in City of Cherry Hills Village v. Trans-Robles Corp.173 In
Trans-Robles, the city had argued that the facts were insufficient to establish estoppel against the government.' 74 The court, however, determined that the city could not downzone property that had been annexed
because the owner had platted the property for one-half acre lots consistent with Arapahoe County zoning regulations that had been applied
before annexation, and had constructed infrastructure in the subdivision
appropriate for the half-acre configuration. 17 5As a result of the evidence, the property could not be used if rezoned for a minimum lot size
of two and one-half acres, and the court held the rezoning was confisca76
tory and unconstitutional.1
The court's theory supporting the invalidation of the rezoning in
Trans-Robles is troublesome. The owner's property could likely have
been used for two and one-half acre lots-the change would simply have
been costly and economic waste might have resulted. The better reasoning would have been that Trans-Robles' development rights had
vested because of its detrimental reliance on Arapahoe County's land
use regulations. The court may have been reluctant to apply the equitable estoppel doctrine against the city since the city had not made any
representation to the developer, or the court might have thought that
evidence of issuance of a building permit was necessary to invoke equita77
ble estoppel. 1
One might ask why the Colorado courts have held that detrimental
reliance on some government representation, such as a permit, is necessary to vest a property right. Why have the courts generally analyzed the
vested rights problem within the framework of equitable estoppel? The
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id.
741 P.2d 1266
Id. at 1269.
Id.
181 Colo. 356,
Id. at 360, 509
Id. at 360, 509
Id. at 360, 509

177.

Compare Witkin Homes, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 31 Colo. App. 410,

(Colo. App. 1987).

509 P.2d 797 (1973).
P.2d at 799.
P.2d at 798.
P.2d at 799.

414, 504 P.2d 1121, 1123 (1972) (owner could not demonstrate reliance considering that
no building permit had issued).
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answer is that the courts quickly concluded that no property rights
vested under even a validly issued permit until there had been reliance
on the permit.1 78 One can trace Colorado law on the rights that attach
to a validly issued building permit back to Pratt v. City and County of Denver. 17 9 Although the court applied the equitable estoppel doctrine
against the government, the court found that the government had not
shown any of the conditions set forth by local laws under which a building permit could be revoked. 18 0 Thus, all that the court assumed was
that local law could provide for the revocation of a building permit on
certain conditions. Two years later, however, in Williams v. Smith, 18 1 the
supreme court wondered whether a city council would have the power to
rescind a building permit before expenditures were made in reliance on
the permit. Citing Pratt, the court stated that it saw "no valid answer to
such a proposition."' 18 2 It now appears firmly embedded in Colorado
law that one acquires no property right under a permit or other land use
approval unless there has been detrimental reliance on the permit or
83
approval. 1
Before examining the Colorado legislature's response to vested
rights problems, it is appropriate to evaluate whether Colorado judicial
treatment of landowners justified the legislative action. Since the Colorado courts have viewed the issue of vested rights from an equitable estoppel perspective, judicial evaluation of vested rights claims is superior
to any legislatively prescribed formula unless the legislature views
vested rights from a different perspective.1 84 The courts are in a better
position than the legislature to make the type of ad hoc inquiry that is
necessary to determine whether the government should be estopped
from changing development regulations applicable to certain property.
A review of the case law demonstrates that Colorado courts have
178.

See Cline v. City of Boulder, 168 Colo. 112, 118, 450 P.2d 335, 338 (1969):

The basic legal question involved is simply, does a building permit per se vest
such a property right in the owner that subsequent rezoning is ineffective as to
the property? The majority rule in the United States is that the owner must take
some steps in reliance on the permit before his fights vest thereunder.

179. 72 Colo. 51, 209 P. 508 (1922).
180. Id. at 55, 209 P. at 509.
181. 76 Colo. 151, 230 P. 395 (1924).
182. Id. at 154, 230 P. at 396. Presumably, this meant that it was irrefutable that the
government could revoke the permit. See also Elam v. Albers, 44 Colo. App. 281, 282, 616

P.2d 168, 169-70 (1980) (conditional use permit gave an owner no more rights than it
would have under basic zoning ordinance). Crittenden v. Hasser, 41 Colo. App. 235, 585
P.2d 928 (1978), relates to this issue in holding that new regulations may be applied to a
land use application if they are pending at the time of the application and the government
does not unreasonably delay in acting on the application.
183. Unfortunately, the case law does not express with certainty whether a building
permit itself is necessary to vest a property right - assuming the requisite reliance. This
could raise substantial problems for property owners in Colorado counties that do not

enforce building codes with a building permit process.
184. The Colorado legislature has, indeed, viewed the vested rights issue from a radically different perspective. The legislative response in S.B. 219 does not consider detrimental reliance relevant to a vested property right claim, rather the legislative focus is on
the permit or approval that the government grants and the rights that attach to that permit

or approval. This "property rights" approach is different from the Colorado courts' equitable estoppel approach.
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treated landowners fairly.' 8 5 The general rule in Colorado is that a
right to develop or use property will vest when a landowner has suffered
detrimental reliance as the result of some land use approval. The reliance must be made reasonably and in good faith, and must be more than
preparatory work done in conjunction with a project. The Colorado
courts have been somewhat pro-landowner in refusing to balance equities, once it has been determined that the elements of equitable estoppel
are present. At the same time, the courts have preserved flexibility in
the land use regulatory process by permitting the government to modify
development regulations after land use approval when the landowner
cannot demonstrate sufficient or detrimental reliance. This scheme affords a reasonable level of certainty to landowners who wish to develop
their properties while allowing for a sensible measure of flexibility for
the land use regulatory process.
B.

Statutory Vested Rights in Colorado: Senate Bill 219
1.

Definitions Under Senate Bill 219

Senate Bill No. 219 drastically changed vested rights law in Colorado. The most obvious change was the legislature's rejection of the
need for any detrimental reliance to vest a property right.
Senate Bill No. 219 defines a vested property right ("VPR") as "the
right to undertake and complete the development and use of property
' 18 6
under the terms and conditions of a site specific development plan.'
In other words, a landowner has the right to proceed with a project free
from the effects of local government regulations adopted subsequently
to the time the landowner receives approval for the project. 18 7 The statute defines landowner as any owner of a legal or equitable interest in
real property, including heirs, successors and assigns. 188
In addition, "site specific development plan" is defined as "a plan
which has been submitted to a local government by a landowner or his
representative describing with reasonable certainty the type and intensity of use for a specific parcel or parcels of property."' 8 9 The statute
provides that the site specific development plan "may be in the form of,
but need not be limited to, any of ten different plans or approvals."' 190
It remains for the local government to determine when a plan or ap185.
186.

See supra notes 159-77 and accompanying text.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-102 (5) (Supp. 1987).

187. Section 24-68-105(1) also addresses the effect of a VPR. The section is labeled
"Subsequent regulation prohibited--exceptions."

It prohibits the government from tak-

ing "any zoning or land use action" that would interfere with the VPR. COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 24-68-105 (1) (Supp. 1987). The prohibition appears to apply to action taken pursuant
to regulations in effect at the time that the government approves a site specific development plan, in addition to regulations adopted subsequent to that approval. It cannot be
the intention of the legislature, however, to provide that one land use approval entitles a
developer to favorable treatment during subsequent, discretionary approval processes. See
infra notes 238-43 and accompanying text, concerning the horizontal vesting effects of S.B.
219.
188. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-102 (1) (Supp. 1987).
189. Id. at § 24-68-102 (4) (Supp. 1987).
190. Id.
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proval constitutes a site specific development plan that will trigger a
VPR.191 The determination may be made by "ordinance, regulation or
upon an agreement entered into by the local government and the landowner." 19 2 "[T]he document that triggers the [VPR] shall be so identified at the time of its approval." 1 9 3 It is not clear whether that
document refers to the agreement only or to an ordinance, regulation or
agreement.1 94 Neither a variance, a sketch, nor a preliminary plan con19 5
stitute a site specific development plan.
Under the statute, a "local government" refers to "any county, city
and county, city, or town, whether statutory or home rule, acting
through its governing body or any board, commission, or agency .. .
having final approval authority over a site specific development
plan."' 19 6 An urban renewal authority constitutes a local government
97
for purposes of the statute.1
2.

Creating a VPR

A VPR is created when a local government approves (or conditionally approves) a site specific development plan, following notice and
public hearing. 19 8 Once the VPR is established, it remains in effect for
three years. 199 The local government, however, can extend the threeyear vesting period by approving amendments to the site specific development plan that expressly authorize an extension. 20 0 The government
also may exceed the three-year period by entering into a development
agreement with the landowner if the excess period is warranted in light
of all relevant circumstances, including the project's size and phasing,
20 1
economic cycles and market conditions.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. This issue may be important in determining the local government's role under the
statute. See infra notes 230-34 and 296-99 and accompanying text. The better interpretation is that "document" refers only to the development agreement which must be designated expressly as creating a VPR. Ordinances and regulations that establish VPR's do
not need to be designated expressly in estabishing the VPR's because definition of a site
specific development plan controls its establishment.
195. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-102(4) (Supp. 1987).
196. Id. at § 24-68-102(2).
197. Id.
198. Id. at § 24-68-103(1). This creates the somewhat paradoxical situation that issuance of a building permit alone does not create a VPR unless the government gives notice
of and holds a hearing on the application for the permit. Under common law principles,
detrimental reliance on the building permit should vest the property. See Williams v.
Smith, 76 Colo. 151, 230 P. 395 (1924). Consequently, a local government may possibly
avoid establishment of a VPR by declining to give notice of a hearing on a land use application. The requirements of procedural due process may, however, dictate that the government give notice of and hold a hearing on the application. See generally Kahn, In
Accordance with a Constitutional Plan: Procedural Due Process and Zoning Decisions, 6 HASTINGS

L.Q 1011 (1979).
199. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-104(1) (Supp. 1987).

CONST.

200. Id.
201. Id. at § 24-68-104(2). The difference between the terms "extend" and "exceed"
in the statute is that the government may enter into a development agreement at the time
of a land use approval and create a vesting period in excess of three years or enter into a
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The local government can conditionally approve a site specific development plan 20 2 as well as impose certain terms-and conditions, as
long as the terms and conditions are reasonably necessary to protect the
public health, safety, and welfare. Furthermore, a VPR can be forfeited
prior to the end of the three-year vesting period if the landowner does
20 3
not comply with the terms and conditions of plan approval.
The local government's approval of the site specific development
plan is effective on the date of the ordinance or resolution approving the
plan. 20 4 The approval, however, is subject to all rights of referendum
and judicial action. 20 5 The time limits for instituting the referendum or
judicial action begin on the date of publication of the approval or on the
date of notice advising the general public of the approval, not on the
effective date of the approval. 20 6 Publication or notice must occur
20 7
within fourteen days following the approval.
Although it appears out of place, the statute provides that zoning
not a part of a site specific development plan does not establish a
VPR. 20 8 This apparently means that no landowner may claim a right to
develop based on the fact that the existing zoning is consistent with
owner's intended use. The owner would need some other land use approval or would need to have had his property rezoned to vest the development right.
Once a local government approves the site specific development
plan and creates a VPR, any zoning or land use action taken by the local
government is precluded if the action would alter, impair, diminish or
delay the development or use of the property.2 0 9 There are four excepdevelopment agreement only and create an original vesting period in excess of three years.
The government may not enter into a development agreement to "extend" the vesting

period.
202. Id. at § 24-68-103(1). The statute authorizes the government to conduct subsequent reviews of the conditionally approved development to ensure its compliance with
applicable conditions. Id. at § 24-68-104(3).
203. Id. at § 24-68-103(1).
204. Id.
205. Id. The drafters of S.B. 219 probably believed that judicial review would occur
through COLORADO RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 106. The rule is the exclusive method of

review for land use actions which may be characterized as quasi-judicial. See Snyder v. City
of Lakewood, 189 Colo. 421, 426-27, 542 P.2d 371, 375 (1975). If judicial review is
sought under Rule 106, review must be sought within 30 days of the challenged decision.
On the other hand, if a land use decision is legislative in character, judicial review may be
sought outside Rule 106 and the plaintiff may have several years to commence an action.
If the plaintiff eventually prevails, the developer cannot claim a vested right under the
statute, because the VPR is subject to judicial review. The statute expressly provides that
adoption of a development agreement is a legislative act. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68104(2) (Supp. 1987). The Snyder criteria for a quasi-judicial action-are: (i) a state or local

law requiring that the decision-maker give notice to the community before acting; (2) a
state or local law requiring that the decision-maker conduct a public hearing, pursuant to
notice, and allowing the public an opportunity to be heard, and (3) a state or local law
requiring that the decision-maker reach a determination by applying facts to criteria established by law. Id. at 374. The approval of most site specific development plans should
satisfy these criteria.
206. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-104(3) (Supp. 1987).
207. Id. at § 24-68-103(1).
208. Id. at § 24-68-103(2).
209. Id. at § 24-68-105(1).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 66:1

tions to this rule. First, the local government can take a zoning or land
use action that alters, impairs or delays the project if the landowner consents to the action. 2 10 Second, the local government can take a zoning
or land use action if the action is necessary to correct a man-made or
natural hazard that would pose a serious threat to the public health,
safety or welfare and the hazard could not reasonably have been discovered at the time the plan was approved. 2 1 ' Third, the local government
can take a zoning or land use action that impacts the project as long as
the landowner receives just compensation for all costs, expenses and liabilities incurred after the local government's approval of the site specific
development plan. 2 12 While the compensation scheme includes reim-

bursement for all architectural, planning, marketing, legal and other
consultant fees, it does not include any diminution in the value of the
landowner's property. 213 Finally, the local government may enact ordinances or regulations that are general in nature and applicable to all
properties subject to land use regulation without paying just compensation, even though these ordinances or regulations alter, impair or delay
2 14
the development or use of the property for which a VPR is claimed.
Examples of these regulations include building, fire, plumbing, electri2 15
cal and mechanical codes.
Under the statute, a VPR acquired while one local government has
jurisdiction over the property, in whole or in part, is good "against any
other local government which may subsequently obtain or assert jurisdiction over such property. ' 2 16 This section would apply most often
when a local government annexes property for which a VPR exists. It is
possible, however, that a municipality could condition any agreement to
2 17
annex property on the owner's waiver of his VPR.

The statute expressly provides that statutory vested rights exist in
addition to whatever vested property right might exist at common
law. 2 18 The statute does not modify the common law regarding claims
that a compensable taking has occurred. 2 19 The first provision sh6uldhave no real impact on the law, but the second provision may be rele22 0
vant to a claim for damages alleging that a taking of property.
Senate Bill No. 219 became effective on January 1, 1988.221 The
statute makes no mention of the need for the adoption of any local law
to implement the vesting scheme. Apparently, any land use application
210. Id.at (1)(a).
211. Id.at (1)(b).
212. Id.at (1)(c).

213. Id.
214. Id.at (2).

215. Id.
216. Id. at § 24-68-106(2).
217. See Groy & Shultz, Negotiating a Successful Annexation Agreement, 39 LAND USE L. &
ZONING DIGEST 3, 6-7 (1987).
218. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-106(3) (Supp. 1987).

219. Id.
220. See infra notes 281-93 and accompanying text.
221.

COLO. REV. STAT.

§

24-68-106(4) (Supp. 1987).
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approved on or after January 1, 1988, which is reasonably certain as to
the type and intensity of use carries with it a VPR.
3.

"How Could We Go So Wrong When We Were So Sincere?"

One could suggest that S.B. 219 was ill-conceived from the beginning. The law totally changes the normal order of things - that the
rights of a property owner are always subject to the reasonably exercised
police power. 2 22 Moreover, an owner of property, at common law, had
no right to make any specific use of his or her property. Instead, the
owner had only a right to a reasonable or beneficial use. 223 As the
as a matter
courts have stated consistently, no property owner is entitled
2 24
of law to the highest and best use of his or her property.
A legislative body is free to modify common law notions of property
rights. Although it is not clear whether a legislature may diminish a
property right on which there has been no reliance beyond some constitutionally protected minimum, it is clear that a legislature may enlarge
rights that are incidental to property ownership. Senate Bill No. 219
greatly enlarges the rights of property owners by establishing the right
"to undertake and complete the development and use of property under
22 5
the terms and conditions of a site specific development plan."
No state has a law that goes as far as Colorado's S.B. 219. A handful
of states vest development rights following preliminary or final plat approval,2 2 6 but even then, only as to certain additional regulations. By
far, the majority of states require some form of detrimental reliance by a
property owner before a development right will vest. 2 27 Senate Bill No.
219, as suggested in the legislative findings, 228 enhances business certainty by eliminating any need for detrimental reliance before a development right will vest.
222. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 369, 395 (1926) (holding that a zoning
restriction is invalid if it is arbitrary and unreasonable with no substantial relationship to
public health, safety or the general welfare). The Supreme Court eventually replaced this
"substantial relationship" test with the "rational relationship" test normally applied to
socio-economic regulation. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498 n.6
(1977); see also Wright v. City of Littleton, 174 Colo. 318, 321, 483 P.2d 953, 955 (1971);
Colby v. Board of Adjustment, 81 Colo. 344, 347, 255 P. 443, 446 (1927). Most recently,
however, the Court revived the substantial relationship test for land use regulations which
exact a property interest from the landowner as a condition for a land use approval or
permit. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3149 (1987).
223. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S.Ct. 1233, 1242
(1987) (a taking may be found where a regulation denies an owner all economically viable
use of his land).
224. See, e.g., Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395-97 (explaining that landowner was not entitled to
commercial use of property simply because that use has a higher value than residential
use); Wright v. City of Littleton, 174 Colo. 318, 322, 482 P.2d 953, 956 (1971) (owner not
entitled to highest use of property).
225. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-68-102(5) (Supp. 1987).
226. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
228. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-68-101(a) (Supp. 1987) states: "It is necessary and desirable, as a matter of public policy, to provide for the establishment of vested property rights
in order to ensure reasonable certainty, stability, and fairness in the land use planning
process and in order to stimulate economic growth ... "
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There are at least three reasons why S.B. 219 unreasonably favors
the development industry. First, land use regulatory processes are often
a system for mediating the inevitable disputes between property developers and their so-called "neighbors. ' 2 29 The officials who implement
the regulatory process must attempt to balance the legitimate and competing expectations of developers and neighbors. Yet frequently, neighbors are not fully informed about land use applications and are
unconcerned about development until there is some visible sign that development is about to take place. 2 30 Under the common law, the protests of neighbors will be both too little and too late if the developer
who has obtained a land use approval has reasonably relied on the approval to its detriment. If reasonable and detrimental reliance does not
exist, the neighbors might have an impact on a previously approved
231
project.
Senate Bill No. 219 drastically changes the dynamics of the land use
regulatory process. If neighbors are unable to come together and effectively challenge a land use application when the government first considers a developer's proposal, the neighbors may have lost their only
opportunity to insist that the developer mitigate the impact of the pro2 32
ject on the community.
A second flaw of S.B. 219 is its insistence that the government pay
just compensation to a landowner when the government interferes with
a VPR because of "natural or man-made hazards on or in the immediate
vicinity of the subject property" 2 33 unless the "hazards could not reasonably have been discovered at the time of site specific development
plan approval, and which hazards, if uncorrected, would pose a serious
threat to the public health, safety, and welfare ....,1234 In other words,
if a development project is determined to pose a "serious threat" to
neighboring property owners or to future residents of the project itself,
the government cannot interfere with the development if the problem
229. The term "neighbors" refers to persons in the community, other than the landowner who propose to develop his or her property. The opinions of neighbors have always played a substantial role in land use decisionmaking. See Allen v. Coffel, 488 S.W.2d
671 (Mo. App. 1972) (discussing legitimate interests of neighbors in land use approval
processes). But courts can hold that the government may not turn the land use decision
making process into a plebiscite on the neighborhood opinion. See Taco Bell v. City of
Mission, 234 Kan. 879, 879 P.2d 133 (1984).

The Colorado Supreme Court held that

neighbors, in the ordinary sense, do not have vested rights in a zoning ordinance that
would restrict the government's rezoning of another person's property. See Spiker v. City of

Lakewood, 198 Colo. 528, 532-33, 603 P.2d 130, 133 (1979).
230. See Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 16, at 668-69.
231. See, e.g., William C. Haas v. City and County of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117
(1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980) (concerning a protracted legal battle between a
developer and neighbors).
232. In essence, S.B. 219 creates a form of collateral estoppel for land use decisions
that prevents neighbors, to a limited extent, from attacking an approved development proposal in another forum. Neighbors are free to seek judicial review of the land use approval. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 7
(rev. ed. 1926) (permitting judicial review at the request of persons aggrieved by zoning
decisions). See also CoLo. R. Civ. PROC. 106(a)(4).
233. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-105(l)(b) (Supp. 1987).

234. Id.
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should have been discovered at the time the government approved the
site specific development plan. However, the government can pay just
compensation to the landowner. 23 5 This legal limitation creates a difficult dilemma for the government. The government is unlikely to compensate a property owner for what could amount to several hundred
thousand dollars of work if it interferes with a VPR. 2 3 6 But the cost
would be a liability to neighbors or future residents of the project due to
the government's failure to interfere with the project. 23

7

Given current

economic conditions, it is unlikely that the government will interfere
with the VPR, merely hoping that the gods will look favorably upon its
decision.
Senate Bill No. 219 also creates the difficult problem of determining
when a natural or man-made hazard could reasonably have been discovered, presumably by the government. 238 This limitation on the right of
the government to interfere with a VPR should not be applied strictly by
a court when the developer has not incurred the type of reasonable and
detrimental reliance that would vest a development right at common
law. Similarly, a court should not read the phrase "serious threat" as
requiring proof by the government that the threat is life-threatening or
more likely than not to occur. The interference with development
projects, even for public health and safety reasons, imposes costs on developers. Furthermore, those costs often can be internalized and spread
235. Id.
236. At common law, expenditures will not necessarily vest a development right. If the
costs are incurred for preparatory work or are small relative to the overall cost of a project,
the development right will not vest. See Delaney & Kominers, supra note 49, at 226-29.
237. See Eschette v. City of New Orleans, 245 So. 2d 383 (La. 1971) (holding local
government liable for failure to enact sufficiently stringent subdivision regulations, which
resulted in damage to neighbors of subdivision); compare Barney's Furniture Warehouse of
Newark v. City of Newark, 62 N.J. 456, 303 A.2d 76 (1973) (holding that the city lacked a
duty towards plaintiffs to impose specific subdivision improvement requirements on developer). Several courts have refused to hold governments liable when land use decisions
caused injury to neighbors of a development on the grounds of immunity for the exercise
of a discretionary, governmental function. See, e.g., Panepinto v. Edmart, Inc., 129 N.J.
Super. 319, 323 A.2d 533 (App. Div. 1974). Whether neighbors of or residents in a development project could bring an action against the local government depends on application
of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-101 to -118
(1982 & Supp. 1987). Generally, the act immunizes a local government from claims in
tort, id. at § 24-10-105, unless the claim involves certain exempted areas in which the government may be liable, id. at § 24-10-106. Even then, a plaintiff must comply with certain
notification requirements or forfeit its claim. See Morrison v. City of Aurora, 745 P.2d
1042, 1046 (Colo. App. 1987); compare Franks v. City of Aurora, 147 Colo. 25, 362 P.2d
561 (1961) (neighbors brought an action against Aurora due to flood damage allegedly
caused by undersized drainage culvert installed by private developer pursuant to plans
issued by city engineer-the City settled).
238. Section 24-68-105(l)(b) is ambiguous as to who should have reasonably discovered the hazard. Presumably, the government may not interfere with the right if it reasonably should have discovered the hazard. The government normally relies on data that the
land use applicant submits in support of its application, thus the government will argue
that the hazard was not reasonably discoverable because the applicant failed to submit
sufficient data. In addition, if the government should have realized that a hazard existed,
the government should not be prohibited from interfering with the VPR if the applicant
was not forthcoming and withheld data from the government that would have made the
hazard even more apparent. Compare Fueston v. City of Colorado Springs, 713 P.2d 1323,
1325 (Colo. App. 1985) (estoppel not available to developer who acts wrongly).
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among the various consumers of the development industry's products.
This cost shifting technique is superior to forcing the government to put
a segment of the population at risk because of its fiscal austerity or a
court's anti-government reading of S.B. 219.239
The third problem with S.B. 219 is the likelihood that S.B. 219 will
promote the warehousing of property. Under the statute, property owners will want to bring as much land within the size specific development
plan as possible in order to gain protection from subsequent changes in
the law. 2 40 A developer will include excess land in a site specific development plan, even if the land is unlikely to be developed within the
three-year vesting period. Unfortunately, the "terms and conditions" by
which a site specific development plan is approved could become obsolete within three years. Apart from differing land use control philosophies, there are two major reasons for the obsolescence: (1) planning
and engineering principles change and (2) conditions within the community change. An example of the first reason is a determination, when
the slope of land increases, that the density of development should be
reduced even more than previously believed. 24 1 Senate Bill No. 219
prevents a rezoning to reduce density for all land within the site specific
development plan, regardless of whether a rezoning was part of the approval process. 24 2 An example of the second reason is a determination
that other development occurring subsequent to approval of a site specific deyelopment plan has had a greater impact on community services
2 43
and facilities than was previously expected.
Where to draw the line between flexibility and certainty is a political
question. The Colorado legislature drew the line far to the side of cer239. Compare Western Land Equities v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980). The
Utah Supreme Court held that a developer acquired a vested property right when he filed
a substantially conforming plan for a building permit or subdivision plat approval while
there was no notice that a change in the law was pending and if the change in the law was
not necessary to protect public health and safety. Thus, even in ajurisdiction that adopts a
very pro-landowner vesting rule, the court will not vest a right when public health and
safety militates against the vesting, at least when there is no detrimental reliance. Senate
Bill No. 219 arguably codifies Colorado common law by vesting a right when the government should have known about hazards associated with the project. See, e.g., Williams v.
Smith, 76 Colo. 151, 230 P. 395 (1924). The common law rule, that would vest a right
when the government should have known about a hazard, included the requirement that
the landowner demonstrate detrimental reliance.
240. See generally M. Shultz & J. Groy, The Premature Subdivision of Land in Colorado: A
Study with Commentary, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Cambridge, Mass., Monograph 8610 (1986) (DISCUSSING EXTENT AND EFFECTS OF PREMATURE CONVERSION OF LAND TO RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT).
241. See L. KENDIG, PERFORMANCE ZONING

39 (1980) (showing relationship between
slope and need for additional open space within boundaries of property). Governments
are increasingly adopting ordinances to regulate hillside development for health, safety
and aesthetic reasons. See Sellon v. City of Manitou Springs, 745 P.2d 229 (Colo. 1987)
(en banc) (upholding hillside development ordinance).
242. Although existing zoning may not be the basis for claiming a VPR, COLO. REV.
STAT. § 24-68-103(2) (Supp. 1987), once the VPR is established, the government may not
interfere with the VPR by rezoning the property to which it attaches. Id. at § 24-68-105(1).
243. Generally, local governments may deny land use approvals due to a lack of available community services or facilities. The leading case in support of this proposition is
Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).

1
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tainty. Unfortunately, the statute raises numerous issues that will need
to be resolved by amendment or litigation. To the extent that developers, local government officials, and neighbors do not know how a court
might resolve the ambiguities in S.B. 219, certainty will remain elusive.
The courts or the legislature will need to address the following issues.
4.

Is S.B. 219 a Mandatory or an Enabling Statute?

Senate Bill No. 219 appears, at first, to be a self-executing scheme
for creating vested property rights. The statute defines a vested property
right and links that right with approval of a site specific development. If
the statute mandated the types of land use that constitute a site specific
development plan, there would be little or no reason for local government action.

24 4

Instead, the statute appears to allow each local government to determine what will constitute a site specific development plan. Section
24-68-102(4) of the Colorado Revised Statutes provides that a site specific development is a plan that describes "with reasonable certainty the
' 24 5
type and intensity of use for a specific parcel or parcels of property.
Ambiguity is created by the next sentence of the section which reads in
244. If one reads S.B. 219 with the understanding that it establishes a vested property
right as a matter of state law without reference to local law, one may interpret section 2468-102(4) as follows:
I. A site specific development plan is one that is reasonably certain as to type
and intensity of use;
2. A number of land use plans and approvals may be site specific development
plans and, in fact, will be ifthey meet the two criteria for a site specific development plan;
3. Because local governments use different types of plans or approvals, what
finally constitutes a site specific development shall be determined by the government on a case by case basis as it approves land use applications by ordinance or regulation or when it enters into a development agreement;
4. If the government creates a vested right by entering into a development
agreement, the document evidencing the agreement shall be designated by
the government at the time of its approval.
This view of S.B. 219 leaves no room for local discretion regarding establishment of a VPR
except as one may be established by the development agreement. In all other circumstances, when the government approves a land use plan or application by ordinance or
regulation, assuming public notice and a hearing, and the plan or approval is reasonably
certain as to the type and the intensity of use, a VPR is established as a matter of state law
notwithstanding the local government's desires. Ifthis is the correct interpretation of S.B.
219, the law is even more draconian than it appears at first glance. A court must interpret
S.B. 219 to provide local governments some latitude in designating land use plans or approvals that constitute site specific development plans. Local administration is allowed too
much discretion in regulating land by imposing a state law scheme that operates irrespective of local law. Since an interpretation, not based on plain meaning, of S.B. 219 would
be to preclude any meaningful role by local governments to establish a VPR, a court
should base the reading of the statute on the policy implications of the various reasonable
interpretations of the statute.
Apparently, Governor Romer believes that S.B. 219 allows for local discretion in determining what constitutes a site specific development plan. Letter from Governor Roy
Romer to Colorado State Senate (August 27, 1987). Governor Romer indicated that he
signed S.B. 219 because it included language which allows local governments to have the
final determination on what plans or approvals will vest the right. The Governor, however, may have overestimated the impact of the sentence that was added to S.B. 219 following the Governor's veto of S.B. 60.
245. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-102(4) (Supp. 1987).
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part: "[sluch plan may be in the form of, but need not be limited to, any
of the following plans or approvals .... "246 The section then lists ten
specific land use approvals in addition to "any other land use approval
designation as may be utilized by a local government" that may consti2 47
tute a site specific development plan.

At this point, it may appear that the types of plans and approvals
listed in section 24-68-102(4) not only may, but will, be a site specific
development plan when the plan or approval relates to the type and intensity of use for a parcel or parcels, at least if the type and intensity of
development are described with "reasonable certainty" in the plan or
approval. The better interpretation is that no specific land use plan or
approval needs to constitute a site specific development plan unless the
local government determines that the plan or approval will constitute a
site specific development plan. Section 24-68-102(4) is clear on this:
"What constitutes a site specific development plan under this article that
would trigger a vested property right shall be finally determined by the
local government either pursuant to ordinance, regulation or upon an
agreement entered into by the local government and the landowner
"248

In light of the local government's discretion to determine which
plans or approvals will constitute a site specific development plan, S.B.
219 appears merely to enable a local government to adopt a vesting ordinance or regulation. Even assuming that the local government is
obliged to refer to the statutory definition of site specific development
when determining whether a plan or approval is within that definition,
S.B. 219 allows local government the ultimate decision. 2 49 At most,
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. This section, which purports only to define a site specific development plan, is
extremely unclear. The ordinance or regulation referred to in the section may mean one
of general applicability which establishes local government policy, or it may mean every
ordinance or regulation relating to a development plan or approval that describes the type
and intensity of development with reasonable certainty. The term "certainty" itself is ambiguous. "Certainty" implies predictability whereas the intent of the section appears to
connote "certainty" as "specificity."
249. The ambiguity of S.B. 219 is again present in one sentence of section 24-68102(4) which provides that "[wihat constitutes a site specific development plan.., shall be
finally determined by the local government .
The sentence may be interpreted four
different ways:
1. On a case by case basis, the government must ("shall") determine that a land
use plan or approval constitutes a site specific development plan if the plan or
approval describes with reasonable certainty the type and intensity of development. This determination is subject to judicial review;
2. On the basis of an ordinance or regulation of general application, the local
government must ("shall") determine that its land use approvals and required development plans, which describe with reasonable certainty the type
and intensity of development, are site specific development plans. This determination is subject to judicial review;
3. On a case-by-case basis, the government may exercise final discretion and
shall determine whether a specific land use plan or approval constitutes a site
specific development plan. This determination could possibly be reviewed
only to evaluate whether the government acted arbitrarily or capriciously in
determining that a land use plan or approval does or does not constitute a
site specific development plan because of the degree of certainty with which
the type and intensity of development are described in the plan or approval;
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S.B. 219 might require a local government to designate one land use
plan or one land use approval as a site specific development plan.
If a local government is obligated to designate one or more land use
plans or approvals as a site specific development plan, a related issue is
whether a property owner may waive his or her claim to a VPR. 2 5 0 For
example, if the local government determines that final subdivision plat
approval constitutes a site specific development plan, the government
may grant final plat approval only if the property owner waives any claim
to the VPR. Assuming that local governments must recognize site specific development plans, which by statute create vested property rights,
it is illogical to believe that the government always could withhold approval of a land use application unless the property owner waived any
claim to a VPR. Similarly, the government should not be permitted to
withhold approval of land use applications unless the landowner waives
the right to argue that the government reasonably could have discovered a hazard associated with development at the time of approval.
Logically a local government could, on a case-by-case basis, determine that certain specific land use approvals should not create a VPR
because of hazards associated with a given development project. Thus,
for example, a rezoning to residential use may create a VPR generally,
but the government may refuse to rezone property in a floodplain to
25 1
residential use unless the property owner waives any claim to a VPR.
Even here, the government might need to retain the power to deny approval for public health and safety reasons.
4.

On the basis of an ordinance or regulation of general application, the government shall determine by the exercise of its discretion, which is final, which of
its land use approvals or required development plans will constitute site specific development plans. This ordinance or regulation could possibly be reviewed only to determine whether the government acted unreasonably in
determining that a specific land use approval process or plan does or does
not constitute a site specific development plan.
250. See letter from Governor Roy Romer to Colorado State Senate (August 27, 1987).
In his letter, Governor Romer stated that when he vetoed the predecessor of S.B. 219
(S.B. 60), he suggested that express language be included in a revised bill authorizing the
waiver of a VPR. Waiver should be possible only when the government offers to waive
certain conditions that it could impose on the developer in exchange for the developer's
waiver of any claim to a VPR. This issue relates to whether the local government has
discretion in designating plans or approvals which constitute site specific development
plans. If the local government really does have complete or substantial discretion, waiver
is irrelevant because the government may refuse to designate a specific plan or approval as
a site specific development plan and avoid establishment of a VPR altogether. See Memorandum from Gerald E. Dahl to Municipal Officials at 1 (September 28, 1987) (discussing
waiver of vested rights).
251. The government will be on safer ground if it either (1) adopts an ordinance or
regulation of general application that excludes plans or approvals involving hazardous
sites from the definition of site specific development plans, or (2) amends existing zoning,
subdivision or other land use approvals to limit a landowner's ability to develop property
involving natural or man-made hazards. Compare Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v.
DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987) (upholding restrictions on coal mining to prevent
subsidence). The government also should be free to agree to waive certain conditions that
it lawfully could impose on a development in exchange for the developer's waiver of any
claim to a vested right. The waivers should logically relate to one another. See Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987) (suggesting that land use regulations
may not be used as a system of extortion).
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What is the Effect of a VPR on Subsequent Land Use Approval and Permit
Processes?

A superficial reading of S.B. 219 would infer that a development,
for which the government has approved a site specific development
plan, cannot be subjected to any regulation enacted subsequent to the
establishment of the VPR if the regulation "would alter, impair, prevent,
diminish, or otherwise delay the development or use of the property as
set forth in the site specific development plan ....-252 There can be no
doubt that a VPR does not entitle a property owner to additional land
use approvals or permits unless the owner meets the conditions for
those approvals or permits that existed at the time the VPR was
253
established.
More importantly, a VPR does not immunize a development project
from the effect of regulations enacted after the establishment of the VPR
if the regulations do not relate to the "terms and conditions" of the site
specific development plan. 2 54 For example, the terms and conditions of
252. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-68-105(1) (Supp. 1987).
253. For example, if a landowner subdivides a five-acre tract into five one-acre lots
pursuant to a government approved plat, the landowner has no vested right to have the
property rezoned to residential use. Rather, the landowner must prove to the zoning
board that a change in use is proper. This proof of necessity for rezoning is required, if
for no other reason, because subdivision and zoning are two different land use regulatory
processes and the terms and conditions of subdivision approval do not deal with the type
of use permitted for a piece of property. See Spiker v. City of Lakewood, 198 Colo. 528,
532, 603 P.2d 130, 132 (Colo. 1979) ("Although zoning changes and plat approvals may
be conjoined, they are essentially separate and distinct matters.") A more difficult question is whether the government may rezone the property following plat approval. See infra
notes 240-41 and accompanying text. Senate Bill No. 219 provides that the local government plan exists to determine its compliance with the terms and conditions of approval.
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-68-104 (3) (Supp. 1987).

254. The phrase "terms and conditions" used in section 24-68-102(5) is ambiguous, as
demonstrated by New Jersey case law. At one time, New Jersey state law provided that
tentative approval of a subdivision plat assured the developer that the government could
not change "terms and conditions" upon which approval was granted for three years from
the date of approval. See Hilton Acres v. Klein, 35 N.J. 570, 574, 174 A.2d 465,469 (1961)
(discussing statute). In a series of cases, the New Jersey Supreme Court determined that
"minimum lot size" was a term or condition of tentative plat approval. Id. On the other
hand, the court held that paving requirements, Levin v. Township of Livingston, 35 N.J.
500, 509, 173 A.2d 391, 400 (1961), the existence of sidewalks, and the width of streets,
Pennyton Homes v. Planning Bd., 41 N.J. 578, 197 A.2d 870, 872 (1964), were not terms
and conditions of approval, and therefore the government could alter those requirements
after tentative approval. The fact that a VPR is not created when a local government approves a sketch or preliminary subdivision plat,see CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-68-102(4) (Supp.
1987), does not negate the fact that courts will need to determine what constitutes the
"terms and conditions" of each site specific development plan.
Unfortunately, the issue regarding the scope of the VPR is even more confusing because of the inconsistency between the definition of a VPR, which relates to a right to
develop and use property in accordance with the "terms and conditions" of the site specific development plan, Id. at § 24-68-102(5), and the effect of a VPR, which prevents a
government from interfering with the development or use of property subject to a VPR
"as set forth in a site specific development plan." Id. at § 24-68-105(l). A site specific
development plan might "set forth" matters that were not necessarily considered the local
government during its approval of the plan and therefore should not be considered part of
the "terms and conditions" of the plan. To the extent that section 24-68-102(5) defines a
VPR, it should control the scope of the VPR and the correlative duty of the local
government.
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final subdivision plat approval may include the right of the subdivider to
use individual sewage disposal systems in the subdivision. However, the
terms and conditions may not include any criteria relating to the design
standards for the individual sewage disposal systems. 25 5 Although the
local government could not refuse to allow the individual systems after
final plat approval, the government should be able to require the subdivider to comply with local regulations which existed when an application
was submitted. The local government should also be able to require
compliance with regulations which are amended subsequent to the establishment of the VPR. The enforcement of amended regulations
would not affect the "development or use of the property as set forth in
a site specific development plan" unless the plan contained the design
standards for individual sewage disposal systems.
In addition, the statute prohibits any change in zoning or land use
except where "the application of ordinances or regulations which are
general in nature and are applicable to all property subject to land use
regulation by a local government.' '256 Although the section lists only
building, fire, plumbing, electrical and mechanical codes, the section
should be read to include any other ordinance or regulation that does
not deal on a site specific basis with property for which a site specific
development plan exists.

257

255. See CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 25-10-101 to -112 (1982 & Supp. 1987). It should not
matter whether the local government had regulations regarding individual sewage disposal
systems in place at the time that the government approved the site specific development
plan. The developer should be subject to regulations, whether existing before or after
establishment of the VPR, so long as the regulations do not involve the "terms and conditions" of the site specific development plan. It is unreasonable, for example, to argue that
a term or condition of approval is that a landowner does not have to conduct an environmental impact assessment ("EIS") when the government has no regulations concerning an
EIS. If, however, the government imposes an EIS as a condition precedent to issuance of a
building permit, the landowner who claims a VPR should be required to perform the EIS.
Compare Western Land Equities v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388, 391 (Utah 1980) (holding
that a landowner could be subject to regulations pending adoption at the time he or she
submits a conforming land use application if the owner is aware of the regulation); see also
Crittenden v. McPherson, 585 P.2d 928, 929 (Colo. App. 1978) (county could deny liquor
license application pending at time when government rezoned subject property so long as
there was no undue delay in acting on the application). It is worthwhile to note that a
landowner has no right under S.B. 219 to request its land use application be reviewed
under only those regulations in effect at the date of the application.
256. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-68-105(2). One may wonder if rezoning, accomplished by
an amendment to the zoning ordinance text, would be within this provision. Although the
amendment may prohibit a previously permitted use in a certain zoning district, such
amendment will have a general application since it will apply to all property within the
zoning district for which the applicable regulations have been amended. In other words,
the textual change is not really a site specific rezoning.
257. There are two state statutes enabling local governments to regulate land use that
are in possible conflict with S.B. 219. The Local Government Land Use Control Enabling
Act ("LUCEA"), CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 29-20-101 to -107 (1986), adopted by the Colorado
legislature in 1974 when the land use control pendulum was in a different position, generally empowers local governments to regulate land use for a number of specific reasons in
addition to "[o]therwise planning for and regulating the use of land and protection of the
environment in a manner consistent with constitutional rights." Id. at §§ 29-20-104(a)-(h).
It remains to be seen whether regulations adopted pursuant to LUCEA are exempt under
S.B. 219. The Colorado Supreme Court limited the apparent breadth of LUCEA in Pennobscott, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 642 P.2d 915 (Colo. 1982) (state enabling
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Apart from the horizontal vesting question, 2 58 there is the question
of the effect of a VPR on state or regional land use approval processes
(vertical vesting). The statute only vests a development right against
interference by a local government. Section 24-68-102(2) defines local
government in a way that cannot be read to include any state or regional
land use approval process. 2 59 For example, an owner's development
right is not vested against changes in state regulations under the federal
Safe Drinking Water Act. 2 6 0 Similarly, a development right should not
be vested against regulations that the Colorado Land Use Commission
may adopt.

C.

26 1

What is the Scope of Government Liability for Interference with a VPR?

The scope of a local government's liability for interference with a
VPR is uncertain under S.B. 219. The statute does not directly address
the question of liability if a local government interferes with a VPR;
rather, the statute allows for local government interference with a VPR
provided "the affected landowner receives just compensation for all
costs, expenses, and liabilities incurred by the landowner" after the government approved the site specific development plan. 26 2 The payment

ofjust compensation appears, from the statute, to be a condition precedent to the government's right to interfere with the VPR. Assuming the
likelihood that the government may not pay just compensation prior to
interference with a VPR, the question is whether the landowner is entitled to damages or injunctive relief.
If governmental interference with a VPR constitutes a "taking" of
statute limiting county subdivision control to divisions creating parcels under 35 acres also
limited LUCEA).
The second statute of general application is the Areas and Activities of State Interest
Law. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-65.1-101 to -502 (1982 & Supp. 1987). The act encourages
local governments to designate areas and activities of state interest and to administer these
areas and regulate these activities after designation. Id. at § 24-65.1-101(2)(b). Areas of
state interest include natural hazard areas, areas containing or having a significant impact
on historical, natural or archeological resources of statewide importance and areas around
key facilities in which development may have a material effect on the facility or the surrounding community. Id. at § 24-65.1-201. Activities of state interest include, among
others, site selection and construction of major new domestic water and sewage treatment
systems and major extensions of existing systems and site selection and development of
new communities. Id. at § 2 4 -65.1-203(1)(a), (b) & (g). Although this statute does not
appear to come within the exemption provided in section 24-68-105(2) of S.B. 219, a court
should exercise caution before holding that a landowner is vested against regulations
adopted pursuant to a statute that is predicated on matters of statewide interest to the
same extent as S.B. 219.
258. Horizontal vesting refers to the effect that detrimental reliance has on an approval
from one agency of the local government to other agencies at the same level of that local
government.
259. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-102(2) (Supp. 1987) states: "Local government means
any county, city and county, city, or town, whether statutory or home rule, acting through
its governing body or any board, commission, or agency thereof having final approval
authority over a site specific development plan, including without limitation, any legally
empowered urban renewal authority."
260. See id. at § 25-1-107(1)(x)(I) (1982).
261. See id. at § 24-65-104(2) (1987).
262. Id. at § 2 4-68-105(I)(c) (Supp. 1987).
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property, a property owner is not entitled, at least as a matter of federal
constitutional law, to enjoin the taking. 2 63 The owner may merely be
2 64
entitled to just compensation, as required by the fifth amendment.
The government may pay just compensation after the taking rather than
26 5
Of
prior to the taking without violating the federal Constitution.
course, state law may impose different limitations on the power of the
government to interfere with property rights and a court. For example,
state law may dictate that the local government's failure to pay just compensation to the property owner, whose VPR has been interfered with,
entitles the owner to sue for damages, including all incidental and con2 66
sequential damages.
When the VPR is established pursuant to a development agreement, 26 7 the local government may have increased its exposure to a
claim for damages. A development agreement is a contract between the
property owner and the government, 26 8 and if the government breaches
the contract, it may be burdened by more than just statutory liability.
To avoid paying more than the damages enumerated in the statute, the
local government will need to convince a court that the statutory measure of damages is meant to be exclusive. The government should be
free to enforce the provision in the development agreement which limits
its liability to the damages specified in section 24-68-105(1)(c).

26 9

Senate Bill No. 219 creates the possibility which requires a local
government to pay just compensation to an owner who is liable for a
public nuisance. 2 70 Such a result would not be required even under the
expanding "takings" jurisprudence of the United States Supreme
Court. 2 7 1 As the Court stated, no person can acquire a vested right to
263. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 695 (1949); Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104 (1932). The Supreme Court recently extended the rule that the
owner of property that is taken for a public purpose, is entitled as a matter of law to just
compensation and not injunctive relief for local regulations that "go too far." First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378,
2388 (1987).
264. See supra note 39.
265. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172, 194, (1985) (federal constitution does not require that just compensation be paid in
advance of or contemporaneously with taking).
266. See supra note 223 (regarding local government immunity in Colorado). As an
alternative, a landowner may seek relief from the district court if the government action
that interferes with a VPR is quasi-judicial in nature and the action exceeds the local government's authority. See CoLo. R. CIv. PROC. 106(a)(4) (Supp. 1987); see also Snyder v. City
of Lakewood, 189 Colo. 421, 542 P.2d 371 (1975) (dealing generally with Rule 106 relief
against a rezoning of property); Ossman v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 184 Colo.
360, 360, 520 P.2d 738, 742 (1974) (discussing available damages in inverse condemnation action).
267. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-68-102(4) (Supp. 1987).
268. See generally Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, Development Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of Government Land Use Deals, 65 N.C.L. REv.
957, 995-1003 (1987) (providing a detailed treatment of the proper characterization of
development agreements and arguing that they are as much regulatory in nature as
contractual).
269. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-68-105(l)(c) (Supp. 1987).
270. For a discussion of public nuisance law, see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 88 (1971).
271. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1245-1246
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maintain a nuisance. 2 72 Under S.B. 219, the government will be forced
to pay just compensation to a property owner who engages in a nuisance
if the government reasonably should have known at the time of approval
of the site specific development plan that the owner's intended use
would constitute a nuisance. 2 73 For example, a government may approve an application to operate a landfill only to discover later that the
landfill constitutes a public nuisance. It is unfair that the government
could terminate the landfill three years and one day after the establishment of the VPR without payment of just compensation. However, the
government could not interfere with the completion of the landfill project during the three year vesting period unless it paid just compensa274
tion as defined in S.B. 219 to the property owner.
Another interesting issue with respect to the scope of local governmental liability is whether a local government must pay just compensation when it interferes with a VPR, pursuant to the mandate of state or
federal law. For example, the federal government could require a local
government to adopt regulations respecting clean air, and the regulations would apply to the property subject to a VPR. 2 75 It would be unconscionable to require the local government to pay out of its pocket
just compensation to a property owner only because the local government was forced to enact regulations under the mandate of state or federal law.
A final issue on local government liability relates to the receipt of a
windfall by the property owner if the government tries to "alter, impair,
prevent, diminish, or otherwise delay the development or use of the
property." '2 76 If a regulation enacted subsequent to the establishment
of the VPR delays the completion of the affected development for one
day, section 24-68-105(l)(c) requires the government to pay "just compensation" for all of the property owner's expenses which were incurred
following establishment of the VPR. 2 7 7 "Just compensation" is a legal
term of art and generally refers to fair market value. 2 78 Thus, the government would appear to be liable for the fair market value of all "costs,
n.22 (1987) (rejecting the landowner's argument for a right to compensation when government interferes with nuisance or nuisance-like activities).
272. See id. at 1245 n.20 ("no individual has a right to use his property so as to create a
nuisance or otherwise harm others").
273. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-105(l)(c) (Supp. 1987).
274. Senate Bill No. 219 appears to prohibit a change in use of property, to which a
VPR attaches, for three years even if development of the property is completed in a much
shorter time. Id. at § 24-68-102(5) (Supp. 1987) (VPR "means the right to undertake and
complete the development and use of property"). This interpretation may be correct, for
an owner may not develop his or her property following establishment of a VPR. Thus,
the VPR protects the "use."
275. The failure of the government to enact regulations to come into compliance with
federal air and water quality standards could cause the state or local government to lose
federal funds. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7405, 7616 (1982) (federal grant programs for air quality
control and sewers).
276. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-105(1) (Supp. 1987).
277. Id. at § 24-68-105(l)(c).
278. See D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER,
CONTROL LAw

610 (2d ed. 1986).
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expenses, and liabilities incurred by the landowner" after establishment
of the VPR even though the extent of government's interference with
the VPR is negligible.
A court should read "just compensation" (as used in S.B. 219) as
meaning something other than "fair market value." The application of
the term fair market value is out of context of payment for all "costs,
expenses, and liabilities" incurred by the landowner. Within the context
of section 24-68-105,279 'just compensation" should denote an amount
of money that is reasonably related to the extent of the government's
interference with a VPR. For example, a local government should not
be required to pay all of the landowner's costs, expenses, and liabilities
when the government reduces the allowable density of the development
project, unless the developer can demonstrate that the development
project would not have been undertaken at the reduced density. Instead, a court should determine what constitutes a fairportion of costs,
expenses, and liabilities for which the government should compensate
280
the landowner.
D.

What Standards Will Guide a Court Seeking to Resolve Conflicts Involving
Development Agreements?

Four states other than Colorado have adopted development agreement statutes by enacting a relatively comprehensive scheme to guide
local governments entering into a development agreement. 28 ' Presumably, the statutory schemes and legislative histories, where they exist,
can provide standards to guide a court when resolving disputes in this
area. Colorado, by contrast, has two sentences of text regarding devel282
opment agreements.
There are several issues that may be litigated with respect to development agreements. First, S.B. 219 does not establish a maximum time
period for which a development right will be vested pursuant to the
agreement. The statute only provides that the normal three year period
may be exceded if the landowner and government enter into the agreement. Since a development agreement is included within the examples
of site specific development plans, 28 3 and a VPR resulting from ap28 4
proval of a site specific development plan lasts only for three years,
the agreement may extend the original vesting period by a maximum of
only three years. This argument necessarily assumes that the development agreement must be used in conjunction with some other plan or
approval that constitutes a site specific development plan, otherwise the
279. COLO. REV. STAT. 24-68-105.
280. This argument is supported by the statutory language that the government may
interfere with the VPR "[t]o the extent" that it pays just compensation. COLO. REV. STAT.

§ 24-68-105(1)(c) (Supp. 1987).
281. See supra note 119.
282. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-68-104(2) (Supp. 1987).
283. Id. at § 24-68-102(1).
284. Id. at § 24-68-104(1).
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agreement standing alone would vest a right for the basic three year
period only.
Unless S.B. 219 limits the time period for which a development
agreement can vest a development right, local governments are free
under the statute to vest a right in property for eternity. This possibility
raises a constitutional question: may a local government agree never to
adopt a regulation that will interfere with a landowner's property interests? The answer is no. Under the reserved powers doctrine, no legislative body may agree by contract to refraii from exercising its legislative
powers. 2 85 Several courts have limited the effect of the reserved powers
doctrine to a total abdication of power by the government and thus have
upheld agreements that limited the exercise of legislative power for a
reasonable period of time.2 86 It is not certain what a Colorado court
28 7
would consider a reasonable period of time to be.
A second potential issue for litigation is the permissible purpose for
which a local government may enter into a development agreement.
The development agreement originally was viewed as a method to protect phased developments from government interference. 288 The
agreement was necessary because common law vesting rules did not
protect future phases of a development for which present development
did not create a vested right. In a number of jurisdictions, dealmaking
has replaced strict adherence to statutory procedures and standards for
land use approvals. 289 Thus, local governments may treat each development application as a new business opportunity. The government approves the land use application, waives certain procedural or substantive
requirements, and vests the development for some period of time, all in
exchange for the developer's contract to provide certain benefits to the
government. The benefits usually include constructing or paying for
off-site improvements or by setting aside units in a residential develop2 90
ment for middle to low-income persons.
Senate Bill No. 219 does not specify the purposes for which the
285. See Wegner, supra note 268, at 965-68 and 965 n.30.
286. See e.g., Morrison Homes Corp. v. City of Pleasonton, 58 Cal. App. 3d 724, 130
Cal. Rptr. 196 (1976); City of Farmers Branch v. Hawnco, Inc., 435 S.W. 2d 288 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1968).
287. Cf Geralnes, B.V. v. City of Greenwood Village, 583 F. Supp. 830, 841 (D. Colo.
1984) (upholding annexation agreement that limited city's power to rezone for 25 years).
There is no consideration of the time element in this court's decision.
288. See Kessler, supra note 116, at 451.
289. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text; see also Sigg, supra note 7. A full treatment of dealmaking and the increased use of development agreements is beyond the scope
of this paper. The most thorough treatment of the topic is by Professor Wegner. See
generally Wegner, supra note 268.
290. See Wegner, supra note 268, at 1023-27 (discussing possible limitations on "extractions" imposed as part of a development agreement).

Although Wegner suggests that

there are limits beyond those imposed under a theory of unconscionability, she herself
admits that "a contractor with the government has the freedom to contract or to walk away
from the proposed deal." Id. at 1024. This does not mean that the landowner is not
entitled to a land use approval, only that the government may agree to a land use approval,
and that the government may agree to vest property rights beyond three years on a "take it
or leave it" basis.
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government may use development agreements. The statute appears,
however, to allow the agreements only for the purpose of exceeding the
three year vesting period and only when the government considers the
statutory criteria. 291 The government should not be permitted to use
development agreements to avoid the procedures and standards for
land use approvals which are contained in state laws and local ordinances. The local government should, however, be permitted to condition its acceptance to enter into a development agreement on whatever
terms it chooses. Nothing in the statute entitles a landowner to compel
the local government to enter into a development agreement. Therefore, the terms and conditions of the agreement should be based on the
arms-length negotiations of the parties. The local government's assent
to vest a development right might very well be conditioned on performance by the landowner. The government could not have required this
under either state or local laws or the federal constitution.
A final issue regarding development agreements concerns their reviewability. First, who, if anyone, will have standing to challenge a development agreement? By statute, the agreement must be adopted by a
legislative act and is subject to referendum. One must presume that an
aggrieved citizen could challenge the government's decision to enter
into the agreement. The statute itself makes no effort, unfortunately, to
identify any person or group of persons who might have standing to
challenge the development agreement.
Similarly, it is uncertain under the statute as to whether a local government must consider the factors of the "size and phasing of the development, economic cycles, and market conditions" before entering into
an agreement. 2 92 Section 24-68-104(2) provides that these are some of
the "relevant circumstances" on which the government may base a decision to enter into a development agreement, but they are not the only
factors. 293 If a court does not consider the statutory factors to be controlling, a court should review the government's decision to enter into a
development agreement under a minimum rationality standard. 2 94
291.

See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-104(2) (Supp. 1987).

292. Id.
293. Id.
294. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (holding that local
zoning ordinance that, inter alia, prohibited multi-family housing was constitutional because it bore a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose). This standard of review
assumes that adoption of a development agreement truly is a legislative act as the statute
suggests. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-104(2) (Supp. 1987). Under the standards established by the supreme court in Snyder v. City of Lakewood, 189 Colo. 421, 542 P.2d 371
(1975), the act appears to be more quasi-judicial or administrative in nature. See supra note
193. Thus, review would be through a Rule 106 action. Snyder, 189 Colo. at 427, 542 P.2d
at 375. Section 24-68-104(2) only provides that adoption of a development agreement is a
legislative act and subject to referendum. Thus, it still is possible that Rule 106 is the
proper procedure for judicial review of a development agreement. See Margolis v. District
Court, 638 P.2d 297, 304-05 (1981) (small-scale rezoning is quasi-judicial for purposes of
judicial review and legislative for purpose of initiative and referendum process). The issue
probably will center around whether a court will defer to the legislature's judgment that
adoption of a development agreement is a legislative act for purposes of both judicial
review and initiative and referendum.
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Conversely, no one should have standing to review the validity of the
29 5
government's refusal to enter into the contract.
E.

What is the Relationship Between S.B. 219 and Federal Constitutional
Law?

Senate Bill No. 219 provides that nothing in the law should "preclude [a] judicial determination, based on common law principles, that a
vested property right exists in a particular case or that a compensable
taking has occurred."' 29 6 This provision does little more than make explicit that the rights created by S.B. 219 are in addition to rights a landowner has at common law.
The more important relationship is between S.B. 219 and federal
constitutional law. The federal constitution requires that a state or local
government pay just compensation to a property owner whenever the
government "takes" the owner's property. 29 7 A taking may occur when
the government physically invades an owner's property or when the government subjects the property to an unreasonably restrictive police
power regulation.2 98 In the latter instance, the Supreme Court may find
a taking when a regulation denies an owner all reasonable use of his or
her property, works a substantial diminution in value or extracts a property interest from the owner without substantially advancing a legitimate
state interest. 29 9 The United States Supreme Court has even given a
constitutional dimension to the common law's vested rights doctrine by
virtue of its own reasonable, investment-backed expectations test for a
30 0
taking.
Senate Bill No. 219 relates to federal takings jurisprudence in a
straight-forward manner. The federal constitution does not define
property or property rights. Instead, independent sources, such as state
law, define the nature of the rights that a property owner may claim. 30 '
The Supreme Court has compared a property right to a legitimate claim
295. A developer would need to argue that section 24-68-104(2) creates an entitlement
to have the government enter into a development agreement when the developer makes
the necessary showing regarding the size and phasing of the development, economic cycles, and market conditions. This section, however, expressly "authorize[s]" local governments to "enter into development agreements."

CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-68-104(2) (Supp.

1987). The authority to enter into a development agreement cannot be read to create a
duty in the government to enter into development agreements.

296. Id. at § 24-68-106(3).
297. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Ange-

les, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 2388 (1987) (holding that the landowner is entitled to just compensation when government regulation effects even a temporary taking of property).
298. See Penn. Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978)
(discussing takings from the viewpoint of the character of the government's action).
299. See id. at 124; Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 3149 (1987)
(holding that condition on development approval that landowner dedicate lateral beach
easement did not substantially advance legitimate state interest and thus constitute a
taking).
300. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005-07 (1984) (discussing in
detail the prerequisites to establish a "reasonable investment-backed expectation").
301.

See id. at 1001. In Moranto, the court found that trade secrets constituted prop-

erty under Missouri law and were therefore within the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.

1988]

VESTED PROPERTY RIGHTS

of entitlement, which is an expectation of gaining some benefit that is
more than a mere hope or desire. 30 2 The expectation may not be unilat3 03
eral but must be based on some bilateral relationship.
Traditionally, a landowner in Colorado had no legitimate claim of
entitlement to be free from land use regulations adopted or applied after the landowner had obtained some government approval. Detrimental reliance, probably on a building permit, would have been necessary
to vest the development right. 30

4

Senate Bill No. 219 creates a legiti-

mate claim of entitlement to a vested right immediately on the government's approval of a site specific development plan. The VPR is more
than a mere incident of property ownership that remains subject to police power regulation. By definition, the VPR is immune from interference by police power regulations adopted or applied after establishment
of the VPR for a period of three years. 30 5 As a consequence, because
302. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). In Roth, the court confirmed
that property interests are not created by the Constitution, rather "they are created and
their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits
and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits." Id. at 577. The court also explained that "to have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than
an abstract need or desire for it." Id.
303. See id. To claim a property interest, a person "must have more than a unilateral
expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Id.
Although Roth dealt with a procedural due process claim, its discussion of property rights
should apply equally to taking claims. See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1001, citing Roth in its
discussion of whether trade secrets are property for purposes of the taking clause.
304. See supra note 139.
305. Compare Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-38
(1982) (holding that state law, which authorized cable television company to invade landowner's property, permanently and physically constituted a per se taking). In Loretto, the
court felt that there was something special about the right to exclusive physical possession.
Although the scope of Loretto has been undermined, see PruneYard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (upholding right of citizens under state law to disseminate
information at private shopping center), its point is well taken. There are certain attributes of property, which may vary from time to time and place to place, that are so tied up
with the concept of property itself that if the government interferes with those attributes,
the government's action constitutes a taking. The Supreme Court has emphasized two
major "attributes" of property that may serve to define property operationally - exclusive
physical possession and reasonable use. If the government interferes with either of these
attributes, the court is likely to find a taking. See Loretto, 458 U.S. 419 (1982); First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378
(1987). The Court has been less protective of other attributes of property or property
ownership., e.g., the power to transfer ownership to another. See Andrus v. Allard, 444
U.S. 51 (1979) (upholding federal prohibition on the sale of pre-existing avarian artifacts).
If a state defines property in a way that elevates an attribute of property ownership to the
level of exclusive possession or reasonable/beneficial use, the court should afford that
attribute the same constitutional protections which it affords the latter attributes.
This analysis of what constitutes fundamental aspects of property ownership, which
aspects may be defined by state law, is difficult to reconcile with Monsanto. In that case, the
Court first determined that Monsanto had a property interest in trade secrets and that the
fundamental aspect of a trade secret was exclusive possession. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1002.
The Court, nevertheless, held that Monsanto had no reasonable, investment backed expectation that would prevent the federal government from disclosing Monsanto's trade
secrets, thereby destroying them. Id. at 1006-07. The Court did hold, however, that during a period when federal law provided that trade secret data would not be revealed except
on certain conditions, Monsanto had a reasonable, investment backed expectation that
would cause government disclosure of the data to constitute a taking for which Monsanto
would be entitled to just compensation. Id. at 1010-11. The Court does not explain why a
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state law now establishes a new right that attaches to land ownership,
the local government's interference with that right-the VPR-will
render the government liable for the payment of just compensation. If
the local government interferes with a VPR, it may be required to pay
just compensation to the property owner. Just compensation will equal
the fair market value of the VPR, which will include the diminution in
30 6
the value of the land to which the VPR was attached.
Arguably, section 24-68-105(1)(c) avoids the result described above
by limiting just compensation evolving from reliance damages and exproperty owner must undertake reasonable investments in order to secure a right to exclusive possession of property. In contrast, Loretto did not inquire into whether an apartment
building owner incurred reasonable investments, rather Loretto focused on the character of
the government's action. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 419.
Whatever the rationale for Monsanto, the situation should be different when the state
establishes that a landowner acquires a right to complete development and use of property
for three years following approval of site specific development plan and that the owner
need not make any reasonable investment to secure that right. Thus, the state defines a
fundamental attribute of property and negates any need for detrimental reliance to secure
that right against changes in government regulations. Although a state should be able to
repeal a statute creating vested property rights, the statute should be permitted to operate
prospectively only because property owners who have acquired VPRs should be able to
rely on the government's representation that reliance is unnecessary to vest a right. At the
very minimum, the government, if it repealed a statute that vested development rights
without detrimental reliance, must afford the owner a reasonable time period to commence development before extinguishing the vested development right. Compare FLA.
STAT. § 380.06(4), (20) (1988) (concerning the termination of vested rights in subdivision
against changes in the law pursuant to Florida's developments of regional impact ("DRI")
law). Formerly, under Chapter 380, owners of certain platted lands in Florida could be
vested without any detrimental reliance against changes in DRI regulations, while other
persons could vest their rights only by reliance. In 1985, Florida adopted a new, comprehensive land use management scheme that required owners to notify the government of
their claims of vested rights and allowed vested owners to undertake development within a
certain time period or else they would lose their vested status. The statute appears to
require owners who vested without reliance to notify the government of their claims, but it
does not terminate those rights except for failure to notify the government.
All that has been said to this point has assumed that government interference with a
VPR should constitute a taking. Equally arguable is that interference will be a violation of
substantive due process. Compare Littlefield v. City of Afton, 785 F.2d 596, 601 (8th Cir.
1986) (holding that applicant for building permit suffered substantive due process violation when government arbitrarily withheld permit). A substantive due process violation is
remediable under section 1983, which affords a right to money damages. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1982).
306. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City, 473 U.S. 172, 191-92 n.12 (1985) (discussing measure of damages for taking as a
result of interference with a vested property right). Clearly, if a property owner had a VPR
to build a ten-story building and the government downzones the property to five stories,
the owner has had five stories of development rights taken for which he should be compensated. The compensation might be based on the diminution in the value of the owners's estate in land or on the fair market value of the development rights that the
government has taken (assuming those two measures would yield different results). See
also Ossman v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 184 Colo. 360, 365-66, 520 P.2d 738, 74142 (1974) (discussing existence of inverse condemnation action in Colorado and holding
that exemplary damages are not available in such action). Ossman concerns a physical invasion of property. In Wright v. City of Littleton, 174 Colo. 318, 323, 483 P.2d 953, 956
(1971), the court also suggested that a zoning regulation that denies all owners any reasonable use of his or her property could constitute either a taking of property without just
compensation or a violation of due process. Since S.B. 219 reserves to the landowner a
right to claim a taking under common law principles, the statutory limitation on compensation may be irrelevant to a state inverse condemnation action.
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cluding compensation for "diminution in the value of the property
which is caused by such action" 30 7 that interferes with the VPR. There
are two answers to this argument. First, the section probably does no
more than delineate a state law remedy for interference with a VPR.
The section does not exclude a claim for relief under federal law which
applies federal rules on the elements ofjust compensation. Second, the
passage cannot be read as creating a diminutive property right- one for
which the owner of the right is entitled only to partial compensation
when it is taken. The United States Supreme Court has not adopted the
"half-a-loaf" theory of property rights. The theory would permit the
government to interfere with a so-called property right through any process established by the state, on the theory that the process for protecting the right is merely a reflection of the scope of the right in the first
instance.3 0 8 The court has taken an all-or-nothing approach with regard
to property rights. If a property right exists, the government will be
subject to the procedural due process requirements of the fourteenth
amendment and the owner will be compensated if the government takes
the property right. 3 0

9

In short, the apparent limitation of section 24-68-

105(l)(c) on government liability for interference with a VPR should
give little comfort to a local government which may be liable under federal law for interference with the VPR.
The five areas discussed in this section of the article are only some
of the many issues that the legislature or courts will need to address at
some future time. In the interim, the much sought-after certainty for
land developers will remain as elusive as the infamous "missing link."
V.

DRAFTING A LOCAL ORDINANCE OR REGULATION TO IMPLEMENT
SENATE BILL

219

At least some of the ambiguities of S.B. 219 may be cleared up if a
local government adopts a sufficiently specific local ordinance or regulation to implement the statute. Since local ordinances or regulations may
differ, a landowner must be careful to consult local law before asserting
a claim for a VPR.
307. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 24-68-105(l)(c) (Supp. 1987).
308. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 152-54 (1974) (plurality opinion by
Justice Rehnquist arguing that state could deprive a person of property interest pursuant
to state-established procedures that might not comport with due process because the procedure by which an interest may be deprived serves to define the scope of the property
interest in the first instance). Other courts have been less certain about the relationship
between procedures to protect individual interests and the existence of property rights.
See, e.g., Shelton v.City of College Station, 780 F.2d 475, 482 (5th Cir.) ("a state's use of
an adjudication-like mechanism for zoning decisions does not by itself . . . create such
[protected] property rights"), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3276, cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 89 (1986).
309. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 535 (1978) (noting that Rehnquist
has not obtained a majority for his positivist view of property rights); see also Cleveland
Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (majority dearly rejects Rehnquist's positivist view of property rights). Although cases like Arnett and Loudermill arise in
the context of procedural rights that a state affords to property rights, the analysis should
apply equally when a state purports to offer less than just compensation when it takes a
property right.
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Should the Local Government Implement Senate Bill 219 by Ordinance or
Regulation?

Section 24-68-102(4) permits a local government to determine what
constitutes a site specific development plan by "ordinance or regulation.'310 This language permits a local government to delegate the responsibility for determining what constitutes a site specific development
plan to any agency, such as a planning commission, which may enact
regulations to implement S.B. 219.311 From a flexibility point of view, it
may be better to implement S.B. 219 by regulations which may be
amended administratively rather than by ordinance which may be
amended only by legislative action. This flexibility may be important as
local governments learn to live with S.B. 219.
Section 24-68-102(4) appears to authorize a local government to
create a VPR only by entering into development agreements which are
designed to create VPRs when the government approves an agreement.
The section provides that a local government shall determine what constitutes a site specific development plan "either pursuant to ordinance or
regulation or upon an agreement. 3 1 2 If the local government really is
free to choose among three options for determining what constitutes a
site specific development, the government need not adopt an ordinance
or a regulation. This interpretation supports the view that S.B. 219 is
merely an enabling statute.3 1 3 The probable intent of the legislature
was to allow the government to establish a VPR by entering into a development agreement in addition to its adoption of an ordinance or regulation. Obviously, the statute's language poorly executes the legislative
intent.
Possibly, S.B. 219 does not envision that a local government will
adopt an ordinance or regulation of general application regarding
vested rights. Rather, if the government acts by ordinance to approve a
specific land use application, the site specific development plan is established by ordinance. If an administrative agency approves a specific application, then the site specific development plan may be established by
regulation. This approach is consistent with the statutory requirement
that "the document that triggers such vesting shall be so identified at the
time of its approval." ' 3 14 The "document" may refer to the ordinance,
regulation or development agreement establishing the VPR. 3 15 Still, a
310. COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-68-102(4) (Supp. 1987).
311. The definition of "local government" in S.B. 219 includes any local "commission,
or agency" that has "final approval authority" over a site specific development plan. Id. at
§ 24-68-102(2). One might ask if a commission or agency has "final approval authority"
when its approval is subject to appeal to a zoning board of adjustment or to the local
legislative body.
312. Id. at § 24-68-102(4) (emphasis added).

313. See supra notes 186-201 and accompanying text.
314.

See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-102(4).

315. It is more reasonable to interpret that "document" refers only to a development
agreement and not a document executed by a legislative body or other agency as part of
the adoption of an ordinance or regulation. Thus, only the document evidencing the development agreement must be identified as establishing a VPR. This interpretation makes
sense if state and, perhaps, local laws already identify those plans or approvals that consti-
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local government would be well-advised to have a general policy regarding the establishment of VPRs. This policy can assist the government in
making site specific determinations on whether a site specific development plan exists. The government may, for example, want to establish
precisely the certainty required for the type and intensity of use necessary for a plan or approval to qualify as a site specific development
3 16
plan.
B.

Which Plans or Approvals Shall the Government Designate as Site Specific
Development Plans?

The statute is not clear about how a site specific development plan
can be in the form of a land use approval, rather than a plan. 3 17 Perhaps
if a land use application is not reasonably certain regarding type and
intensity of use, but the approval of the application is, a site specific
development plan appears.
Assuming a local government need not designate every land use approval and every development plan that a landowner submits to it as a
site specific development plan--even if the approval or plan is reasonably certain as to the type and intensity of use-the government should
be very careful when designating approvals or plans as site specific development plans. The government should exclude from the definition
of these plans any plan involving a natural or man-made hazard in or
near the property that is subject to a land use application. Similarly,
plans or approvals involving environmentally sensitive lands should be
excluded. The government should establish sufficiently specific standards regarding the hazards and environmental considerations that will
exclude a plan or approval from constituting a site specific development
3 18
plan.
tute a site specific development plan. It is not necessary to identify specifically that the
plan or approval, whether accomplished by ordinance or regulation, constitutes a site specific development. When, however, the government and a developer enter into a development agreement, it will not be clear that the parties intended that the agreement establish
a VPR.
A self-executing statute would be consistent with a legislative intent to vest development rights pursuant to state law and without respect to local policy. Indeed, the effective
date of the statute was January 1, 1988, and the approval of any site specific development
plan on or after that date establishes a VPR. The statute did not become effective until
local adoption of an ordinance or regulation of general application. The statute did not
mandate that local governments adopt a general ordinance or regulation. Compare COLO.
REV. STAT. § 30-28-133 (1986) (regarding requirement that counties create planning commission and adopt subdivision regulations by September 1, 1972, or else the Colorado
Land Use Commission would adopt regulations for the county).
316. The courts should defer to a local government's judgment whether a specific development plan or approval lacks the "reasonable certainty" regarding type and intensity
of use necessary to constitute a site specific development plan even if a court holds that
S.B. 219 otherwise is self-executing. Local regulations may be necessary to provide a developer with sufficiently specific standards regarding what the local government believes is
necessary to establish "reasonable certainty." See Beaver Meadows v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 709 P.2d 928 (Colo. 1985) (regarding standards for approval of a planned unit
development). See also Dahl, supra note 236, at 4.
317.

CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-68-102(4).

318. See Beaver Meadows v. Board of County Comm'rs, 709 P.2d 928 (Colo. 1985)
(regarding standards for approval of a planned unit development). The fact that a devel-
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The local government also may exclude development proposals
above certain size thresholds, whether based on the number of units or
acres, from qualifying as a site specific development plan.3 19 Consequently, this policy will minimize the impact of a VPR by restricting its
establishment to downsized developments. As an alternative, the local
government may accomplish the same effect by amending its zoning,
subdivision or other land use approvals to developments that are limited
in size. In fact, the government may incorporate a public need criterion
into its various land use approvals that would permit the government to
deny approval when there is no public need for a rezoning or a subdivision. 320 The government may put the land use applicant to the proof
that other land that is properly zoned or already subdivided is not available for development.3 2 1 The purpose of these government techniques
is to limit the land mass in the jurisdiction that may lay claim to a VPR,
and thereby promote greater flexibility.
C.

How May the Government Condition a Land Use Approval?

Clearly, S. B. 219 provides for the local government to approve a
site specific development conditionally. The landowner's failure to comply with the "terms and conditions [of approval] will result in a forfeiture of the vested property rights."'3 22 Although the forfeiture appears
automatic, the local government should expressly state, in any land use
approval, that the landowner's failure to comply strictly with the terms
and conditions of approval will result in an automatic forfeiture of
vested rights, including any that could otherwise have been obtained
under common law.
oper may acquire a VPR when there is a natural or man-made hazard, see COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 24-68-105(1)(b) (Supp. 1987), does not mean that a developer has a right to develop
property when the government knows of a natural or man-made hazard in or near the
subject property. It merely means that if the government approves the development, a
VPR is established unless the hazard "could not reasonably have been discovered at the
time .. .[ofl approval." Id. The government can protect itself from approving development when it will be inappropriate to establish a VPR by conditioning approval on the
developer's waiver of a VPR, or better yet, by amending its other land use approval
processes to ensure that land associated with natural or man-made hazards or otherwise
unsuitable for certain types of development cannot receive approval irrespective of the
government's concern over establishment of a VPR. This review of other land use approval processes must be thorough and well thought out.
319.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-103.

320. See e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-3-608 (1987) (requiring government to determine
that proposed subdivision is in the public interest). One factor to determine whether a
proposed subdivision is in the public interest is "the basis of the need for the subdivision."
Id. at § 76-3-608(2)(a).
321. See Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs of Washington County, 264 Or. 574, 575,
507 P.2d 23, 28 (1973) (suggesting that rezoning is proper when there is no other available property that could be developed equally as well). In Neuberger v. City of Portland,
288 Or. 155, 163, 603 P.2d 771, 779 (1979), the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that,
considering the changes in Oregon statutory law, the other "available property" requirement should no longer be a mandatory factor when local governments consider rezoning
proposals. See also 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(l)(2)(ii) (1987) (Army Corps of Engineers' criteria
for issuing dredge or fill permits under section 404 of Clean Water Act, including whether
other available land may be developed).
322. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-103(1) (Supp. 1987).
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As a general matter, the government should always condition any
land use approval on the landowner's compliance with all local, state
and federal laws, including both statutes and regulations. The government may also condition a land use approval on the landowner's agreement to commence development within a specific time following the
approval. Similarly, the approval may be conditioned on the landowner's agreement not to abandon the project for any substantial period
of time. As a part of the terms and conditions of a land use approval,
the government should provide that the landowner agrees not to assert
any waiver by the government of its right to claim a forfeiture of the
owner's VPR unless the waiver is in writing and signed by a designated
3 23
government official.
4.

How May a Local Government Protect its Interests When
Entering Into a Development Agreement?

Development agreements could easily be the topic of an entire article;3 24 thus only a few brief comments will be made. Since the agreement should be the result of an arms-length negotiation, each partygovernment and landowner-should be able to insist on whatever terms
and conditions that it wants before consenting to the agreement. When
the government requires a landowner either to perform or promise to
perform certain acts as part of the owner's consideration, the requirements should not be subject to due process challenge any more than
3 25
other contracts that the government may enter.
In the development agreement, the government should insist on
several exculpatory clauses. First, the landowner will limit any claim
based on the government's alleged breach of the agreement to state law
contract claims. Second, the government will not be liable for breach of
the agreement if the conduct giving rise to the breach is mandated by
state or federal law. Third, the government cannot be held liable where
the interference with a VPR is the result of ordinary negligence.
5.

How Does the Government Avoid Interfering with a VPR?

The local government must take care that any land use regulation
adopted subsequent to establishment of a VPR does not interfere with
323. An interesting issue is whether the government may condition approval of land
use application on the applicant's waiver of any right to a VPR. The possibility runs contrary to the entire intent of S.B. 219, though a government might impose the condition
where it believes that vesting would be detrimental to public health and safety as applied
to a specific situation-for example, hillside or flood plain development. See supra notes
238-39 and accompanying text. The government, however, may condition approval of
certain developments involving natural or man-made hazards on the landowner's submission of sufficient data to permit the government to discover possible hazards relating to
development, no matter how remote. The government could agree to waive the requirement if the developer waives any claim to a VPR following approval. It is doubtful, however, that the government could impose artificially restrictive conditions on development
that the government would waive in exchange for the landowner's waiver of any claim to a
VPR. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3148 n.5 (1987).
324. See Wegner, supra note 268.
325. See supra note 274.
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the VPR. Section 24-68-105(1) does not require actual interference with
a VPR before compensation is paid: it is only necessary that a "zoning
or land use action ... would alter, impair, prevent, diminish, or otherwise
delay the development or use of the property. ' 3 26 The possibility exists
that a newly-enacted land use regulation that is not of the type considered in section 24-68-105(2) and that does not expressly exempt
properties subject to a VPR will violate the statute's prohibition on interference, except on payment of just compensation. Thus, the government should include boiler-plate provisions in all land use regulations
exempting all properties subject to a VPR, but only for the time for
3 27
which the VPR is effective with respect to each exempt property.
CONCLUSION

The proponents of Senate Bill No. 219 sought to introduce certainty into the real estate development process, but unfortunately, the
attempt was made by radically altering the existing common law vested
rights doctrine. Even assuming one could accept the political decision
that the Colorado legislature has made, one still must question the wisdom of adopting a law as opaque as S.B. 219. The concept of vested
rights is a difficult one that courts have struggled with for decades. Colorado courts now must struggle with the mysteries of both common law
and statutory vested rights.

326. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-68-105(1) (Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
327. As discussed elsewhere, there should be few land use regulations of general application that actually interfere with a VPR, and even those regulations that are site-specific
may no longer alter the "terms and conditions" of approval of the site specific development plan. See supra notes 208-15 and accompanying text. Thus, a local government
should not be overly generous in granting exemptions from its land use regulations. The
government also may avoid establishment of a VPR by limiting "approvals" until late in
the land development process. Section 24-68-103(1) provides that the VPR is established
when the government approves or conditionally approves the land use application. Thus,
the government may be able to amend its land use regulations to the land use applications
receiving something similar to tentative or preliminary approval. Similarly, consistent with
procedural due process requirements, the government may decline to give notice of and to
hold a hearing on land use applications until late in the regulatory process, thereby defeating establishment of a VPR. Id. (VPR created when plan is approved following notice and
hearing).

SELF INCRIMINATION AND THE INSANITY PLEA:
OUT OF THE MOUTHS OF BABES
SUZANNE R. ARMSTRONG*

In the first degree murder case of State v. Isley,I defendant Billy Isley
asserted the affirmative defense of insanity in addition to his plea of not
guilty. 2 The psychiatrist, who was appointed to determine Isley's sanity
at the time of the offense as well as Isley's competency to stand trial,
testified at trial as to statements made by the defendant during his psychiatric examination. The court gave no instruction that the statements
be considered solely on the issue of insanity.3 As a result, the psychiatrist's testimony, purportedly introduced to rebut Isley's insanity de4
fense, served to strengthen the state's case against Isley.
Despite the United States Supreme Court decision of Estelle v.
Smith, 5 holding that the use of a defendant's statements to a court-appointed psychiatrist violates the constitutional protection against self6
incrimination, and extensive legislative revision in the federal system,
the scope of the fifth amendment's protection remains uncertain when a
defendant attempts to introduce psychiatric evidence after asserting an
insanity or diminished capacity defense and submitting to a compelled
* Associate Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. B.A. 1967, University of Wyoming; M.A. 1971, University of South Carolina; J.D. 1980 (cum laude) Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. Law clerk to the Honorable Peter T. Fay,
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 1980-81.
1. State v. Isley, No. 75-737 B (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 15, 1975). The author was appointed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals to represent Isley in his appeal from the
denial of a petition for habeas corpus. The case was remanded to the district court because
Isley's counsel in the original habeas corpus proceeding had filed an Anders brief, and was
not, therefore, acting as an advocate for his client in that forum. Isley v. Wainwright, 792
F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1986). See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
2. Often a defendant will admit guilt and assert the defense of insanity to avoid being
found guilty. In cases such as Isley's where the defendant pleads not guilty and not guilty
by reason of insanity, he runs a great risk that evidence used for the insanity plea will
prejudice his not guilty plea. Nevertheless, such inconsistent pleading is allowed. See, e.g.,
Holmes v. United States, 363 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1966). This article is concerned with
those cases where the the defendant faces the risk that insanity evidence will be used for
purposes other than to determine the defendant's mental state.
3. In Florida, the defendant has the burden of overcoming the presumption of sanity
by going forward with evidence of insanity. The state must then prove sanity, as any other
element, beyond a reasonable doubt. See Holmes v. State, 374 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 913 (1980).
4. The Isley case is strikingly similar to the hypothetical case posed by White, The
Psychiatric Examination and the Fifth Amendment in Capital Cases, 74J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
943, 950-51 (1983), in which the defendant attempts to invoke the fifth amendment to
refuse to answer questions posed by the government's psychiatrist and the court rules that
he may not invoke the privilege if he wishes to call his own experts at trial. White uses this
hypothetical to illustrate his extensive discussion of the waiver doctrine in the insanity
cases.
5. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
6. See infra notes 133-59 and accompanying text.

DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW

[Vol. 66:1

examination. Will admissions or inculpatory statements made during
the examination be protected by the fifth amendment? Must a defendant give up his right against self-incrimination to assist in his defense?
Part One of this article briefly introduces the use of psychiatric testimony in multiple contexts and discusses how these uses can prejudice a
defendant who pleads both not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. Part Two illustrates the inherent problems with the fifth amendment in the kinds of cases introduced in Part One and discusses the
courts use of the waiver theory to justify admission of prejudicial evidence in insanity cases. Part Three focuses on statutory revisions dealing with the insanity defense in the federal system and recommends
legislative and judicial solutions. This article then concludes that the
use and admission of psychiatrists' testimony based upon compelled interviews is violative of the fifth amendment guarantee against selfincrimination.
I.

PART ONE:

USES OF PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY

IN MULTIPLE CONTEXTS

Government attempts to utilize psychiatric testimony for multiple
purposes, as in the Isley case, are not unusual. In Estelle v. Smith, 7 psychiatric testimony was introduced on the issue of future dangerousness in a
capital sentencing proceeding. The Court indicated it is the use of the
testimony in the proceeding and the danger of incrimination it invites
that forms the foundation for the implication of the fifth amendment
privilege. 8 The privilege, therefore, applies to any "disclosures which
... could be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other
evidence which might be so used." 9 The privilege applies where a stateirent is or may be inculpatory, no matter what type of proceeding is
involved. 10
Government utilization of psychiatric testimony has occurred in five
separate settings. First and primarily, there are numerous instances
where the defendant has, in the process of a psychiatric examination,
made direct admissions of guilt. In subsequently testifying, the psychiatrist related these statements as factual statements told to him by the
defendant. In instances such as Isley's where the actual facts of the
crime are disputed, such testimony may reasonably form the basis for a
As a result, courts have recognized that the
determination of guilt.'
psychiatric testimony of direct admissions implicates the fifth
amendment. 12
7. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
8. Id. at 462 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967)).
9. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 47-48 (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S.
52, 94 (1964)).
10. Id. at 49.
11. See, e.g., United States v. Madrid, 673 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 843 (1982) (statements made in competency examination admissible on issue of sanity at the time of the offense as basis of doctor's opinion).
12. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Kentucky, 107 S. Ct. 2906, 2918 (1987); United States v.
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Second, such admissions may be used by the state in proving the
requisite mens rea in any case requiring proof of specific intent or some
other mental state. In fact, evidence sufficient to prove mental capacity
may not be available to the state except through the sanity examination.
Thus, the defendant's election to plead insanity provides the govern3
ment with evidence allowing it to meet its burden.'
Third, a defendant can be incriminated by the expert's opinion even
though the defendant's statements and admissions are not specifically
discussed by the expert. Thus, when the expert opines that the defendant is sane, the opinion may suggest the defendant is guilty because he is
sane. 1 4 Fourth, a psychiatrist's testimony may be used for impeachment
purposes. A testifying defendant may be impeached with information
that is directly attributable to statements the defendant made in a confidential psychiatric interview. In these cases, the waiver of the privilege
is broad and the defendant obviously elects to submit himself to methods to ascertain the truthfulness of his testimony. When the defendant
elects to testify, this waiver may be said to be a knowing waiver; however, in cases where the defendant does not testify, evidence derived
from the confidential examination may also be used for impeaching the
credibility of the defendant's own experts in the guise of the government's need to test the basis of their opinions. Thus, a waiver of the
privilege may occur even though the defendant does not testify.
Finally, a general category exists represented by cases where the
psychiatrist's testimony had an impact at trial even though not in one of
the above mentioned ways. For example, in White v. Estelle,1 5 the court
held the fifth amendment was violated by use of the psychiatrist's testimony to establish future dangerousness based on a hypothetical ques16
tion which used facts gleaned from the psychiatric interview.
II.

PART

Two:

FOUNDATIONS OF THE WAIVER THEORY-ILLUSTRATION
OF WAIVER IN MULTIPLE USE CASES

In an attempt to accommodate the need of the judicial system for
evidence which is probative of the issues of insanity and mens rea, and the
right of the defendant not to incriminate himself, courts have implied a
"waiver" of the fifth amendment privilege in insanity cases. One of the
difficulties in giving context to the "waiver" of the fifth amendment in
these cases is that the term waiver is often used inaccurately in insanity
Henderson, 770 F.2d 724, 729 (8th Cir. 1985); Gibson v. Zahradnick, 581 F.2d 75, 78 (4th
Cir. 1978).
13.

See Berry, Self Incrimination and the Compulsory Mental Examination: A Proposal, 15

ARIZ. L. REV. 919, 936-37 (1973).
14.

Federal Rule of Evidence 704 now prohibits the expert from giving his opinion on

the ultimate issue of sanity. See United States v. Gold, 661 F. Supp. 1127, 1131 (D.D.C.
1987) (no testimony directly or indirectly opining on the issue of specific intent allowed).
15. 720 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1983).
16. Isley's case is of this type in that the testimony of the psychiatrist was used to lend
credence to the testimony of the state's primary witness, herself a participant in the crime.
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cases. The "waiver" is in part an abrogation of the right against selfincrimination and in part a balance of state and individual interests.
When a defendant pleads an insanity defense or otherwise puts his
mental condition in issue, he can be viewed as electing to burden his
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination in order to exercise a
due process right; the right to present competent evidence in his defense.' 7 This appears in the insanity cases to be permissible despite the
fact that in Simmons v. United States, 18 the Supreme Court held that a defendant could not be forced to choose between a valid fourth amendment claim and a waiver of his fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination. The defendant in Simmons testified in a pretrial suppression hearing that established ownership of a container which had been
illegally seized. The defendant's ownership was a critical element at trial
on the issue of guilt. The Court said, "[i]n these circumstances, we find
it intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered
in order to assert another."' 19 Recognizing that the defendant was
"compelled" to testify at the pretrial hearing only if he wished to benefit
from the exclusionary rule, the Court found this forced election intolerable when the so called "benefit" sought was a constitutionally guaran20
teed right.
Despite the Simmons case, the government has generally been successful in requiring a defendant to waive the fifth amendment privilege
in such instances. For example, a defendant may be forced to accept
immunity and speak when he would otherwise have a right to remain
silent. 2 1 As commentators have noted, 22 in immunity cases the government extends the positive benefit of immunity, thereby eliminating any
harm to the defendant. The insanity defense, however, presents a more
difficult conundrum. If the defendant's right to offer competent evidence in his defense is recognized as a fundamental, even constitutional
right, the resulting waiver of the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination when insanity is asserted as a defense forces the defendant
to choose between the rights without receiving a "benefit." He is in the
same "intolerable" situation the Court saw in Simmons.
17. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973), holds that the defendant has a
fundamental right to present exculpatory evidence in accord with traditional standards of
due process. Recently, in Taylor v. Illinois, 108 S. Ct. 646 (1988), the Supreme Court
affirmed that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment guarantees the defendant

the right to put before the jury evidence that might influence the determination of guilt.
108 S. Ct. at 652. See also Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). There is no constitutional "right" to present an insanity defense, but the right to present psychiatric evidence, reaffirmed in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), illustrates the importance of
psychiatric based defenses.
18. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
19. Id. at 394.
20.

See also Mobley ex relRoss v. Meek, 531 F.2d 924 (8th Cir. 1976) (confession at

plea bargain could not be admitted as violation of fifth amendment; such a statement held
not "voluntary").
21. See, e.g., New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979); Kastigar v. United States, 406

U.S. 441 (1972).
22. Slobogin, Estelle v. Smith:
EMORY L.J. 71, 91 (1982).

The Constitutional Contours of the Forensic Evaluation, 31
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The Supreme Court's decision in Estelle v. Smith 23 recognizes the
compulsory nature of the competency examination and the fifth amendment ramifications when evidence gained from the examination is used
for purposes other than a competency determination. 24 In Smith, the
defendant was given a pretrial competency examination. He was convicted of first degree murder in a bifurcated proceeding 25 in which the
issue of future dangerousness was litigated at the capital sentencing
hearing. The state introduced the testimony of the psychiatrist who examined the defendant. The Court held that since Smith was examined
by the court-appointed psychiatrist solely for the purpose of determining competency to stand trial, the psychiatrist's testimony on the issue of
dangerousness must be excluded on fifth amendment grounds. As a result, a defendant may not constitutionally be compelled to respond to a
psychiatrist's questions if his answers can be used against him in a capital sentencing proceeding. 26 Smith neither voluntarily agreed to the examination nor sought to introduce psychiatric evidence. He received no
2 7
warning that his statements would or could be used by the state.
Smith clearly protects the fifth amendment privilege of the defendant who is examined solely for the purpose of determining competency
and who does not plead the insanity defense. However, it leaves unresolved the fifth amendment waiver issue in circumstances where
mental status is an issue upon which the defendant must produce evidence at trial. In these cases, the need for the government to rebut evidence adduced in support of an insanity defense, or otherwise counter
evidence of mental condition, has caused some courts to find an implied
waiver of the fifth amendment privilege. The circumstances of the
waiver, however, are only slightly more voluntary than in Simmons and
Smith.
Two cases relied on by the Court in Smith 2 8 illustrate the underpinnings of the waiver theory. Although factually these cases varied significantly, in each case the defendant asserted a plea of insanity as a
defense.
In United States v. Bohle, 2 9 the government's request for a pretrial
psychiatric examination was refused. 30 On the second day of trial, after
the defendant had raised the issue of insanity, the court ordered an examination. The defendant's requests to have his own psychiatrist and
23. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
24. Id. at 465. The Court said that if the examination and testimony therefrom is
confined to the issue of competency, there is no fifth amendment problem.
25. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 37.071(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
26. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468 (1981).

27. Id.
28. United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bohle, 445
F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976).
29. 445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971).
30. The opinion is not clear as to whether the purpose of the examination was to
determine competency or sanity. The possibility of an insanity defense was raised at a
bond hearing, but the plea was not asserted until trial. Id. at 58, 66.
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counsel present were denied. 3 ' The basis of the Seventh Circuit's justification for ordering the examination was "the great importance of expert testimony on the issue of insanity and .

.

. the minimal risk to the

Fifth Amendment privilege."13 2 The court concluded that since the examination had as its sole inquiry the expert's opinion of the defendant's
33
mental capacity to form intent, the fifth amendment was not violated.
The evidence would not be introduced to aid in the establishment of
facts showing the defendant committed the acts constituting the crime.
The Seventh Circuit ruled that as the trial court had cautioned counsel,
and presumably the jury, that any testimony predicated upon the psychiatrist's testimony would go to the issue of insanity only, the defendant's
fifth amendment privilege was fully protected. Thus, the court reasoned
that the privilege narrowly reaches only statements introduced to show
the defendant actually committed the offense, but not statements
brought in on the issue of sanity.3

4

The decision ignores the practicality

that facts brought out in the compelled competency examination will
establish intent as an element of the government's case, in addition to
the principle that the privilege protects statements which may be incrim3
inating, whatever their use.

5

In United States v. Cohen, 36 also relied on by the Supreme Court in
Smith, the defendant argued that since insanity negates intent-an element of the crime-the trial court violated his fifth amendment privilege
when it forced him to submit to an examination by the government's
psychiatrist after he had interposed the insanity defense.3 7 The Fifth
Circuit held that the examination was proper, but based its decision on
the government's need for a satisfactory method of disproving the defendant's insanity evidence. According to the Fifth Circuit, it is nearly
impossible to prove sanity without a statement from the defendant. 3 8
The court held it would permit compelled examinations and use of evidence therefrom when the defendant has raised the insanity issue
"[s]ince any statement about the offense itself could be suppressed."13 9
The decision purports to protect some statements of the defendant but
holds the defendant's individual right subject to the government's need.
In contrast, United States v. 4lvarez, 40 a decision not relied on by the
Court in Smith, illustrates the inconsistency of the "waiver" cases. In
Alvarez, the defendant was successful in his argument that sanity is an
issue probative of guilt or innocence which the government must prove
31. On appeal, the issue of the exclusion of defendant's psychiatrist was deemed
waived for failure to assert it as error. Id. at 66.
32. Id.
33. ld; see also United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968) (examination
determined not guilt but capacity to be guilty).
34. 445 F.2d at 66-67.
35. See infra notes 73-92 and accompanying text.
36. 530 F.2d 43 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976).
37. 530 F.2d at 47.

38. Id. at 48 n.14.
39. 530 F.2d at 47; see also United States v. Bohle, I 455 F.2d 54, 66-67 (7th Cir.
1971); United States v. Baird, 414 F.2d 700, 710-11 (2d Cir. 1969).
40. 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975).
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without the defendant's assistance. In that case, a competency examination was ordered and the defendant was found competent. Insanity was
raised at trial, and the government's psychiatrist was allowed to testify,
over objection, that while the defendant denied involvement in the
crime, the defendant knew his acts were wrong. 4 1 The Third Circuit
held that the privilege against self-incrimination is violated when any
statement elicited in a compelled examination tends to establish the fact
42
of the offense.
Thus, in Bohle and Cohen, fairness to the government or state required waiver of the fifth amendment privilege when the defendant introduced the issue of insanity. In Smith and Alvarez, fairness to the
defendant required that the defendant not be surprised by the use of his
statements made in a competency examination when insanity was not
anticipated to be an issue at trial.
The fairness to the government idea has, however, long been used
by federal courts to allow evidence taken from psychiatric examinations
to be introduced when insanity is pled. This is true even in instances
like Alvarez where the examination was clearly one to determine competency. In Alvarez, the court refused to accept the government's argument that the competency examination ought to be considered as having
a dual purpose; the determination of competency and the determination
of sanity. The government sought to rely on a segment of cases in which
a waiver of the fifth amendment privilege has been implied when the
original examination was for competency to stand trial under former 18
U.S.C. section 424443 but the psychiatrist was allowed to testify as to
issues other than competency at trial, particularly on the issue of sanity.
The power to order competency examinations originates in the idea
that we recognize the need in our judicial system for the defendant to
understand the proceedings against him and to assist in the preparation
of his defense. 4 4 In Pate v. Robinson,4 5 the United States Supreme Court
held the state has a constitutional duty to determine the mental condition of a defendant whose competency to stand trial is questioned and
such a defendant cannot "knowingly waive" this defense. In the federal
system, the statute authorizing the competency examination offers protection to the defendant by way of excluding the evidence gained from a
41. Id. at 1041.
42. Id. at 1042. While Alvarez appears to offer very broad protection to the defendant's constitutional right against self-incrimination, it can be argued that it is not based on
constitutional grounds. The court found that the examination ordered was clearly one to
determine competency, and it reserved judgment on the issue whether the fifth amendment would protect use, solely on the insanity issue, of evidence gleaned from an examination to determine sanity.
43. 62 Stat. 855. This section was revised as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II § 403(a), 98 Stat. 2057. The new provision,
located at 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (Supp. IV 1986), is substantially similar to the old competency
section, but the new statute adds section 4242, which authorizes the courts to order sanity
examinations.
44. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960); Featherston v. Mitchell, 418 F.2d
582, 586 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 937 (1970).
45. 383 U.S. 375, 384-86 (1966).
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competency examination from admission on the issue of guilt. 46 The
defendant is compelled to respond to the order requiring examination, 4 7 but the isolation of the competency issue from the issues of guilt,
intent, and justification-theoretically at least-assures that the defendant suffers no prejudice by submitting to an examination for the sole
48
purpose of determining competency.
In the dual purpose cases, however, the courts have used a widely
recognized "inherent power" to order sanity examinations. The assumption underlying the power is that expert testimony is critical to the
insanity issue; the courts, therefore, must be able to compel the defendant to cooperate with an examiner where insanity is an issue or the government would be deprived of the necessary expert testimony. 49 It is
thus not an inherent power in the true constitutional sense but rather an
extension of due process or fairness concerns to the government.
The result of the use of the "inherent power" has been to authorize
dual purpose examinations if, "under the particular facts and circumstances of the case, the order does not impermissibly infringe the defendant's constitutional guarantees." 50 For example, in United States v.
Wade, 51 the Ninth Circuit held that an order appointing a psychiatrist to
conduct a dual purpose examination was not authorized under 18
U.S.C. section 4244. Instead, the court held the trial court possessed
52
inherent power to order the examination. In United States v. Malcolm,

the same court held that concepts of estoppel, waiver, and fundamental
fairness allow the court to overcome the fifth amendment privilege when
the government asks for an examination after the defendant raised the
insanity defense. 53 In United States v. Jacquillon,54 the Fifth Circuit held
that in certain circumstances a psychiatrist who has examined a defendant to determine competency might be competent to testify as to
insanity.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(f) (Supp. IV 1986).
47. Presumably, the defendant could be held in contempt for failure to cooperate
when a competency examination is ordered. Additionally, the uncooperative defendant
runs the risk of displaying "lack of remorse" by his silence before the doctor. Cf Gholson
v. Estelle, 675 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1982). This differs from the sanction of excluding the
defense of insanity or excluding defendant's psychiatric expert when defendant refuses to
cooperate with a court-appointed psychiatrist conducting a sanity examination, a sanction
which appears in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.2 (d). In Taylor v. Williams, 108
S. Ct. 646, 653 (1988), the Court upheld a similar sanction prohibiting testimony of a
defense witness when the defendant failed to comply with a discovery order. Though the
defendant has a right to present evidence, he must do so within established rules of procedure. 108 S. Ct. at 653, n.15 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)).
48. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 465 (1981). The courts have not given full
explanations of the determination that the privilege is not implicated when competency is
the sole issue. See Note, Requiring a Criminal Defendant to Submit to a Government Psychiatric
Examination: An Invasion of the PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination, 83 HARV. L. REV. 648, 64950 (1970).
49. United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54, 66 (7th Cir. 1971).
50. United States v. Malcolm, 475 F.2d 420, 424 (9th Cir. 1973).
51. 489 F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1973).
52. 475 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1973).
53. Id. at 425.
54. 469 F.2d 380, 389 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 938 (1973).

1988]

INCRIMINATION AND THE INSANITY PLEA

In both Malcolm and Jacquillon, procedural defaults prevented the
defendants from prevailing on the fifth amendment privilege. Though
the defendant in Malcolm had not invoked the insanity defense at the
time the dual purpose examination was conducted and was not informed
that the order appointing the psychiatrist authorized such a dual purpose examination, he failed to object to the examination at the time he
pled insanity. Jacquillon, who was surprised at trial by the introduction
of the psychiatric testimony, was unable to show that he was prejudiced
by the dual purpose examination.
Though the dual purpose cases allow the court flexibility in ordering examinations and prevent duplication of effort, it is difficult to see
how a waiver of the fifth amendment privilege can be found when the
defendant has not yet pleaded insanity at the time of the examination.
When the defendant is examined under a statute purporting to authorize only the pretrial issue of competency, it can hardly be said he has
knowingly waived his right to fifth amendment protection on any issue at
trial. The dual purpose cases, then, present an even less appealing circumstance for implying a waiver than the cases where the incriminating
testimony comes from an examination which is actually a sanity evaluation. In neither case, however, does the defendant make a full and
knowing waiver.
It is possible that the United States Supreme Court has recognized
the ineptitude of the waiver analogy. For example, in Buchanan v. Kentucky, 5 5 the waiver terminology does not appear. Buchanan asserted the
defense of "extreme emotional disturbance;" in asserting this defense,
he bore the burden of proof at trial. 56 Buchanan introduced the mental
status issue by calling a social worker to present evidence of his psychological status. He requested that the social worker read from several reports and letters from his medical records prepared five years before the
occurrence of the crime for which he was charged. At the time of the
creation of the records, he was a juvenile in custody charged with the
crime of burglary. 5 7 At trial, the prosecution sought to have defendant's
witness read from a report of a psychological examination made at the
joint request of defense and prosecution at the time the defendant was
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court on the current charge of
murder.5 8 The evaluation was authorized by a statute 59 governing involuntary hospitalization and treatment. Defendant objected on the
ground that the hospitalization examination was irrelevant. 60 The
Supreme Court held that the report of the recent examination could be
55. 107 S.Ct. 2906 (1987).
56. Id. at 2910 n.8.
57. Id. at 2910 n.9.
58. Id. at 2911, n.10.
59. Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 202A.010-990 (1977).
60. The Court noted that there appeared to be some confusion regarding this examination in the state courts. The examination, according to the Supreme Court, was for
hospitalization although the Kentucky Supreme Court referred to it as a competency examination. The report did contain the psychiatrist's opinion on the issue of competency,
although this portion of the report was not read to the jury. 107 S. Ct. at 2911 n. 1.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 66:1

admitted, distinguishing Buchanan from Smith in three respects. First,
the defendant in Buchanan had requested the examination. Second, the
defendant in Buchanan had asserted a mental status defense. 6 1 Third,
the examination report had not included any statements by Buchanan
dealing with the crime charged. 6 2 The introduction of the report for the
"limited" purpose of rebutting the mental status defense did not, ac63
cording to the Court, violate the fifth amendment.
The reasoning of the Buchanan decision appears to be that the fifth
amendment privilege in insanity cases is narrowly confined to instances
where the government goes beyond what is necessary to rebut the defense and attempts to use statements by the defendant dealing with
crimes for which he is charged. If this can be taken as a sign that the
Court has determined that waiver is not the correct analogy, the decision is valuable for academic reasons because it appears to recognize
that waiver of a constitutional right should be extremely limited when no
substitute benefit is offered. The decision leaves a void, however, for
the practitioner who must advise his client how much of his privilege will
be given up if he asserts a mental status defense.
In Pope v. United States, 6 4 the court suggested that the defendant
"waived" the fifth amendment protection by voluntarily making psychological evaluation an issue in the case. 6 5 More than a decade later, the
waiver idea in insanity cases had grown to such an extent that the Fifth
Circuit in Battie v. Estelle6 6 said its earlier decision in United States v. Cohen 67 stood for the proposition that the introduction of psychiatric testimony by the defendant constituted a waiver of the fifth amendment
privilege in the same manner as would the defendant's election to testify
at trial, despite the fact that Cohen specifically said that statements of the
defendant should be suppressed. 68 Despite the pervasive use of the
term "waiver," courts have given little substance to its scope or circumstances. Assuming it is a waiver, it is not a voluntary relinquishment of
the privilege against self-incrimination for two reasons: first, the decisions have not made clear precisely how much or exactly under what
circumstances a relinquishment of the right will occur; second, it is questionable whether an incompetent or insane defendant would be fully
aware of the consequences of injecting the mental status issue. Because
the relinquishment of the right appears to rest more on the need for a
fair inquiry into the defendant's culpability 69 than on the defendant's
61. Id. at 2918.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967) (en banc), vacated and remanded on other grounds. 392
U.S. 651 (1968).
65. 372 F.2d at 720.
66. 655 F.2d 692, 701-02 (5th Cir. 1981).
67. 530 F.2d 43 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976).
68. See text accompanying note 41.

69. See United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (plurality
opinion).
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"free and unconstrained" election, 70 perhaps it should not be called a
waiver at all.
Before suggesting how the courts and the legislatures might accommodate both the need for probative evidence and the protection of the
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, it is helpful to see how
the scope of the privilege has been varied in the cases following Smith. It
appears that with respect to some uses of psychiatric testimony, the privilege remains. Accordingly, the cases fall into categories as follows.
A.

Admissions

The cases in which the fifth amendment privilege and the use of
testimony of the court-appointed psychiatrist most clearly conflict are
those in which the defendant makes actual admissions of guilt to the
psychiatrist and the psychiatrist then testifies as to the admissions. 7 1 In
a clear majority of cases, courts have held that admissions made to
72
court-appointed psychiatrists are inadmissible on the issue of guilt.
Prior to Smith, this result was justified on due process grounds. In Collins
v. Auger, 7 3 for example, the district court excluded the defendant's confession to a court-appointed psychiatrist during a competency interview
that he committed the act with which he was charged. In affirming the
district court's reasoning, the Eighth Circuit concluded it was fundamentally unfair to use the defendant's admissions made during a psychi74
atric interview as part of the prosecution's case.
In Gibson v. Zahradnick,75 the Fourth Circuit reached the same result
on fifth amendment grounds. In Gibson, the defendant exhibited bizarre
behavior immediately after he was incarcerated. After treatment for a
self-inflicted injury (defendant believed a microphone had been implanted in his ear and tore the ear off in an attempt to get the
microphone out), defense counsel requested an order that the defendant be examined by a private physician. Before the examination, the
defendant was transferred to a state hospital where he conferred with a
psychiatrist. At trial, the state offered testimony of one of the state hospital psychiatrists that defendant had told him he remembered going to
70. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961); see Byers, 740 F.2d at 1113
(plurality opinion).
71. In many cases where the insanity defense is pleaded, the defendant admits the acts
and is therefore guilty if he is sane. See Limiting the Insanity Defense, Hearings before the Subcommittee on CriminalLaw of the Committee on theJudiciary, United States Senate, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982) [hereinafter Limiting the Insanity Defense]. In those cases, the admissions are used to
support a diagnosis of sanity and in that respect become self-incriminating. Byers, 740 F.2d
at 1108.
72. See cases cited in United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d at 1149 n.60 (Bazelon, J., dissenting), and Gibson v. Zahradnick, 581 F.2d 75, 78 (4th Cir. 1978).
73. 428 F. Supp. 1079, 1082-83 (S.D. Iowa 1977).
74. 577 F.2d 1107 (8th Cir. 1978). The actual holding of the Eighth Circuit was based
on a determination that the defendant showed sufficient "cause and prejudice" to be relieved of a procedural default and would be allowed to raise the self-incrimination point.
See Wainiwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
75. 581 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 996 (1978).
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his father-in-law's house and shooting him. 7 6 This testimony corroborated testimony of another witness that the defendant was the assailant.
In holding the testimony inadmissible, the court stated when the examination is one to determine sanity authorized under the court's inherent
power, the fifth amendment privilege bars the use of an incriminating
statement made to a psychiatrist for the purpose of proving a defendant's guilt. 7 7 The court stated the same rule would apply in Gibson, a
habeas corpus case, by force of the fourteenth amendment, even though
the "inherent" power to order the examination might not be involved.
The rule applies, according to the court, whether the examination producing the testimony is requested by the defense or by the prosecution,
78
and whether for the purpose of determining competency or sanity.
Conflict arises, however, where the defendant's admissions enter
the record as testimony to establish or rebut sanity and are carried over
by the factfinder to determine the issue of guilt. In any crime in which
specific intent is an element, the defendant should have the opportunity
to present evidence of lack of mental capacity to form intent. Likewise,
the state has the burden of proving specific intent as an element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 79 Evidence probative of incapacity to
form intent is frequently relevant to the issue of insanity, an issue upon
which the defendant bears the burden of proof in many jurisdictions. 80
Because the insanity defense is inseparable from the concept of culpable
mental state, it has been argued that the fifth amendment privilege
should apply equally to the issues of mental state and sanity. 8i
In Devine v. Solem, 82 the defendant, charged with burglary, entered
pleas of guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. Though the state
trial court held that psychiatrists would not be permitted to testify to
admissions made "out of the blue" 8 3 concerning the offense charged,
one doctor testified the defendant stated he "intentionally got into
trouble" and went to the allegedly burglarized apartment and damaged
it. 8 4 Additionally, the court admitted statements that the defendant said
he made up symptoms of mental illness in order to be transferred to a
medical facility, wanted to be evaluated "to come up with a better solution," and had committed a crime. 85 All three admissions were relevant
to the issue of sanity, but the court of appeals held the admission that
the defendant went to the apartment must be excluded because it was
76. 581 F.2d at 77.
77. Id. at 78. The court relied on United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir.
1968), for this analysis.
78. 581 F.2d at 78-79.
79. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
80. Under 18 U.S.C. § 17 (Supp. IV 1986), insanity is now an affirmative defense in
the federal courts. The burden of proof-by clear and convincing evidence-is on the
defendant.

81. See United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting).
82. 815 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1987).
83. Id. at 1206.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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relevant to the issue of guilt and therefore violated the privilege against
8
self-incrimination. 6

,

In Smith, the Court said "the availability of the Fifth Amendment
privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is involved, but upon the nature of the statement or admission and
the exposure which it invites." 8 7 If an aim of the privilege is preservation of the integrity of the judicial system in which the prosecution is
required to "shoulder the entire load," 88 then requiring the state to
prove its case, without relying on the admissions of the defendant made
in the compelled interview, would reinforce the policies of the privilege
and discourage oppressive prosecutorial tactics. Some courts that have
used the waiver theory to allow use of admissions made by the defendant have been overbroad in their analysis. 89 The rationale for the waiver
is that it would be unfair to allow the defendant to refuse to be examined
by the government psychiatrist and then allow the defendant to introduce his own expert testimony on the issue of sanity. While this may be
generally correct, a more equitable state/individual balance could be obtained by requiring the defendant to undergo the examination but to
narrowly circumscribe use of the testimony at trial, particularly direct
admissions of the defendant.9 0 Because the best evidence both of sanity
and guilt comes from the lips of the defendant, a narrow judicial interpretation of the "waiver" theory would seem to further the policies of
the fifth amendment most effectively.
B.

Impeachment

The issue as to whether the defendant's statements made to the
court-appointed psychiatrist may be used for impeachment depends
upon two variables: (1) whether the defendant takes the stand, and
(2) whether the statements were "compelled." As a general rule, the
testifying defendant is subject to impeachment even when the impeaching evidence would be inadmissable in the government's case in chief.9 '
This is so despite language in Miranda v. Arizona, 92 to the contrary:
The privilege against self incrimination protects the individual
from being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner
.... Statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial ....
These statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense of
the word and may not be used without the full warnings and
86. Id. at 1207.
87. 451 U.S. at 462 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967)).
88. Tehan v. United States ex rel Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
90. Some courts seem prepared to keep the waiver narrow when direct admissions are
involved, but the issue appears not to have come up directly. In Buchanan v. Kentucky,
107 S. Ct. 2906 (1987), for example, the Court found no prejudice because defendant
failed to make "any statements." Id. at 2918 (emphasis in original).
91. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62
(1954).
92. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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effective waiver required for any other statement.93
The fifth amendment protection offered with respect to the compelled psychiatric examination is an extension of Miranda.9 4 In Smith,
the Court reasoned a compelled psychiatric examination produced the
same coercive pressures as custodial interrogation and there was no less
of a need in the compelled psychiatric examination for the accused to be
aware of his fifth amendment privilege and the consequences of foregoing it. 9 5 It would seem, therefore, that the above language from Miranda
would foreclose use of information gained from an unwarned psychiatric
interview for impeachment.
The Supreme Court has, however, in balancing the needs served by
the exclusionary rule against the needs of the judicial process, carved
exceptions allowing the use of otherwise excludable evidence for impeachment. In Harrisv. New York, 96 for example, the Court simply identified the above broad prohibition in Miranda as dictum. 9 7 In allowing
the use of unwarned statements made to police to be admitted on the
issue of the testifying defendant's credibility, the Court emphasized that
though the defendant has the right to testify, he has no right to commit
perjury.98 Relying on the earlier decision in Walder v. United States, 9 9
which allowed the defendant to be impeached as to a collateral matter
included in direct examination, the Court in Harris extended the use of
prohibited evidence to impeach the defendant's direct testimony on
matters directly related to crimes for which he was being tried. 100 This
extension burdens the defendant's choice of whether to testify in his
own behalf. 1
In United States v. Havens,' 0 2 the Court permitted illegally seized evidence to be used in rebuttal to impeach the defendant's responses to
questions put forth on cross examination. As Justice Brennan noted in
dissent, this allows the prosecutor to "work in . . . evidence on cross-

10 3
examination [as it would] in its case in chief."
In light of these cases, it would not be surprising to find that courts
are finding broad waiver of the fifth amendment privilege when the insanity defendant takes the stand, thus allowing wide latitude in the use
of psychiatric testimony. Evidence that is foreclosed from government
use in the case-in-chief because made in a compelled psychiatric interview, without Miranda warnings, becomes admissible on the issue of

93. 384 U.S. 436,476-77 (1966) (quoted in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 230-31
(1970)) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 467, 469 (1981).
95. Id.
96. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
97. Id. at 224.
98. Id. at 225 (citing United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969)).
99. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
100. 401 U.S. at 227 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 230 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102. 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
103. Id. at 632 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (quoting Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62,
66 (1954)).
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credibility. In Booker v. Wainwright,' 0 4 when the defendant testified to
his lapse of memory, the court found no constitutional bar to the introduction, for impeachment purposes, of evidence of the defendant's state
of mind on the day of the crime and of the defendant's previous violent
attacks on persons gleaned from the psychiatric report. 10 5 The logic of
the court was as follows: since Harris says Miranda cannot be used to
shield a perjuring defendant, and since Smith followed from Miranda,
then Smith cannot shield the perjuring defendant. 10 6 Taking this syllogistic reasoning and adding to it the holding in Battie v. Estele, 107 that
the "introduction of psychiatric testimony by the defense constitutes a
waiver of the fifth amendment privilege in the same manner as would
the defendant's election to testify at trial," one must conclude that
where the defendant chooses to use the insanity defense, he will be subject to impeachment from a previous psychiatric report despite the privi0 8
lege against self-incrimination. 1
The reasoning in Booker should not go uncriticized. In New Jersey v.
Portash,10 9 the Supreme Court held that legislatively immunized grand
jury testimony could not be used to impeach the credibility of a testifying defendant. It distinguished Harris on the ground that although Harris' statements were unwarned, they were not involuntary or coerced." 10
There being no question that testimony given in response to a grant of
immunity is coerced in the sense that the witness' choice is to talk or face
contempt, the Court held that the system's truth-seeking purpose need
not be balanced and that use of the testimony was impermissible. I "I
When the impeaching testimony in a case comes from a competency interview, the reasoning of Portash should preclude its use since the defendant's choice in the competency context is to cooperate or face
contempt, the same choice given in Portash. 1 2 In cases where the competency examination serves a dual purpose and the defendant was unaware at the time of the examination that he would later assert the
insanity defense, 1 1 3 the reasoning of Portash should similarly preclude
the evidence's use for impeachment.
In cases where the defendant has interposed the insanity defense
before the examination which produces the impeachment evidence, the
reasoning of Simmons 114 should preclude its use. The defendant, as ar104. 703 F.2d 1251 (11th Cir. 1983).
105. Id. at 1258-59.
106. Id. at 1259.
107. 655 F.2d 692, 701-02 (5th Cir. 1981).
108. See also Hargrave v. Wainwright, 804 F.2d 1182, 1192 (11 h Cir. 1987) (implying a
very broad waiver of the privilege when insanity is pleaded).
109. 440 U.S. 450 (1979).
110. Id. at 458.
Ill. Id. at 459; see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (statements made after
hospitalized defendant repeatedly asked for a lawyer were involuntary; therefore, use for
impeachment was prohibited).
112. United States v. Malcolm, 475 F.2d 420, 424 (9th Cir. 1973).
113. E.g., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975); see supra notes 42-45
and accompanying text.

114. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
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gued by Justice Brennan dissenting in Harris, has a constitutional guarantee that he "be free to deny all the elements of the case against him
without thereby giving leave to the government to introduce .by way of
rebuttal, evidence illegally secured by it, and therefore not available for
its case in chief."' 1 5 The defendant has a due process right to present
evidence in his defense; to force him to waive his fifth amendment privilege, even for the limited purposes of impeachment, impermissibly burdens that right. Even though, as the Fifth Circuit stated in Bathe v.
Estelle,' 16 this burden is justified by the state's overwhelming need for
the evidence and by the need to prevent fraudulent mental defenses, the
burden would seem to be less justified in the impeachment context than
in rebuttal of the insanity defense.
A case which would arguably justify the use of the testimony in impeachment is Noggle v. Marshall.'1 7 In Noggle, the defendant was uncooperative. Prior to trial, Noggle was examined by defense psychiatrists
with a view towards entering an insanity defense. On advice of counsel,
the defendant refused to cooperate with an independent expert appointed by the court. Noggle did not take the stand. Two defense psychiatrists testified in response to hypothetical questions that Noggle was
insane. On cross examination, the state was allowed to elicit specific
facts told by the defendant to the doctors, including an admission that
he had stabbed the victim.' 18 The court held the state had the right to
test the validity of the defense experts' opinions' 1 9 and found the defendant was not prejudiced when the court refused to instruct the jury
that the testimony could not be used on the issue of guilt, but only on
the issue of sanity. 1 20 Thus, evidence directly from defendant's lips entered the record through a psychiatrist and was used to incriminate the
defendant based on the governmental need to impeach the defendant's
experts, even though the defendant did not take the stand.' 2 ' While
this appears to be a blatant violation of the privilege, Noggle is at least a
case where knowing actions of the defendant prevented the state from
rebutting the insanity defense. His refusal to cooperate with the independent expert arguably justified the use of the evidence.
In Gholson v. Estelle,12 2 the Fifth Circuit rejected the government's
argument that testimony from a court-appointed psychiatrist introduced
115.

401 U.S. at 228 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Walder v. United States, 347

U.S. 62, 65 (1954)).
116. 655 F.2d 692, 702 (5th Cir. 1981).
117. 706 F.2d 1408 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1010 (1983).
118. 706 F.2dat 1411.
119. In part, this holding must be grounded on Ohio Rule of Evidence 705 which requires an expert to disclose the underlying facts upon which an opinion is based. 706 F.2d
at 1416 n.9.
120. Id. at 1417.
121. A distinguishing factor in Noggle is that the evidence was not the product of a
court-appointed examination. The Noggle court, however, saw no difference in compulsion
between a court-ordered examination and the subpoena of a psychiatrist who has made an
evaluation for the defendant, since evidence of sanity can only be obtained from the defendant. Id. at 1415 n.6.
122. 675 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1982).
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to contradict testimony of the defendant's doctor was "impeachment"
evidence allowed by Hamris.123 The Harris exception, according to the
court, applies only when the defendant has chosen to testify in his own
behalf. In Gholson, the defendant was examined by Dr. Grigson to determine sanity. A second psychiatrist, Dr. Holbrook, employed by the
state, examined the defendant without the knowledge of either the court
or defense counsel. At the sentencing hearing, the state called Dr. Holbrook. The defendant offered his own psychiatrist who testified that the
defendant was not a sociopath and was not likely to commit further violence. The state called Dr. Grigson to rebut defendant's expert. Because defense counsel had been entirely unaware of Holbrook, and
because they had been informed that Grigson was to examine to determine the defendant's sanity, which issue they had withdrawn from the
case, the defendant was surprised and unable to effectively cross examine. It was in this context that the government's impeachment argument was overruled.
Although on different grounds, the government also lost the impeachment argument before the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Leonard.124 Unlike Gholson, however, which was a habeas corpus case, Leonard
arose under federal law. Prior to trial, Leonard had filed a notice of
intent to rely on the insanity defense and, like Gholson, subsequent to
the exam but before trial had withdrawn the plea. At trial, the prosecution cross-examined Leonard as to statements made by him to the prosecution psychiatrist. The court held that such impeachment was
25
prohibited by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.2(c).'
The court reasoned that central to its authority to order a sanity
examination is an understanding that statements obtained in such an
examination be confined to the sanity issue.1 26 It declined to adopt case
law holding that 18 U.S.C. section 4244, the former provision for competency exams, does not bar admission of statements for the purposes
of impeachment.' 27 The court based its reasoning squarely on Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.2(c), which provides that no expert testimony based upon the defendant's statements and no other fruits of the
examination may be admitted on any issue except mental condition. Because a sanity examination authorized by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.2(c) seeks to obtain information from the accused bearing
directly on the issue of guilt, and because the defendant's statements on
123. Id. at 741.
124. 609 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1980).
125. Id. at 1165.
No statement made by the defendant in the course of any examination provided
for by this rule, whether the examination be with or without the consent of the
defendant, no testimony by the expert based upon such statement, and no other
fruits of the statement shall be admitted in evidence against the defendant in any
criminal proceeding except on an issue respecting mental condition on which the
defendant has introduced testimony.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(c).
126. 609 F.2d at 1165.
127. See, e.g., United States v. Castenada, 555 F.2d 605 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
847 (1977).
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the issue of mental capacity to commit the crime are also central to the
issue of intent, there is a greater likelihood the psychiatrist will solicit
128
statements that will infringe the defendant's fifth amendment rights.
The court found nothing in the legislative history of rule 12.2(c) that
indicated case law developed under the competency provision should be
adopted.
In United States v. Leonard,' 2 9 the Fifth Circuit appeared to resolve
the impeachment problem for cases arising under federal law. Rule
12.2(c) prohibits the use of the psychiatrist's testimony on any issue but
sanity. The broad prohibition protects the government's need for expert evaluation and prevents the defendant from waiving his fifth
amendment privilege. In those cases where rule 12.2(c) does not apply,
however, the courts should view the psychiatric interview as a compelled
or coercive interview, even when the defendant has pleaded insanity.
This would protect the defendant's due process right to present evidence in his defense, as well as his fifth amendment right against selfincrimination. Only in cases such as Noggle v. Marshall,13 0 where the defendant is uncooperative and prevents the state from obtaining necessary evidence on the sanity issue should the evidence from the
psychiatric interview be used for impeachment.
III.

A.

PART THREE:

LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS

Federal Statutory Solutions

Following the trial of John Hinckley for the attempted murder of
President Reagan,' 3 ' revisions were made to the federal statutes governing insanity and incompetency. 132 Many states modified the defense
to provide for a guilty but mentally ill verdict.1 33 Over twenty bills were
introduced in Congress to change the insanity plea.' 3 4 Of major con128. 609 F.2d at 1167.
129. 609 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1980).
130. 706 F.2d 1408 (6th Cir. 1983).
131. United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd., 672 F.2d 115
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
132. The revisions were part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. Pub.
L. No. 98-473, tit. II, 98 Stat. 2057 (1984). The short title of the insanity provisions is the
Insanity Defense Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 401 (1984).
133. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.47.020(e), 12.47.030, 12.47.050 (1962 & Supp. 1986);
DEL. CODEANN. tit. 11, § 401(b) (1979&Supp. 1984);GA. CODEANN. § 17-7-131 (1981 &
Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 6-2 to 6-4, 115-2 (Smith-Hurd 1973 & Supp.
1986); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-36-1-1 to 35-36-2-5 (Burns 1985 & Supp. 1986); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 304.060(5), 504.120, 504.130 (Michie 1985 & Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 31-9-3, 31-9-4 (1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 314 (Purdon 1983); S.D. CODIFIED
LAws ANN. §§ 22-1-2(22), 23A-26-3, 12, 14 (1979 & Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 7713-1, 77-35-11, 75-35-21, 77-35-21.5 (1982 & Supp. 1986). See Mickenberg, A Pleasant
Surprise: The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict Has Both Succeeded In Its Own Right and Successfully
Preserved the Role of the Insanity Defense, 55J. CIN. L. REV. 943-96 (1987).
134. Insanity Defense in Federal Courts, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of
the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 95 (1982) (statement of Rep. Don Edwards, Presiding Chairman) [hereinafter as Insanity Defense in Federal
Courts]. In his opening statement, at the Senate Insanity Hearings, Senator Arlen Specter,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, stated that the committee had been convened promptly so
that the public could "be aware that the law can respond to correct errors where such
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cern in these bills was the need to define insanity for the federal courts,
assign the burden of proof of insanity to the defendant, and limit the
3 5
testimony of psychiatrists.1
The new statute defines insanity for the federal courts. 13 6 Prior to
the passage of section 17, the federal courts of appeals had used varying
definitions of insanity.' 37 Under the present formula, all federal courts
would ask the trier of fact to determine: (1) whether at the time of the
offense the defendant had a severe mental disease or defect; (2) and
whether as a result of the disease or defect, the defendant was unable to
38
understand the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts.'
This definition represents a narrowing of the defense in jurisdictions
which had used the American Law Institute Model Penal Code test with
the volitional prong in that it removes cases in which the defendant is
able to show that he was unable to control his actions-the so-called
irresistible impulse test. This test is thought to be the reason for public
criticism of the defense.' 3 9 As far as the jury is concerned, the change
may have little meaning;' 40 for the defendant pleading insanity, however, the change means that the defendant must be able to show substantial illness.
Additionally, the new statute reallocated the burden in insanity
cases, shifting the burden of proof to the defendant to prove insanity by
clear and convincing evidence.' 4 1 Formerly, once the defendant
presented evidence of insanity sufficient to overcome the presumption
of sanity, the government was required to prove the defendant was sane
errors are found in the criminal justice system. Limiting the Insanity Defense, supra note 73, at
I.
135. Insanity Defense in Federal Courts, supra note 136, at 95 (statement of Rep. Don Edwards, Presiding Chairman).
136. 18 U.S.C. § 17 (Supp. IV 1986) provides:
(a) AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE. It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution
under any Federal statute that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was
unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts.
Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.
137. Most federal courts used the ALI Model Penal Code test under which "[a] person
is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental
disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law." ALI
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (quoted in United States v.
Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 979 (D.C.Cir. 1972)).
The Third Circuit used the Currens test: "The jury must be satisfied that at the time of
committing the prohibited act the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked
substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law which he is
alleged to have violated." United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 774 (3d Cir. 1961)
(footnote omitted).
The approaches of the federal circuits are outlined in Brawner, 471 F.2d at 978-80.
138. 18 U.S.C. § 17 (Supp. IV 1986).
139. The Insanity Defense, ABA and APA Proposalsfor Change, 7 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP.
136, 138 (1983) [hereinafter ABA Proposalsfor Change].
140. Hinckley Juror Brown, testifying before the Senate Subcommittee, felt that if
Hinckley were found not guilty by reason of his insanity, he should still have to pay for his
crime. Limiting the Insanity Defense, supra note 73, at 161. It may be, therefore, that the
average juror does not understand that insanity is a complete defense.
141. 18 U.S.C. § 17(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
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beyond a reasonable doubt.1 4 2 Many felt the burden upon the government to prove sanity was unfair, particularly when evidence of sanity or
143
insanity is peculiarly available to the defendant.
An additional change, wrought by the Insanity Defense Reform Act
of 1984,t4 4 was in the scope of expert testimony under Federal Rule of
Evidence 704.145 The effect of the change was to eliminate the then
current practice of allowing the expert to opine whether the defendant
was "sane" or "insane" or lacked the capacity "to conform his behavior
to the requirements of the law" or "knew right from wrong." The spectacle of allowing competing expert witnesses to testify to directly contra14 6
dictory legal conclusions was considered too confusing for the jury.
This, however, like the niceties of the definition of insanity, may be more
14 7
a problem for lawyers and judges than for jurors.
The effect of these three changes should allow the defendant
greater protection of the fifth amendment privilege. First, the new definition of insanity narrows the opportunities for presenting a successful
insanity defense. It more accurately separates the mens rea and insanity
issues, allowing the government to disprove the defendant's assertion of
insanity by showing absence of mental disease or defect-a more clinical
inquiry than, for example, disputing "personality disorders." 148 According to the American Bar Association, after the narrowing of the defense, the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt should be placed
on the government, because as a matter of public policy, the government should assume the risk of error when defendants' rights have been
142. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952); Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373, 378
(1897).
143. Statement of President-Elect Edwin L. Miller, Jr. of the Nat'l District Attorneys
Ass'n at 16-17 (quoted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 3410).
Said Rep. E. Clay Shaw, "I would hate to think that any of us here in Congress would have
to prove our sanity beyond a reasonable doubt." Insanity Defense in FederalCourts, supra note
136, at 17.
144. Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, § 401, 98 Stat. 2057.
145. Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II § 406, 98 Stat. 2067. The rule now provides:
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a
defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the
defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.
146. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 230, reprinted in U.S. CODE. CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3182, 3412 (1984).

147. HinckleyJuror Brown said:
As far as the defense-psychiatrists, I do not see how anyone really could have
went [sic] too much on their testimony except for some of the things Hinckley
told them .... Well, my ultimate decision, as I stated, I always thought he was
guilty. I really gave in to what my decision really was, not the evidence itself
made my decision, because by the evidence he was guilty. Limiting the Insanity
Defense. supra note 73, at 165, 192.
148. According to Professor Stephen Morse, mental disorder rarely negates mens rea.
The "crazy" killer intends to kill his victim; he does so for fundamentally irrational reasons. Insanity Defense in Federal Courts, supra note 136, at 223 (written statement ofJ. Stephen Morse, J.D., Ph.D., Orrin B. Evans Professor of Law and Professor of Psychiatry and
the Behavorial Sciences, University of Southern California Law Center & School of
Medicine).

1988]

INCRIMINATION AND THE INSANITY PLEA

restricted. 149 Nonetheless, Congress assigned the burden of proof (and
the risk of error) to the defendant, thus adopting a more restrictive
policy.
Though the narrowing of the defense and the shift in the burden of
proof may indicate an intention to restrict the rights of the defendant,
there is no indication that Congress intended to interfere with the right
against self-incrimination. In fact, if the burden of proof is on the defendant, the need of the government to have psychiatric evidence
through a compelled interview is reduced. Because the defendant must
prove insanity by clear and convincing evidence, in some cases the government may not need to present evidence on the issue at all. In cases
where defendant comes close to meeting his burden, the government
would need only rebuttal evidence.
The change in the scope of the expert's testimony should also protect the defendant. The expert's ultimate opinion need not be supported by admissions from the defendant. Psychiatric testimony would
be limited to presenting and explaining diagnosis and to what the characteristics of the disease or defect may have been.150 Psychiatrist Ernst
Prelinger, testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee, said this included evidence in concrete terms of the facts of the defendant's life
history, circumstances of his early development, family life experiences,
and particular emotional issues or conflicts relating to the act with which
he is charged. 15 1
In cases where the defendant pleads insanity and assumes the burden of proof, the government's need for the compelled testimony is lessened. Therefore, waiver of the fifth amendment should not be implied
by the mere pleading of the defense and any waiver formerly justified by
the government's need for the evidence 152 should be very narrow.
The new statute has not been extensively tested in the courts. At
least two courts have held that the revisions narrow the affirmative defense of sanity, but do not prevent the defendant from introducing psychiatric evidence to negate intent. 15 3 Because intent is an issue upon
which the government bears the burden of proof, the government's
need for the compelled psychiatric testimony will be as great as it was
before the revisions. The statutory scheme, however, fails to provide for
authority to compel the defendant to be examined for the purpose of
assisting the government in rebutting the defendant's psychiatric testi149. ABA Proposals for Change, supra note 140, at 139.
150. See supra, note 146.
151. Limiting the Insanity Defense, supra note 73, at 232. On the other hand, Judge Gerald
B. Tjoflat of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, also testifying before the Senate committee, stated the expert is of no value to the trier of fact in some courts unless he renders
an opinion on the ultimate issue. Id.
152. See, e.g., United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
855 (1976); United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971); Pope v. United States, 372
F.2d 710, 720 (8th Cir. 1967); see supra notes 31-44 and accompanying text.
153. United States v. Gold, 661 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (D.D.C. 1987); United States v.
Frisbee, 623 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Cal. 1985); contra United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889
(3rd Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 710 (1988).
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mony on the issue of intent. 15 4 At least one court has said in dictum
that the courts' "inherent power" would still allow such an
55
examination. '
Compelling a defendant to be examined for the purpose of assisting
the government in rebutting the defendant's evidence negating intent
would appear to violate the fifth amendment. However, if the privilege
can be abrogated in the interest of fairness, as is suggested in earlier
decisions, 15 6 fairness, it could be argued, would dictate that the compelled admissions be allowed. Because the statute now clearly sets out
different examinations to determine competency and sanity, the prohibition in section 4241 on the use of the competency determination should
be adhered to strictly. Only after the defendant notices intent to rely on
the insanity defense under rule 12.2(c)1 5 7 should an examination on the
issue of sanity be ordered. However, the evidence from the sanity examination should, by the terms of the statute itself, be Used only on the
58
sanity issue.1
B.

Instructions

It would seem at the very least, a court should instruct that testimony allowed because the defendant has introduced the issue of mental
condition may be considered only on that particular issue.15 9 The problem, however, is that instructions are only of benefit if the jury will follow them and insuring this may be difficult. The Supreme Court, in
Harris v. New York, 160 allowed the use of unwarned statements for impeachment only, and the trial court instructed the jury that the state154. By its terms, 18 U.S.C. § 4242 gives authority to order an examination after defendant files notice of intent to rely on the insanity defense. Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 12.2(b) requires similar notice "[i]f a defendant intends to introduce expert
testimony relating to a mental disease or defect or any other mental condition of the defendant bearing upon the issue of guilt," but does not itself authorize a compelled
examination.
155. United States v. Nichols, 661 F. Supp. 507, 509 n.4 (W.D. Mich. 1987); contra
United States v. Leonard, 609 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1980).
156. In Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 720 (8th Cir. 1967), the court said it
would be a "strange situation" if the government, bearing the burden of proof and compelled to afford psychiatric service and evidence, were denied the opportunity to have its
own exam. Accord State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 9, 210 A.2d 763, 770 (1965).
157. United States v. Castenada, 555 F.2d 605 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847
(1977).
158. In United States v. Halbert, 712 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1983), the court held that
admissions made in a compelled interview were admissible where the defendant raised a
diminished capacity defense. Said the court construing rule 12.2: "Because Congress intended to permit the admission of statements related to insanity, there is little doubt that it
also intended to admit statements related to mental capacity in general." Id. at 390.
159. A cautionary instruction was given in United States v. Madrid, 673 F.2d 1114,
1118 n.4 (10th Cir. 1982), as follows:
Now the defendant is not on trial before you for any act or conduct not charged
in the indictment, specifically any evidence as to . . . other crimes was admitted
solely for the reason that one of the experts utilized those claimed facts as a portion of the basis of his opinion as to the mental competency of the defendant at
the time of the offense alleged in the indictment ....
You are not to consider
such evidence for any other purpose that [sic] in evaluating the expert testimony.
160. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
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ments could only be used for credibility. The Court has also recognized,
however, that the assumption that an instruction will invariably overcome the juror's practical inability to separate the evidence is somewhat
naive. 161

In Noggle v. Marshall,162 the court recognized the debatable effectiveness of such instructions, stating that they were "at best a device for
balancing interests of the State and the defendant."' 63 Whether the absence of the instruction was prejudicial in Noggle was determined by the
strength of the government's case, and the court recommended that in
every case the need for the instruction be tested by a question of general
fairness of the trial as a whole. 164 In contrast, the court in United States v.
Leonard 165 recognized that the statutory provision 166 itself limits the use
of the testimony in all cases. According to the House Conference Committee, a limiting instruction would not satisfy the rule if a statement
67
were so prejudicial that a limiting instruction would not be effective.'
The problem with relying solely on instructions as a cure for violations of the fifth amendment is that the Noggle test requires a very subjective assessment by the trial judge. He must, in determining whether
to give the instruction, consider the strength of the government's case,
the context of the defendant's statements and the expert's recitation of
them, as well as the jury's ability to overcome prejudicial effects. Even
after he has made this determination, however, there is no way of assuring that the jury will follow the instruction.
C.

Limiting the Testimony of the Psychiatrist

A more realistic solution than limiting instructions to the jury is limiting the testimony of the psychiatrist. In the federal courts, the revision
of Federal Rule of Evidence 704 may already afford defendants greater
protection of their fifth amendment rights than earlier case law. 168 Further limitation could be imposed in the interest of the defendant's
rights.
At the heart of an evidentiary solution to the fifth amendment problem is the judicial system's need to assure truthfulness. Federal Rule of
Evidence 703 regulates the basis of opinion testimony by experts.
Under the rule, if the facts and data relied on by the expert are of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field, the facts or data
need not be admissible in evidence. 169 The fact that the expert may rely
on inadmissable evidence does not, however, mean he may automati161. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368
(1964).
162. 706 F.2d 1408 (6th Cir. 1983).
163. Id. at 1417.
164. Accord Watters v. Hubbard, 725 F.2d 381 (6th Cir. 1984).
165. 609 F.2d 1163, 1165-66 (5th Cir. 1980).
166. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(c).
167. 6. CONt. REP. No. 94-414, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 10, reprintedin U.S. CODE CONG. &
An. NEws 713, 715 (1975).
168. See supra notes 146-52 and accompanying text.

169. FED. R. EvID. 703.
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0
cally become a vehicle for introducing such evidence into the record.17
The trial judge has discretion under Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and
611 to disallow the evidence if its prejudicial effect outweighs probative
value or if the jury would be likely to be confused. 17 1 Thus, even without the revisions to Federal Rule of Evidence 704, the trial judge has the
discretion to prevent the expert from testifying to facts related by the
defendant.
The rules of evidence also provide, however, for assuring that the
17 2
expert's opinion is well grounded. Dissenting in United States v. Byers,
Judge Bazelon suggests the balance between the need for well grounded
opinion and the defendant's right can be struck by excluding any statements made by the defendant to the psychiatrist which are not integral
to the process of diagnosis. In Byers, the defendant stated that his wife
suggested to him he could be under the influence of magic spells or
roots. The psychiatrist testified the statement had not been vital to his
diagnosis because he did not feel it was pertinent to the defendant's
state of mind at the time of the offense and because it was the thinking
of the wife, not the defendant. The statement's admission at trial, however, was considered "devastating" by the trial judge and the

prosecutor.'

73

In most cases, however, it may not be so easy to determine what
statements are essential to the diagnosis. The American Psychiatric Association's position on the proposed changes in the insanity defense was
one of agreement with the limitation of expert testimony.' 74 The Association noted that in many criminal trials both prosecution and defense
psychiatrists agree on the nature and extent of defendant's disorder.
The disagreement comes with the medical expert's "leap in logic" to
testimony on the ultimate legal issue of insanity. 175 The psychiatrist regards it as his just obligation to "present medical information and opinion about the defendant's mental state and motivation and to explain in
detail the reason for his medical-psychiatric conclusions." 176 A number
of courts have recognized that defendant's admissions, and even his
omissions, may be critical to psychiatric conclusions. 17 7 In those cases,
170. United States v. Brown, 548 F.2d 1194, 1206 n.22 (5th Cir. 1977) (while expert
may testify based on hearsay, witness here sought to establish a fact of which she had
insufficient knowledge); see also 3 W. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 389
(1979).
171. Advisory Committee Notes accompanying Federal Rule of Evidence 105, which
requires the court to make limiting instructions when evidence is admissible for limited
purposes, indicate that rules 403 and 105 are in close relationship. That is, the court may
either limit the use of the testimony or exclude it entirely.
172. 740 F.2d 1104, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bazelon,J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 1146 n.42 (Bazelon,J., dissenting). The court gave no reason why the testimony was admitted notwithstanding its recognition of the prejudicial impact.

174. See ABA Proposals For Change, supra note 139, at 146.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., Scott v. Oliver, 552 F.2d 20, 21 (1stCir. 1977). In Otiver, the psychiatrist
testified, "[flor instance, he remembers when the gun went off that he was sitting there
with the gun in his hand." Though clearly establishing a fact of the offense, the testimony
went directly to the issue of defendant's memory, a matter relevant to diagnosis.
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the battle would still rage unless a more explicit prohibition is implied.
In jurisdictions where the expert may testify as to the ultimate issue of
insanity, the defendant's admissions may be even more obviously the
178
basis for the opinion.
The State of Arizona has adopted an evidentiary privilege which
serves to protect the defendant even when he raises the insanity defense. 179 The statute provides a broad privilege for any admission made
by the defendant which concerns the transaction from which the current
charges stem. Introduction of admissions requires the consent of the
defendant and is not waived by defendant's taking the stand 180 or failure
to object.' 8 ' Case law interpreting the provision holds that the doctor
examining for the purpose of determining competency may give his
opinion regarding sanity at the time of the offense 18 2 and may testify
generally as to the basis of his opinion. 183 Evidence other than admissions covered by Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(b)(l) may be
admitted when a defendant raises the insanity issue and takes the witness stand. Thus, highly prejudicial admissions are absolutely privileged while the expert is free to explain his opinion using any evidence
gleaned from the examination except admissions about the crime
itself. 184
D.

Bifurcation

Even in jurisdictions having evidentiary protection such as Arizona's, bifurcation of the trial where insanity is an issue may be necessary to fully protect the defendant. In such a procedure, separate
hearings are used to determine "guilt" or factual responsibility and culpability under the jurisdiction's definition of insanity. In cases where
the defendant pleads not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity, the
178. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text; see also Isley v. Wainwright, 792 F.2d
1516, 1520 (11 th Cir. 1986), on remand, Isley v. Wainwright, No. 81-996-Civ.-T-15 (M.D.

Fla. Mar. 17, 1987) (evidentiary hearing centered on issue of statements necessary for
expert opinion).
179.

The Arizona Rule provides:

Rule 11.7. Privilege
A. GENERAL RESTRICTION. No evidence of any kind obtained under these
provisions shall be admissible at any proceeding to determine guilt or innocence
unless the defendant presents evidence intended to rebut the presumption of

sanity.
B.

(1)

PRIVILEGED STATEMENTS OF DEFENDANT

No statement of the defendant obtained under these provisions, or evi-

dence resulting therefrom, concerning the events which form the basis of the

charges against him shall be admissible at the trial of guilt or innocence, or at any
subsequent proceeding to determine guilt or innocence, without his consent.
(2) No statement of the defendant or evidence resulting therefrom ob-

tained under these provisions, concerning any other events or transactions, shall
be admissible at any proceeding to determine his guilt or innocence of criminal
charges based on such events or transactions.
ARiz. R. CRIM. P. 11.7 (West 1987).
180. Berry, supra note 15, at 947.
181. State v. Magby, 113 Ariz. 345, 554 P.2d 1272 (1976).
182. Id. at 349, 554 P.2d at 1278.
183. State v. Torres, 127 Ariz. 309, 620 P.2d 224 (1980).
184.

Berry, supra note 15, at 947-48.
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procedure prevents carryover of the defendant's statements from the insanity issue to other issues such as intent, and prevents prejudice to
other defenses. '

85

Few jurisdictions mandate bifurcated trials when the insanity defense is pled,186 and a number ofjurisdictions have repealed or declared
unconstitutional bifurcation statutes.18 7 In general, the bifurcation procedure requires careful planning to avoid either duplication of evidence
by presenting psychiatric evidence on the issue of mental capacity for
intent in the first phase and on the issue of insanity in the second phase,
or violation of defendant's right to due process by precluding evidence
of lack of intent in the first phase and then providing no opportunity to
address that issue as the second issue is insanity.' 88
Even in the absence of statute, case law recognizes power in the trial
judge to use his discretion in providing for bifurcation and in ordering
the progress of the trial to avoid prejudice to the defendant.1 8 9 This
power is implicit in the common law power to order the trial' 9 0 and in
the federal' 9 1 as well as state rules of criminal procedure.' 9 2 The presence of a substantial defense on the merits which might be prejudiced by
the introduction of evidence on the insanity issue, and the presence of a
substantial insanity defense, should prompt the practitioner to request
9 3
these special procedures.
185. Holmes v. United States, 363 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
186. See, e.g., 6 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026 (West 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-104
(1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 40 (1964 & Supp. 1987-88); MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. § 12-109 (Supp. 1988); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 20.02(6); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 49
(West Supp. 1987); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 50, § 7404 (Purdon Supp. 1987); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 971.175 (West 1982).
187. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1621.01, 187, repealed by Laws 1977, ch. 142, § 35,
[effective October 2, 1978]; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 918.017, repealed by Laws June 6, 1979, ch.
79-164 § 186; TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. art. 46.02, repealed by TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 1172 (Vernon 1965); Wvo. STAT. § 7-242.5(a) (1957), declared unconstitutional by
Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270 (Wyo. 1977).
188. Cf. State v. Shaw, 106 Ariz. 103, 471 P.2d 715 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009
(1971); State ex rel Boyd v. Green, 355 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1978); Hermann, Assault on the
Insanity Defense: Limitations on the Effectiveness and Effect of the Defense of Insanity, 14 RUTGERS L.
J. 241, 291-310 (1983).
189. Holmes v. United States, 363 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
190. Id. at 283.
191.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b).

192. 10 U.L.A. 268, Rule 521 (1987) (provides an order of proceeding at trial "unless
the court for cause otherwise permits"). Similar statutes are CAL. PENAL CODE § 1094
(West 1985) and MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-402 (1987); Cf. TEX. CRIM. PROC.ANN. § 36.02
(Vernon 1981).

193. Among other procedures suggested have been recordation of the compelled interview, United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1155-56 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting); presence of counsel at the interview, which was found not necessary in Thornton v. Corcoran, 407 F.2d 695, 705-11 (1969) (Burger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and administration of a "psychiatric Miranda." See Read, Can a "Psychiatric
Miranda" Work? A California Perspective, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 431 (1983). The objection to each
of these methods has been that they are too obtrusive and interfere with the psychiatrist's
ability to examine the subject.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

If we do recognize that the privilege against self-incrimination has a
place in our criminal justice system, 194 then the privilege should not be
easily waived by defendants pleading insanity. Because their mental
condition is often questionable, they should be assured greater protection of their right against self-incrimination.
Prior to the passage of the Insanity Defense Reform Act, the tendency in the federal courts was to protect the government's interest in a
truthful proceeding by broadening the waiver of the fifth amendment
privilege when insanity was raised as a defense. Because statutory revisions restrict the defense, they should be interpreted in such a manner
as to assure maximum self-incrimination protection. This could be accomplished by limiting the testimony of the psychiatrists to the facts absolutely necessary in explaining their medical opinions, and preventing
them from directly revealing admissions of the defendant relevant to the
crime charged. Direct admissions gleaned from the psychiatric interview, because it is a compelled or coercive interview, should be unavailable for impeachment, even when the defendant takes the stand.
Evidence gleaned from a compelled interview should be strictly confined
to the issue of sanity by the use of bifurcated trials whenever it appears
that the defendant will have a substantial defense on the merits, a substantial defense of insanity, and when it appears that limiting instructions will not cure the prejudicial effect.

194. See Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self Incrimination?, 33
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1063 (1986).

NEW YORK STATE CLUB AssocmmA0N, INc. V. CITY OF NEW
YORK:

As

"DISTINCTLY PRIVATE"

Is

DEFINED,

WOMEN GAIN ACCESS

I.

INTRODUCTION

Society and the judicial system have struggled to determine to what
extent personal liberty and freedom of association should be sacrificed
to provide fairness in the workplace.' Federal and state civil rights acts
and public accommodation laws 2 have attempted to find an equitable
balance between the two clashing values. 3 Until 1984, no state or city
had enacted an ordinance that modernized business opportunities for
4
women in our society.
In New York State Club Association, Inc. v. City of New York, 5 the United
States Supreme Court unanimously upheld a New York City ordinance
containing a "three-prong test" used to determine if a club or association qualifies as a "private exemption" under the public accommodation
laws. 6 The Court's decision, which upheld the New York City ordinance
against freedom of association and equal protection facial attacks, leaves
society with a model ordinance to follow in its attempt to curb discrimination against women in the business world. 7 This Comment will trace
the historical development of the constitutional right of freedom of association and outline the evolution of public accommodation laws which
have attempted to define "distinctly private." It will then analyze the
Supreme Court's holding in New York Club Association and its impact on
opportunity for women in the work place. Finally, this Comment will
show why the decision is proper from a constitutional and a societal
standpoint.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

History of the Right of Association

Freedom of association is fundamental to the liberty of every individual 8 and has been recognized to embody the choice not to associate
with others. 9 Though freedom of association is not an enumerated con1. See infra notes 9-69 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 40-64 and accompanying text.
3. Id.
4. See infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
5. 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
6. See infra notes 83-103 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 112-128 and accompanying text.
8. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984) ("freedom of
association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty").
9. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977) (recognized the right
of the individual to "refuse to associate").
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stitutional right, 10 it has evolved from the first amendment. 1 1 The right
of association was first recognized in 1958 by the United States Supreme
Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.12 In Patterson, the NAACP
refused to disclose the names and addresses of its members to the state
of Alabama.' 3 The Supreme Court found the NAACP members' right
of association would be violated by an involuntary disclosure of the
NAACP membership lists. 1 4 The Court concluded that any state action

attempting to infringe upon freedom of association is subject to a review
of "the closest scrutiny."' 5 Additionally, the Court, in using the strict
scrutiny test, found the state's disclosure requirement was not adequately compelling to allow an infringement on the NAACP members'
freedom of association. 16 Thus, in Patterson, the Supreme Court created
a constitutionally protected freedom of association which groups could
assert, similar to the protection given to individual members of a group
under the first amendment.17
Following its decision in Patterson, the Supreme Court extended the
freedom of association to protect political parties' 8 and organizations' 9
from attempted government restrictions.
In Griswold v. Connecticut,20 the United States Supreme Court broadened the scope of the right of association. In the majority opinion, Justice Douglas declared the right of association as belonging to the
penumbra of the first amendment, 2' and used the right as a safeguard
10. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482
(1965) (right of privacy protected from state interference is a fundamental interest within
the first, third, fourth and fifth amendments), the Court has recognized and expanded
rights not enumerated in the Constitution. See infra notes 20-38 and accompanying text;
see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973) (legislation prohibiting abortion in state
found to be a violation of individual privacy rights).
I1. See id. at 483 (holding freedom of association as a necessity to make the enumerated first amendment guarantees significant).
12. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
13. 10 ALA. CODE § 192-98 (1940).
14. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 450.
15. Id. at 460-61.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 465-66 (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)). In
Sweezy, the Supreme Court found that the first amendment protects a citizen's right to take
part in political associations. The Court recognized that the subordinating interest of the
State must be compelling.
18. See, e.g., Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 211-12 (1986). The
Republican Party challenged the state requirement which permitted only members of that
party to vote in the party primary. The party prevailed by asserting that the requirement,
which directly conflicted with Republican aspirations to permit the independent voter to
vote in its primaries, violated the party's freedom of association. See also Democratic Party
of United States v. Wisconsin ex. rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 112 (1981); Cousins v.
Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
19. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963) (the Court held that litigation
is protected as a form of political expression); Brotherhood of R.R. Trailman v. Virginia ex.
rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (assembly and petition rights include the right to
legal help from an association).
20. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
21. Id. at 484. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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while concluding his discussion on marital privacy. 22 In recognizing
marital privacy as a fundamental right of privacy, the Court based its
decision on general principals inherent in the Constitution, rather than
on particular constitutional language.
Thus, the Supreme Court introduced a right of expressive association in Patterson,23 where individuals obtain standing when acting
through organizations. In addition, the Court in Griswold recognized a
right of intimate association protected by the first amendment, which
24
exists to protect marital couples who plan to procreate.
25
In 1984, the Supreme Court decided Roberts v. United StatesJaycees,
which distinguished between the two aspects of freedom of association. 2 6 The Court held that freedom of intimate association exists to
protect highly personal relationships. 2 7 Additionally, the Court defined
the freedom of expressive association as the right to associate with
others while exercising express first amendment activities. 2 8
Thus, through history, the Supreme Court has recognized that the
rights of intimate and expressive association are subject to different
standards of review. 2 9 Freedom of intimate association is given a higher
level of constitutional protection because it involves the fundamental
nature of personal liberty. 30 This freedom has not been extended to
protect unrelated individuals from government actions.3 1 The Supreme
Court has held that a state may only infringe on the freedom of expressive association when such a freedom conflicts with a compelling state
interest.3 2 Yet, according to the Court's decision in Roberts, the infringement will not be allowed if the state interest can be achieved through a
33
less restrictive means.
In 1987, the Supreme Court was once again confronted with a freedom of association claim. In Board of Directors of Rotary International v.
Rotary Club of Duarle,34 the Supreme Court adopted the standard of review used in Roberts. 35 Justice Powell's majority opinion replaced intimate association with the term "private association." The opinion
22. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486. (receiving information on contraceptives is imperative
to exercising the fundamental right to make procreational choices).
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
468 U.S. 609 (1984). See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
Roberts,

468 U.S. at 618.

See id. at 619 (protecting highly personal relationships from unjustified state inter-

ference "safeguards the ability independently to define one's identity that is central to any
concept of liberty.").
28. See id.; see also Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S.
Ct. 1940, 1945 (1987).

29.
30.
see, e.g.,
31.
Boraas,
32.
33.
34.

See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18.
See id. at 618 (affords "personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary");
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-06 (1977).
See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189-90 (1986); Village of Belle Terre v.
416 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1974).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976).
Id.
107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987).

35. See supra notes 25-33.
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expressly stated that private association is not limited to family relations;
rather, the Court found that it applies to a variety of personal relations.3 6 However, the Court established that there is no clear boundary
for activities protected under private association. 3 7 While reviewing the
association, the Court followed the proceappellant's right of expressive
38
dure set forth in Roberts.
B.

The Evolution of Ascertaining "Distinctly Private"

The Civil Rights Act of 19643 9 bans discrimination supported by
state action or affected by interstate commerce. 40 The United States
Congress, through the commerce clause, is empowered to prohibit private discrimination from affecting interstate commerce. 4 1 Congress has
utilized its power under the commerce clause to regulate private race
44
42
employment, 43 and housing.
and sex discrimination in education,
However, Title II of the Civil Rights Act only prohibits discrimination
based on color, race, religion, or national origin.4 5 Furthermore, Title
II exempts "private clubs" from its scope of enforcement, 4 6 and this has
enabled a great number of groups and associations to be protected by
the exemption. 4 7 Though the Act prohibits discrimination against particular groups, 4 8 it fails to protect gender-based discrimination and
leaves the definition of "private club" open for broad interpretation.
Following the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, most states
instituted their own anti-discrimination laws. The California 4 9 and Minnesota 50 public accommodation laws have been subjected to strict judi36. Duarte, 107 S. Ct. at 1947.
37. Id. at 1944-45. The Court recognized begetting and bearing children, child rearing, education, marriage, and co-habitation with relatives as examples of protected private
association activities.
38. See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1982) [hereinafter "Civil Rights Act" or "Act"].
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c) (1982).
41. Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964).
42. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982) (makes sex discrimination unlawful in educational activities that are federally funded); 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982) (prohibits discrimination based
on race in contracts for educational services); see also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160,
172 (1976).
43. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII addresses employment benefits); see also
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1964).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1983). The law states: "All persons shall be entitled to the
full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without
discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin."
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1982). This section of the law provides:
The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to a private club or other establishment not in fact open to the public, except to the extent that the facilities of
such establishment are made available to the customers or patrons of an establishment within the scope of subsection (b) of this section.
47. See generally Note, The Private Club Exemption To The Civil Rights Act of 1964: .4 Study
In Judicial Confusion, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1112 (1969).
48. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
49. CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 (West 1982).

50.

MINN. STAT. ANN.

§ 363.03(3) (West Supp. 1988).
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cial review, 5 1 and are responsible for the first actual step toward
defining "distinctly private." The Minnesota Human Rights Act prohibits unfair discriminatory practice based on sex, race, color and other categories. 52 Thus, the law was one of the first state public accomodation
statutes to include "sex" as a forbidden basis of discrimination. As such,
it was inevitable that the Minnesota provision would be the focus of a
constitutional challenge.
The United States Supreme Court reviewed the struggle amidst the
equal access rights of women and the associational rights of a presumably private club for the first time in Roberts v. United StatesJaycees.53 The

Court's review of the Minnesota public accommodation law is the first
step toward defining "distinctly private." In Roberts, the St. Paul and
Minneapolis chapters of the Jaycees admitted women in 1974 and
1975; 5 4 subsequently, the United States Jaycees threatened to revoke
the local chapters' charters. 5 5 In response, members of the local chapters filed complaints with the state department of human rights asserting
discrimination in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act. 56 The
Supreme Court of Minnesota found that the Human Rights Act applied
to any "public business facility" and concluded the Jaycees fell within
that classification because they solicited membership on a nonselective
basis. After a federal district court affirmed the Minnesota Supreme
Court decision and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 57 the
United States Supreme Court upheld the Minnesota legislation and
found that Minnesota's highest court correctly applied the law to the
58
Jaycees.
In Roberts, the Supreme Court created a bifurcated framework for
the analysis of associational freedom. 5 9 The Court failed to thoroughly
evaluate what characterized the Jaycees as a "public accommodation."
The Roberts Court simply accepted the findings of the Supreme Court of
Minnesota, thus leaving the legitimate parameters of defining "distinctly
private" unresolved.
51. See Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S. Ct. 1940
(1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
52. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(3) (West Supp. 1988). The public accommodation law
makes it unlawful "to deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation
because of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin or sex." Id.
53. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 609. The United States Jaycees, founded in 1920, is a nonprofit corporation which was traditionally known as a mens club. Women are allowed as
associate members, but are not permitted to vote, hold office, or participate in all
activities.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 614.
56. See supra note 52 and accompanying text [hereinafter "Human Rights Act"].
57. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 534 F. Supp. 766 (D. Minn. 1982), revd, 709
F.2d 1560 (8th Cir. 1983), revd sub noma., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609
(1984).
58. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 630-31.
59. Id. at 629-30. See Linder, Freedom of Association after Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 82
MICH. L. REV. 1878, 1901 (1984); see also Note, Private Club DiscriminationCan Be Outlawed
Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 19 U.S.F. L. REV. 413, 423-24 (1985); see supra notes 25-33
and accompanying text.
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The California Unruh Act broadly defines public accommodations
to encompass "all business establishments of whatever kind." 60 The law
also prohibits discrimination based on sex, 6 1 similar to the Minnesota
public accommodation law. In Board of Directors of Rotary Internationalv.
Rotary Club of Duarte,6 2 the United States Supreme Court affirmed a California Court of Appeals decision ordering the reinstatement of a local
63
Rotary club that refused to abide by a male-only membership policy.
The Supreme Court limited its review of the case to determine if the
Unruh Act violated the first amendment freedom of association as applied to Rotary International and its member clubs. 64 The Court
adopted the standard of review established in Roberts6 5 to determine if
Rotary International was susceptible to the law. The Supreme Court
considered the exclusivity, purpose, selectivity, and size of the association. 6 6 Recognizing that Rotary's activities include representation of the
business community, the Court found that the activities constituted public purposes rather than exclusive private ends. 6 7 In addition, the Court
found Rotary's willingness to seek publicity and to participate with other
organizations to attribute to its public purpose. Therefore, the Supreme
Court found the Unruh Act did not improperly infringe upon the Rotary
68
Club members' freedom of association.
In Duarte, the United States Supreme Court recognized the authority of the states to prohibit sex discrimination through means of public
accommodation laws. The Court considered the club's purpose, size,
exclusivity, and selectivity to determine if it was "distinctly private.''69
The Court's failure to clearly define the characteristics of "distinctly private" left an open door for further attempts to ascertain a standard test.
III.

A.

INSTANT CASE

Facts: New York State Club Association, Inc. v. City of
70
New York
In reaction to the alleged networking and business conducted at its

60. CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 (Deering Supp. 1987).
61. The Civil Rights Act reads: "All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are
free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national
origin are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges,
or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." CAL. CIV. CODE § 5i
(West Supp. 1982).
62. Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l, 178 Cal. App. 3d
1035, 224 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1986), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987).
63. See Duarte, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1067-68, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 214-15.
64. The Court did not review the issue of overbreadth and vagueness which Rotary
International claimed. Rotary, 107 S.Ct. at 1945.
65. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
66. Roberts, 468 U.S. 609, 620-21 (1984).
67. See Duarte, 107 S. Ct. at 1945-46 (local club membership is unlimited); see also
STANDARD ROTARY CLUB CONSTITUTION art. V,
3.
68. Duarte, 107 S. Ct. at 1947.
69. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620-21.

70.

108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
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exclusive, male only private clubs, the New York City Council enacted
Local Law 6371 on October 9, 1984. The law was an attempt to ascertain and distinguish private clubs from public clubs. 7 2 The 1984 amendment (Local Law 63) goes one step further than the City's Human
Rights Law 73 in illustrating the difference between public and private
organizations. New York City's original Human Rights Law prohibits
discrimination in any "place of public accommodation, resort, or amusement" based on sex, race, creed and other categories, 74 but broadly exempts places that are "distinctly private." 7 5 Local Law 63 fills the
"distinctly private" void by providing three requirements which must
not exist for a club, or other place of accommodation to be deemed
"distinctly private." 76 If a club has more than 400 members, furnishes
regular meal service, and receives payment directly or indirectly on behalf of or from non-members, it is no longer protected by the "distinctly
private" exemption.
Immediately following the New York City Council's enactment of
Local Law 63, the New York Club Association 77 filed suit in state court
seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment contending that under the first
and fourteenth amendments Local Law 63 was unconstitutional on its
face.
The trial court declared the ordinance constitutional and the state's
intermediate appellate court affirmed. 78 The state's highest court, the
71.

N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986).

72. LEGISLATIVE DECLARATION LOCAL LAWS No. 63 OF CITY OF NEW YORK § 1 (1984).
According to the findings of the City Council, the importance of this legislation was to
make apparent the City's "compelling interest in providing its citizens ... regardless of
race, creed, color, national origin or sex ... a fair and equal opportunity to participate in
the business and professional life of the City." Id.
73. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986).
74. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(2). The New York City Human Rights Law enacted in 1965 makes it:
[a]n unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee,
proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public
accommodation, resort or amusement, because of the race, creed, color, national
origin or sex of any person directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny
to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges
thereof, or directly or indirectly, to publish, circulate, issue, display, post or mail
any written or printed communication, notice or advertisement, to the effect that
any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any such place

shall be refused, withheld from or denied to any person on account of race, creed,
color, national origin or sex of that the patronage or custom threat of any person
belonging to or purporting to be of any particular race, creed, color, national
origin, or sex is unwelcome, objectionable or not acceptable, desired or solicited.
75. See id.
76. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986). Local Law 63 provides that any:
institution, club or place of accommodation, other than a benevolent order or a
religious corporation, shall not be considered in its nature distinctly private if it
[I] has more than four hundred members, [2] provides regular meal service, and
[3] regularly receives payment for dues, fees, use of space, facilities, services,
meals or beverages directly or indirectly from or on behalf of non-members for
the furtherance of trade or business.
77. The New York State Club Association, Inc. is a non-profit corporation made up of
a consortium of 125 private clubs and associations.
78. New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 505 N.Y.S. 2d 152, 118
A.D.2d 392 (1986).
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Court of Appeals of New York also affirmed, 79 holding that the law does
not violate club members' freedom to privacy, free speech or association.8 0 The court declared that through Local Law 63, the city facilitated the least restrictive means to achieve its end, 8 ' and that the law
was but a mere intrusion on protected freedom of association.8 2 The
New York State Club Association appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, and the Court granted certiorari.
B.

Reasoning
1.

Majority Opinion

83
Justice White's majority opinion addressed four separate issues.
Among these issues the first amendment's freedom of association and
the fourteenth amendment's equal protection were the most relevant
constitutional concerns. The appellant's facial attack of Local Law 63's
84
constitutionality was found to have no merit and the law was upheld.
Addressing appellant's private association claim,8 5 the Court recognized
that when the first amendment's freedom of speech is at stake, it will
often allow a facial attack. Using the tests espoused in City Council v.
Taxpayerfor Vincient, 8 6 the Court cautioned a facial attack would only prevail if the appellant could demonstrate one of two exceptions. Thus,
under the exceptions the appellant was responsible for proving that Local Law 63 could either "never be applied in a valid manner" or be so
broad that it "may inhibit the constitutionally protected speech of third

79. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 513 N.Y.S.2d 349, 505 N.E.2d
915 (1987).
80. Id. at 920-22. Without discussing it, the court also denied relief on the equal protection claim.
81. Id. at 92 1. The court held the law abridges on the policies and activities of the
clubs' only "to the extent necessary to ensure that they do not automatically exclude persons from membership or use of the facilities on account of invidious discrimination." Id.
82. Id. at 921-22. The court stated that "[a]ny incidental intrusion on protected free
speech rights accomplished by the local measure is no greater than necessary to fulfill the
state's legitimate purpose in extending to them equal opportunity in employment." Id.
See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628-29 (1984).
83. New York Club Ass'n. v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988). The first issue
addressed by the Court was one of standing. Relying on Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977), the Court held the club association had
standing to sue for the benefit of its members because "(a) its members would otherwise
have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interest it seeks to protect are germane to
the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires participation of individual members in the lawsuit." See also Warth v. Seldin, 442
U.S. 490, 511 (1975). The Court cited WVarth while rejecting appellees contention that the
appellant's membership associations must have standing only to sue for their own benefit,
and not on anyone's behalf. In addition, the Court found that the appellant's member
associations have standing to bring the same suit on behalf of their own members because
these individuals "are suffering immediate or threatened injury" to their first amendment
rights as a consequence of the ordinances enactment. Id.
84. New York Club Assn, 108 S.Ct. at 2234.
85. See Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S.Ct. at 1947
(inreference to Court's past view' of "private association").
86. New York Club
nss',
108 S. Ct. at 2233 (citing City Council v. Taxpayers for
Vincient, 466 U.S. 789, 798 (1984)).
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parties regardless of its legal application." '8 7 In its analysis, the Court
acknowledged that both exceptions were narrow. 8 8 To qualify under
the first exception, every application of the law must create "an impermissible risk of suppression of ideas."18 9 To fall within the second exception the Court must find the law to be substantially overbroad,
posing a "realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized first amendment protections of parties not before the
Court." 90 Subsequent to the appellant conceding that Local Law 63
could constitutionally apply to some of the larger clubs under the
Court's decisions in Rotary and Roberts, 9 1 the Court found the appellant's
private association attack failed.
Citing Roberts, the Court denounced appellant's expressive association claim and held that on its face Local Law 63 in no considerable way
affects the capability of individuals to develop associations that promote
public or private viewpoints. 9 2 While upholding the law, the Supreme
Court found that it could "hardly hold otherwise," because appellants'
facial attack offered no evidence of the characteristics of any of the clubs
it represented. 93 The Court concluded its discussion of freedom of expressive association by finding that the law does not mandate clubs to
"abandon or alter" any freedoms protected by the first amendment. 94
Also, the Court found Local Law 63 to be "no obstacle" to a club that
attempts to exclude individuals that do not hold the same views which
the club's members support. 9 5 Recognizing the compelling interest of
the city, the Court found the law "merely prevents" a club or association
from using sex, race and other distinct characteristics as requirements
"inplace of what the city considers to be more legitimate criteria for
96
determining membership."
Finally, the Court found the club association failed in its facial equal
protection attack on Local Law 63.97 The club association's claim was
premised on the exemption under the law which declares benevolent
orders and religious corporations to be "distinctly private."'9 8 Relying
Id. (quoting Taxpayer for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 798).
Id.
Id. (quoting Taxpayersfor Vincient, 466 U.S. at 798, 801).
Id.
91. See supra notes 53-69 and accompanying text.
92. New York Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2234.
87.
88.
89.
90.

93. Id. at 2234-35
94. Id. at 2234 (quoting Rotary, 107 S. Ct. at 1945).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See id.at 2235. Prior to addressing the issue of equal protection, the Court discussed appellant's "overbreadth" and "irrebuttable" presumption contention. Using the
test set forth in Broaderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) ("a law is constitutional
unless it is substantially overbroad"), the Court found the overbreadth doctrine could not
apply because the appellant made no indication that any club's ability to associate or to
support private or public viewpoints was impaired by the law. The Court rejected appellants "irrebuttable" presumption contention by finding the administrative and judicial
proceedings under the law are adequate to guarantee that whatever overbreadth that exists "will be curable through case-by-case analysis of specific facts." Id. See also Ohio Civil
Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S. 619, 629 (1986).
98. New York Club Ass n, 108 S. Ct. at 2235.
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on Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, appellant asserted that benevolent
orders and religious corporations should be treated equal to private associations because appellee presented no evidence that one was actually
different from the other. 9 9 Using the rational basis test, the Court did
not find appellant's argument to be convincing.
First, the Court supported the city council's reasoning that identified benevolent orders and religious corporations to be unique.' 0 0 It
paralleled the city's logic with the decision in Bryant which upheld a state
law that similarly exempted benevolent orders.' 0 ' Second, the Court
recognized that legislative classifications are assumed to be constitutional, and held that the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the burden of showing it is unconstitutional. 10 2 The club
association failed because it did not provide evidence that indicated benevolent orders and religious corporations are identical to its private
0 3
clubs which fall under Local Law 63's anti-discrimination provision.'
2.

Concurring Opinions

Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia each wrote concurring opinions, with Justice Scalia concurring in part and in judgment. Agreeing
with the majority, the Justices' recognized that the appellant's facial freedom of association attack on Local Law 63 must fail. Justice O'Connor's
concurrence, joined by Justice Kennedy, assured that the majority opinion does not threaten the significance of associational interests that may
be at stake. 10 4 Justice O'Connor's concurrence recognized the importance of balancing the states' power of ensuring "nondiscriminatory access to commercial opportunities in our society" against an
"association's First Amendment right to control its membership."' 0 5
Acknowledging that the amount of commercial activity varies with each
organization, Justice O'Connor stated that there will definitely be clubs
that fall within the law's reach, but will be entitled to constitutional protection.' 0 6 However, the Justice concluded by stating that those organizations which are predominately commercial will not be protected by the
10 7
first amendment's associational or expressive right to be free.
99. Id. at 2236 (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439
(1985)).
100. See id. (citing New York ex. rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1928)).
In Bryant the Court upheld a law which exempted benevolent orders from filing certain
documents that most associations and corporations had to file with the state. See N.Y. Civ.
RIGHTs LAw § 53 (McKinney 1976).
101. New York Club Ass 'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2236 (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111
(1979)). (Challenging party must convince the court that the legislative facts upon which
the classification is based could not reasonably be thought to be true by the government
body).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2236-37.
104. Id. at 2237 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
105. Id. (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 635 (1984) (O'Connor,J,
concurring in part)) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 2237 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
107. Id. (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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Justice Scalia's concurrence in part found the majority's equal protection rationale to be weak. He expressed dissatisfaction toward the
Court's reliance on the New York appellate division's statement defining
benevolent orders as "unique" because, as he pointed out, the statement was cited incorrectly and does not define benevolent orders but
rather "fraternal benefit societies." 10 8 According to Justice Scalia, the
"mere fact that benevolent orders are unique" does not suffice to determine that a rational basis is present to allow an exemption.10 9 Additionally, the Justice maintained that some reasonable connection must exist
between the respect in which they are unique and the objective of the
law. Therefore, Justice Scalia argued that the equal protection analysis
of the Court was not well-founded. 1 0

IV.

ANALYSIS

Over a period of four years, the United States Supreme Court, in
three decisions, finally recognized that associational discrimination in alleged private clubs can be prohibited."I 1 A unanimous Supreme Court
held that nothing in the Constitution makes New York City's "threeprong test" unlawful. 1 2 New York Club Association opened the door for
women to become members of the once exclusive men's clubs. Our society cherishes personal liberty in one's home' 13 and in private association,' 14 but at the same time fairness in the marketplace has become a
compelling state interest.'' 5 In an attempt to remedy these conflicting
values, the Supreme Court recognized a legitimate definition of "distinctly private,"' 1 6 and in doing so, the Court has left many members of
society with mixed feelings.
Associational rights have suffered a great loss due to the interests of
the state. Focusing on the size and commercial activities of clubs,' 17
New York City structured a paradigm for other cities and states to follow. In fact, numerous other cities have enacted similar laws, including
the District of Columbia, Chicago, Buffalo, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. i8 Justices Samuel Warren's and Louis Brandeis' "right to be left
alone"' 19 has been compromised by the Court's acknowledgment of the
108. See id. at 2238 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
109. Id.
I10. Id.
11. See New York Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988); Board of
Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987); Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
112. See supra notes 70-109 and accompanying text.
113. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
114. NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
115. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 70-109 and accompanying text.
117. See LEGISLATIVE DECLARATION, supra note 75. The City relied on considerations
which guided the Court in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964), to uphold Local Law 63.
118. WASHINGTON, D.C., CODE § 1-2502; CHICAGO, ILL., MON. CODE ch. 199A; BUFFALO, N.Y., CiTY ORD., Art. XXIII of Chap. VII; Los ANGELES, CA., MUN. CODE
§§ 44.95.00-44.95.04; SAN FRANCISCO, CA., POLICE CODE, §§ 3300BI-3300B.7.
119. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). There is
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changing role of women in our society. No longer will men be capable
of enjoying the "right to be left alone" at their once private clubs.
Alexis de Tocqueville, in his commentary on the role of democracy in
America, found that the propensity in the United States to establish private associations derives from and is preserved by the inalienable right
of private association, which he cautioned against limiting:
The most natural privilege of man next to the right of acting for himself, is that of combining his exertions with those of
his fellow creatures and acting in common with them. The
right of association therefor appears to be almost as inalienable
in its nature as the right of personal liberty. No legislator can
I2 0
attack it without impairing the foundations of society.
Therefore, it could be tempting to conclude that the Court in New York
Club Association 12 l should have weighed the right of association to be
greater than the compelling interest of the City. However, the Court
was correct in finding Local Law 63 valid on its face.
The development of civilization requires change. The needs of
human beings are met through communicating, negotiating, implementing, and enforcing laws, or in the extreme event, war. When tradition
and individual attitudes stand in the way of the evolution of society, the
American legal system must confront the issue. 122 The New York City
Council operated as an effective government body by enacting Local
Law 63. Though the New York Club Association contended that the law
rests on a baseless assumption categorizing clubs as marketplaces for
business opportunities, the reality of the situation is that business does
take place at both private and public clubs.
The suppression of business opportunities based on gender impairs
the economy of the United States. Women make up a large percentage
of our workforce and to prohibit their admittance to venues where business is conducted deprives the nation of potential economic growth.123
In New York Club Association, the United States Supreme Court's decision
is just from both a moral and economic standpoint. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court decision is legally well-founded, giving women the opportunity to compete with their male counterparts.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in New York Club Association is equitable and correct for many reasons. First, while attempting a
facial expressive association attack on Local Law 63, the club association
offered no evidence to the Court displaying the characteristics or purno express constitutional right to privacy. Justice Brandeis introduced the right into case
law in Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
120. Brief of the Conference of Private Organizations as Amicus Curiae for Appellant
at 2, New York Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988) (quoting A. DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 196 (Bradley ed. 1954)).
121. 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
122. Perhaps one of the most important pieces of legislation enacted was the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. For a short period of time, the anti-discrimination law was not widely
accepted by certain members of society. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c) (1983).
123. Employment in Perspective-Women In The Labor Force, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,

Rep. 756 (1988) (56.2% of people in the work force are women).
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pose of any represented club.' 2 4 Second, in its equal protection facial
attack, the club association failed again to provide the Court with any
evidence identifying benevolent orders and religious organizations to be
identical to private clubs.' 2 5 Therefore, without evidence to the contrary, the Supreme Court had no alternative but to find the club association's claim to be without merit. Third, the club association conceded
that Local Law 63 could apply constitutionally to some of the larger
clubs, thus making its facial attack untenable. 12 6 The purpose of a facial
attack is to allege that the law is invalid in all applications, yet the club
association expressly acknowledged that the law was valid when applied
to some clubs. Finally, although the United States Supreme Court
struck down the club association's facial attack on the constitutionality of
Local Law 63, the Court did recognize that the ordinance could be unconstitutional if applied to certain clubs. 127 The Court stressed a caseby-case analysis of those clubs or associations that provide evidence to
demonstrate how their specific purpose is being impaired, proving the
ordinance invalid as it applied to that given club. 12 8 Therefore, clubs
that can actually demonstrate how their right to association is being infringed upon by Local Law 63 should be successful in maintaining their
exclusive membership.
V.

CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court's decision in New York Club Association has finally defined "distinctly private" as it may be applied in public
accommodation laws. At the same time, the decision has infringed upon
the right of private and expressive freedom of association. Women have
gained access to traditional men-only clubs at the expense of individual
privacy. Unfortunately, access will not guarantee business, and only
time will tell how women have benefitted from the Court's decision.
However, our society as a whole has profited by identifying the equally
important role women play in the business world. New York City's
"three-prong test" should be adopted by all cities and states, and if a
club feels that it has a legitimate argument, it should go forth with evidence and attempt to prove it. The United States Supreme Court has
finally brought womens' business opportunities up to date, and in doing
so, the Court in New York Club Association utilized its power to terminate
one of this country's most oppressive traditions.
Kurt Frederick Overhardt

124. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. Compare this argument with Justice
Scalia's discussion on equal protection. New York Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S.
Ct. 2225, 2238 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
126. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
127. New York Ctub Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2234, 2237-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 2235.

LIMITING PROSECUTORIAL DISCOVERY UNDER THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL: HUTCHINSON V. PEOPLE
I.

INTRODUCTION

This comment examines the Colorado Supreme Court's recent decision in Hutchinson v. People.' Part I of the Comment addresses the facts
of the case. Part II then explores the background out of which the legal
issues of the case arise. Part III addresses the reasoning adopted by the
court, and Part IV focuses upon a general analysis of the court's decision. While reference is made to a variety of sources, such as the Rules
of Criminal Procedure and leading United States Supreme Court decisions, particular emphasis is placed on Colorado law.

I.

FACTS

In Hutchinson, the Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the defendant's convictions for second-degree forgery and conspiracy to commit second-degree forgery. 2
The charges against the
defendant arose when he obtained deposit slips from a bank and then
allegedly forged the writing on two checks which he presented for payment twice. The defendant denied that he wrote the checks or knew that
they were invalid. Hence, a critical issue in the case involved the identity
3
of the person who wrote the checks and the deposit slips.
The defense was permitted to retain, at state expense, a handwriting expert who conducted an independent analysis of the handwriting
evidence. The expert's findings were generally unfavorable to the defendant's case, and therefore, the defense decided not to call the expert
4
as a witness.
Prior to trial, however, the prosecution sought a ruling allowing it
to call the defense-retained expert to the stand. The trial court denied
the prosecution's request, and the case proceeded to trial. A mistrial
5
was declared when the jury was unable to reach a verdict.
Prior to the second trial, the trial court reversed its decision regarding the prosecution's use of the expert. The court allowed the prosecution to use the defense's expert in its case-in-chief, and at the second
6
trial, the defendant was found guilty on all counts.
The Colorado Court of Appeals upheld the trial judge's decision in
i.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

742 P.2d 875 (Colo. 1987).
CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 18-2-201, 18-5-103 (1986).
742 P.2d at 877.
Id. at 877-78.
Id. at 878.
Id. at 878-79.
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an unpublished decision. 7 However, in a precedent setting decision, the
Colorado Supreme Court reversed and held that the prosecution's use
of the defense-retained expert in its case-in-chief violated the defend8
ant's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.
II.

A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Expansion of ProsecutorialDiscovery

The issues presented in Hutchinson arose out of a modem trend permitting and expanding prosecutorial discovery of a defendant's case.
Such discovery was once believed to be barred by the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. Under this privilege, the prosecution
was required to carry the burden of proof without any assistance from
the defendant. 9
Relatively recent judicial and legislative actions radically altered
those traditional views. Liberal discovery procedures on both sides of a
criminal case are now an accepted means of encouraging and promoting
the truth-seeking process.1°
1.

Discovery under the Rules of Criminal Procedure

Rule 16 of the Federal and Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure
have had a profound impact on prosecutorial discovery. I I Both rules
afford the prosecution fairly broad discovery rights.
If the defendant has requested discovery, the federal rule permits
the prosecution to obtain documents and tangible objects in the defendant's possession or control which the defendant intends to introduce
into evidence at trial. 12 The federal rule also allows discovery of any
results or reports of examinations and tests made in connection with the
case. 13

The Colorado rule is somewhat broader than its federal counterpart
and does not contain the express limitations set forth in the federal
rule. 14 The state rule permits prosecutorial discovery of medical and
7. According to the Colorado Supreme Court, the court of appeals relied on People
v. Perez, 701 P.2d 104 (Colo. App. 1985), in upholding the trial judge's decision to allow a
prosecutor to use a defense expert.
8. 742 P.2d at 876.
9. See generally Allis, Limitations on ProsecutorialDiscovery of the Defense Case in Federal

Courts: The Shield of Confidentiality, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 461 (1977); Nakell, Criminal Discovery
for the Defense and the Prosecution-The Developing Constitutional Considerations, 50 N.C.L. REv.

437, 479-81 (1972); Van Kessel, ProsecutorialDiscovery and the PrivilegeAgainst Self-Inciminalion: Accommodation or Capitulation, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 855 (1977).

10. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16; COLO. R. CRIM. P. 16; People v. District Ct., 187
Colo. 333, 531 P.2d 626 (1975).
11.

See infra note 14.

12. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(A).
13. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(l)(B).

14. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 16 II does not contain a reciprocal requirement nor does it
contain an express provision precluding discovery of defense counsel's work product.
Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(2) (precludes discovery of work product of defendant, his
attorneys or agents).
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scientific reports made in connection with the case, 1 5 the nature of any
defense which the defendant intends to use at trial,' 6 and notice of an
alibi defense, along with the names and addresses of any supporting witnesses. 1 7 The rule has survived constitutional attack and has been heralded as an effective means of removing the "cloak of secrecy" from the
criminal justice process. 18
2.

United States Supreme Court Decisions

The United States Supreme Court has not decided if the prosecution's use in its case-in-chief of a defense-retained expert violates the
defendant's constitutional rights. However, in several cases, the Court
has expressed its approval of increased prosecutorial discovery under
certain circumstances.
In Williams v. Florida,19 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a Florida notice-of-alibi statute which required a defendant, who
intended to rely on an alibi defense, to provide information to the prosecution regarding the time and place of the alibi and the names and
addresses of any supporting witnesses. 20 In holding that the rule did
not violate the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, the
Court reasoned that, at most, the rule only accelerated the timing of the
21
defendant's disclosure of an alibi defense.
The Court maintained that the adversary system is not an end in
itself and "is not yet a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute
right always to conceal their cards until played." '2 2 Hence, the Court
approved the Florida rule as a means of enhancing the search for truth,
providing both the defendant and the prosecution ample opportunity to
23
investigate crucial facts of the case.
In a separate opinion, Justice Black strongly argued that the noticeof-alibi rule violated the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. 24 Justice Black adhered to the traditional view that the prosecution
must carry the entire burden of proof without any assistance from the
defendant. He stated that the defendant has an absolute right to remain
silent, "in effect challenging the State at every point to: 'Prove it!'- 25
In the 1973 Wardius v. Oregon 2 6 decision, the Court again considered the constitutionality of a notice-of-alibi rule. In this case, the Court
held that an Oregon alibi rule was unconstitutional under the due pro15. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 16 II(b).
16. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 16 11(c).
17. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 16 If(d).

18. People v. District Ct., 187 Colo. 333, 338, 531 P.2d 626, 629 (1975).
19. 399 U.S. 78 (1970), affg, 224 So,2d 406 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
20. 399 U.S. at 78.
21. Id. at 85.
22. Id. at 82.
23. Id. The Court noted that the Florida notice-of-alibi rule was "carefully hedged
with reciprocal duties requiring state disclosure to the defendant." Id. at 81.
24. Id. at 106-16 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
25. Id. at 112 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
26. 412 U.S. 470 (1973). revk, 6 Or. App. 391, 487 P.2d 1380 (1971).
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cess clause of the fourteenth amendment 2 7 because it required the defendant to disclose alibi information, but did not give the defendant
reciprocal discovery rights. 28 The Court maintained that it would be
fundamentally unfair to require the defendant to divulge information of
his case while subjecting him to possible surprises from the prosecution
regarding the information he disclosed. 29 Nonetheless, the Court again
expressed its approval of liberal discovery procedures as a "salutary development which . . . enhances the fairness of the adversary system,"

30
and stated that discovery must usually be a two-way street.
Finally, in the 1975 United States v. Nobles 3 ' decision, the Supreme
Court held that defense counsel could be compelled to disclose relevant
portions of a defense investigator's report after counsel had introduced
limited portions of the report in order to impeach prosecution witnesses.3 2 The Court determined that the fifth amendment did not bar
disclosure of the report since the privilege is personal to the defendant
33
and does not extend to the testimony or statements of third parties.
Furthermore, the Court reasoned, disclosure was not prohibited by the
work product doctrine, as the defense waived the privilege by electing to
34
call the investigator as a witness.

The Court addressed, in a footnote, the defendant's claim that his
35
sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated.
The basis of the claim was that disclosure of the defense investigator's
report compromised counsel's ability to thoroughly investigate and prepare for the case, impaired the relationship of trust and confidence between the client and attorney, and inhibited counsel from gathering
important information. The Court rejected the claim, maintaining that
the defense voluntarily elected to make testimonial use of the investigator's report. The discovery order was also limited to relevant portions
of the report.3 6 While the Court dispensed with the claim, at least one
commentator has argued that Nobles laid the foundation for a sixth
amendment challenge to prosecutorial discovery of a defense witnesses'
37
statements.
3.

Colorado Decisions

Colorado courts have also followed the United States Supreme
Court trend of allowing increased prosecutorial discovery. In People v.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

28. 412 U.S. at 472.
29. Id. at 476.
30. Id. at 474-75. The Court stated, however, that if there is any imbalance in discovery rights, it should work in the defendant's favor. Id. at 475-76 n.9 (quoting Note,
Prosecutorial Discovery under Proposed Rule 16, 85 HARV. L. REv. 994, 1018-19 (1972)).
31. 422 U.S. 225 (1975), revg, 501 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1974).
32. 422 U.S. at 227-29.
33. Id. at 234.
34. Id. at 238-39.
35. Id. at 240 n.15.
36. Id.
37. See Blumenson, Constitutional Limitations on Prosecutorial Discovery, 18 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REv. 122, 175 (1983).
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District Court 38 decision, the Colorado Supreme Court held that Rule 16

of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure is constitutionally valid on
its face. In examining the breadth and scope of the rule, the court determined that while the rule recognizes that the prosecution has a right to
discovery, the court will not grant discovery if it forces the defendant to
relinquish his right to obtain' discovery or disclose information which
will not be used at trial.39 The court emphasized that limitless discovery
might be unconstitutional and that a trial court ruling on a prosecution's
discovery request must first decide if the discovery would violate the de40
fendant's rights.
In the 1981 decision of People v. Small,4 1 the Colorado Supreme
Court reached a similar decision as the United States Supreme Court
reached in Nobles. 4 2 In Small, the court ruled that it was proper for the
prosecution to use a defense investigator's report after defense counsel
introduced at trial limited portions of the report. The court held that
neither the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination nor the de43
fendant's privilege under the work product doctrine were violated.
The court adhered to the modern view that criminal discovery promotes
accuracy and efficiency in the fact-finding process and should not be a
"one-way street flowing in the direction of the defense." '4 4
The cases discussed above clearly illustrate that courts are allowing
increased discovery in criminal cases. 4 5 However, their desire to liberalize discovery must be balanced against the constitutional privileges afforded to defendants.
B.

Limitations on ProsecutorialDiscovery
1. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

Courts once widely accepted that the defendant's privilege against
self-incrimination barred prosecutorial discovery. 4 6 Today the privilege
does not automatically preclude prosecutorial discovery. The privilege
does, however, remain a very powerful constitutional limitation on the
permissible boundaries of prosecutorial discovery. In People v. District
Courl,4 7 for example, the Colorado Supreme Court emphasized that the
prosecution's discovery requests must be denied if they require a de48
fendant to relinquish his right against self-incrimination.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

187 Colo. 333, 531 P.2d 626 (1975).
187 Colo. at 341, 531 P.2d at 630.
Id. at 343, 531 P.2d at 632.
631 P.2d 148 (Colo. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1101 (1981).
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
631 P.2d at 158-59.
Id. at 158 (citations omitted).

45. See alsoAnnotation, Right of Prosecution to Discovery of Case-Related Notes, Statements,

and Reports-State Cases, 23 A.L.R. 4th 799 (1983) (for a collection of state cases regarding
prosecution's right to discovery in a criminal case).
46. See supra note 13.
47. 187 Colo. 333, 531 P.2d 626 (1975).
48. Id. at 341, 531 P.2d at 630.
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The Colorado Supreme Court has held that the prosecution's use of
a defense-retained expert violates the defendant's privilege against selfincrimination. In both People v. Rosenthal4 9 and People v. Roark,50 the
court ruled that the prosecution could not call as a witness in its case-inchief a psychiatrist retained by the defendant in order to obtain incriminating admissions made by the defendant during a pretrial sanity investigation. 51 In Rosenthal, the court recognized that such a result would
deter the cooperation and candidness necessary for effective diagnosis,
which might in turn, adversely affect the reliability of opinion evidence
52
in the fact finding process.
The defendant in Hutchinson argued that the prosecution's use of
handwriting samples obtained by the defense-retained expert and its
testimonial use of the defense expert violated his privilege against selfincrimination. 53 However, handwriting samples are considered an identifying physical characteristic, and not within the privilege. 54 Statements
of third-party witnesses, such as an expert, also do not come within the
privilege. 55 Although the privilege against self-incrimination protects
the defendant from certain prosecutorial discovery, the court in Hutchinson did not rely on the self-incrimination privilege, in reaching its
decision.
2.

The Work Product Doctrine

In some cases, the work product doctrine is another limitation
which may provide protection from prosecutorial discovery. The doctrine provides a limited and qualified privilege against pretrial discovery
56
of documents and tangible items prepared in anticipation of litigation.
Courts have recognized that while the work product doctrine is primarily intended to protect the work product of the attorney, it also extends to the attorney's agents. 5 7 As the Supreme Court reasoned in
Nobles, one of the realities of litigation is that attorneys must rely on
investigators and other agents in preparation for trial. This requires
58
protecting materials prepared by the agent as well as by the attorney.
In Hutchinson, the defendant argued that disclosure of handwriting
samples, as well as testimonial statements, opinions and conclusions of
the defense expert, violated the privilege afforded by the work product
49. 617 P.2d 551 (Colo. 1980).
50. 643 P.2d 756 (Colo. 1982).
51. 617 P.2d at 555; 643 P.2d at 769.
52. 617 P.2d at 556.
53. Petitioner's Opening Brief at 21-25, Hutchinson v. People, 742 P.2d 875 (Colo.
1987) (No. 85SC510).
54. See, e.g., People v. District Ct., 187 Colo. 333, 340, 531 P.2d 626, 630 (1975).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 234 (1975); People v. Small, 631
P.2d 148, 158, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1101 (1981).
56. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); A. v. District Court, 191 Colo.
10, 550 P.2d 315 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977).
57. See, e.g., Nobles, 422 U.S. at 225 (1975).
58. Id. at 238.
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doctrine. 59 However, the court did not extend the privilege to the instant case since handwriting examples are not privileged nor
confidential. 60
3.

The Attorney-Client Privilege

The attorney-client privilege provides another significant limitation
61
upon prosecutorial discovery.
Generally, the privilege extends only to confidential communications made by or to a client in the course of obtaining legal counsel,
62
advice, or direction.
Colorado courts have held that the attorney-client privilege may extend to communications between the client and an agent of the client's
attorney. In Miller v. District Court,63 the Colorado Supreme Court held
that a defense-retained psychiatrist is an agent of defense counsel and
thus comes within the protection of the attorney-client privilege. 6 4 The
court recognized that consultation with an expert, such as a psychiatrist,
is often indispensable in preparing for trial, and reasoned that defense
counsel should not have to run the risk that a defense-retained psychiatrist might be forced to become an involuntary witness for the
65
prosecution.
Although the court based its holding on the attorney-client privilege, its rationale bordered on an effective assistance of counsel analysis.
The court was concerned that allowing the prosecution's use of a defense-retained expert would endanger counsel's ability to represent his
client. 6 6 Some courts have, in fact, recognized that there is often a fine
line between the effective representation by counsel and the attorneyclient privilege. For example, in State v. Mingo,6 7 discussed in-depth in
the following section, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reached a result
similar to that reached by the court in Hutchinson. In discussing the
claims involving violation of the defendant's attorney-client privilege
and right to effective assistance of counsel, the court stated that it regarded such rights as related, and furthermore, are used to promote
criminal defendant's rights. 6 8
The attorney-client privilege is limited and its scope, with respect to
defense-retained experts, remains somewhat uncertain at this time.
While the court in Hutchinson acknowledged application of the attorney59. Petitioner's Opening Brief at 26-27, Hutchinson v. People, 742 P.2d 875 (Colo.
1987) (No. 85SC510).
60. Id. at 21-25.
61. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107 (1987).
62. See, e.g., Miller v. District Court, 737 P.2d 834, 837 (Colo. 1987); Law Offices of
Bernard D. Morley v. MacFarlane, 647 P.2d 1215, 1220 (Colo. 1982).
63. 737 P.2d 834 (Colo. 1987).
64. Id. at 838.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 838-39.
67. 77 N.J. 576, 392 A.2d 590 (1978), aff'g, 143 N.J. Super. 411, 363 A.2d 369 (1976).
68. 77 N.J. at 584, 392 A.2d at 594.
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client privilege in similar circumstances, 69 the court chose not to address its application in the instant case. The court chose instead to base
its decision on the right to effective assistance of counsel.
III.
A.

INSTANT CASE

Majority Opinion

The court first examined the scope of the right to assistance of
counsel as set forth in both the Colorado Constitution and the United
States Constitution. 70 The court stated that the right to counsel, which
is interpreted as the right to effective assistance of counsel, is a fundamental component of the criminal justice system. It affects the defendant's ability to assert other rights he may have, and ultimately affects the
71
defendant's right to a fair trial.
The right to effective assistance of counsel imposes certain affirmative duties upon defense counsel, including a duty of loyalty to the client, a duty to consult with the client, and a duty to inform the client of
important developments in the case. 72 Counsel's duty to adequately investigate his client's case is of paramount importance. This is largely
because without adequate pre-trial investigation of the factual and legal
73
issues, assistance of counsel is rendered virtually ineffective.
The court recognized that adequate pretrial investigation and preparation often requires consultation with an expert, which as the court
emphasized, may not only be desirable but "absolutely vital." 7 4 The
court stressed that the effectiveness of an expert's assistance is dependent in large part upon a relationship of trust, loyalty and confidentiality
between the expert and the defendant. 75 Such a relationship promotes
a full and frank exchange, which better enables counsel to honestly and
accurately assess his client's case. 76 Supporting this reasoning is the
court's reference to statements made by the handwriting expert who testified that he attempted to establish a working relationship with the defendant by first sending a letter of introduction and then later assuring
the defendant that he represented the defense counsel and was on his
side.

77

Recognizing that the assistance of an expert may be a crucial element of the right to effective assistance of counsel, the court determined
that the prosecution should not be permitted to intrude upon the expert
and defense relationship as it might inhibit or deter counsel from consulting with an expert. The court maintained that permitting such a result would only marginally promote the truth seeking function of the
69. Hutchinson v. People, 742 P.2d 875, 884 (Colo. 1987).
70. See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
71. 742 P.2d at 880.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 881.
(quoting People v. White, 182 Colo. 417, 421-22, 514 P.2d 69, 71 (1973)).
at 882.
at 879.
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system while severely damaging defense counsel's ability to provide ef78
fective assistance.
The court found support for its decision from two cases in other
jurisdictions. In State v. Mingo, 79 the Supreme Court of NewJersey held
that the prosecution's use of a defense-retained handwriting expert in a
rape case violated the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel.80 As in the instant case, the defense decided not to call the expert
as a witness, even though the state was fully capable of retaining its own
expert.8 1 The court in Mingo stressed that defense counsel must be permitted full investigative latitude in developing his client's case, which
should not be restricted by providing the state with damaging
82
information.
Similarly, in United States v. Alvarez, 8 3 the Third Circuit held that the
prosecution's use of a defense-retained psychiatrist in a competency
proceeding violated the defendant's "sixth amendment attorney-client
privilege." 8 4 As in Mingo, the court determined that defense counsel
must be free to make an informed judgment with respect to retaining an
expert without running the risk of creating a potential government
85
witness.
In Hutchinson, the Colorado Supreme Court emphasized that its
holding is of a limited nature and does not extend to rebuttal of experts
or of non-expert witnesses. 8 6 The court maintained that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must usually be considered on a case-by87
case basis and that a showing of prejudice is required to warrant relief.
The court adopted the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington,88 which
requires a court to determine whether there is a reasonable probability
that, absent the improper use of the witness, the fact-finder would have a
8
reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.

9

Applying those standards to the instant case, the court determined
that there was a reasonable probability that the defendant would not
have been convicted, but for the prosecution's use of the defense-retained handwriting expert.9 0 It found that the defendant had not waived
his right to effective assistance of counsel, that the defendant was not
78.

Id. at 882.

79. 77 N.J. 576, 392 A.2d 590 (1978).
80. 77 N.J. at 587, 392 A.2d at 595. As the Hutchinson court notes, however, the prosecution's use of the defense expert was harmless error as the expert's testimony was cumulative. Hutchinson v. People, 742 P.2d 875, 883 n.3.
81. 77 N.J. at 580-81, 392 A.2d at 591-92.
82. Id. at 582, 392 A.2d at 592.
83. 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975).
84. Id. at 1046-47. The Hutchinson court states that the holding in Alvarez is based
upon the "Sixth Amendment attorney-client privilege" as the Alvarez court essentially subsumed the two claims. Hutchinson, 742 P.2d at 883.
85. 519 F.2d at 1036, 1047 (quoted in Hutchinson, 742 P.2d at 883).
86. 742 P.2d at 885-86.
87. Id. at 886.
88. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
89. 742 P.2d at 886 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695).
90. Id.at 887.
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uncooperative with the prosecution's experts while assisting the defense's experts, and that the defense's expert testimony was damaging.9 1 Also, there was no compelling justification for the prosecution's
use of the defense expert as there was no indication that the prosecution
was unable to retain its own competent expert. 92 Hence, the court reversed the defendant's conviction and remanded the case for a new
trial.

B.

93

Dissenting Opinion

In the dissenting opinion, Justice Vollack argued that the case could
have been decided under Rule 16 of the Colorado Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the attorney-client privilege, 94 thus avoiding construction of the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Justice Vollack argued that the defense expert's report was discoverable
under Rule 16 and that the prosecution's use of the expert did not violate the attorney-client privilege. In addition, the defendant's rights
were protected because the trial court limited the expert's testimony by
excluding any confidential communications between the expert and the
95
defendant.
IV.

ANALYSIS

Prosecutorial discovery is a relatively recent development in criminal law and courts will continue to confront new and different issues
regarding the breadth and scope of permissable discovery. Today many
of the limitations which have traditionally afforded the defendant some
measure of protection have greatly diminished and are often ineffective
barriers to broad discovery requests.
In response to the trend toward greater prosecutorial discovery, the
court in Hutchinson applied what is also a developing trend in criminal
law - the theory that the sixth amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel can provide a constitutional basis which precludes the prosecution's use of a defense-retained expert in certain circumstances. The
theory is not completely novel, but merely a logical extension of the
Mingo96 and Alvarez 97 decisions.
The right to effective assistance imposes certain affirmative duties
upon defense counsel, such as the duty to adequately prepare for and
investigate the client's case. 98 Realistically, however, factors external to
the conduct and performance of defense counsel may adversely affect
counsel's ability to provide effective assistance. For example, in Hutchin91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 886-87.
Id. at 887.
Id.
Id. at 887 (Vollack, J., dissenting).
Id. at 888-91 (Vollack, J., dissenting).
77 N.J. 576, 392 A.2d 590 (1978).
519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975).
See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.

1988]

HUTCHINSON V PEOPLE

son, such a factor was the conduct of the prosecution. While it is essential that the prosecution obtain the necessary facts of the case, the
prosecution should not be permitted to undermine defense counsel's
efforts to fulfill his duties and responsibilities to his client. In Hutchinson,
the court has taken a positive step forward in ensuring that the defendant is afforded his constitutional rights.
Perhaps the ultimate strength of the opinion is the limited holding.
The court has not created a per se rule which prohibits the disclosure and
use of a defense-retained expert. Instead, the court maintained that
cases involving claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must focus on
the facts of the individual case, and must show prejudice to the defendant resulting from the violation in order to obtain relief. The decision
also requires a court, in determining whether the prosecution's use of
the defense expert is justified, to determine if a compelling justification
exists. 99 In Hutchinson, there was no compelling justification for the
prosecution's use of the defense-retained handwriting expert. However,
the court's decision does not in any way foreclose the possibility that a
compelling justification may indeed mandate a different result.
In its Petition for Rehearing, 10 0 the prosecution argued that the
court's decision has turned the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel on its head and that the expansive nature of the decision
has startling implications. 10 ' Ironically, the prosecution presented two
hypotheticals which, instead of illustrating the potential flaws of the
opinion, tended to reinforce its strength. In one hypothetical, the prosecution raised the issue that if it learned of the consistencies between
the spelling errors made by the defendant and by the forger, and subsequently conducted an additional examination to confirm such evidence,
the defendant could challenge the admissibility of the subsequently derived evidence as it was the fruit of the prosecution's "violation of his
sixth amendment right to consult and silence his experts."' 0 2 The facts
presented by the hypothetical clearly do not come within the protection
afforded under Hutchinson. Hutchinson does not extend to evidence obtained through an independent examination conducted by an expert independently consulted by the prosecution. Instead, it focuses on the
prosecution's direct use of a defense-retained expert in its case-in-chief.
The fact that the prosecution's subsequent investigation reveals the
same information as a prior defense investigation, does not in any way
violate the rule set forth in Hutchinson.
The prosecution presented another hypothetical which involved actions concerning drunk driving.' 0 3 The prosecution hypothesized that
if a defense-retained expert happens to conduct an examination of the
defendant's blood or breath sample, the prosecution may later be pre99. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
100. Respondent's Petition for Rehearing, Hutchinson v. People, 742 P.2d 875 (Colo.
1987) (No. 85SC510).
101. Record at 2-3, Hutchinson v. People, 742 P.2d 875 (Colo. 1987) (No. 85SC510).
102. Id. at 6.
103. Id.
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cluded from presenting any evidence regarding the defendant's state of
intoxication. 10 4 However, if the only evidence as to the defendant's intoxication is the sample preserved and examined by a defense-retained
expert, then there is a compelling justification for the prosecution's use
of both the information obtained by the defense expert himself and also
the use of the defense expert himself.
While the court has created a constitutional basis precluding the
prosecution's use of a defense expert in its case-in-chief, the decision
imposes sufficient limitations. These limitations effectively alleviate any
abuse or injustice which might otherwise result.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Hutchinson, the court expanded the traditional concepts of the
right to effective assistance of counsel. Since its inception, the Constitution has been subject to a considerable amount of interpretation and
expansion, some of-which has been positive and some negative. The
court's decision in Hutchinson is manifestly positive, as it affords the defendant a constitutional shield from what is already an overwhelming
arsenal of prosecutorial power.' 0 5 In the dissenting opinion set forth in
Williams v. Florida,'0 6 Justice Black maintained that the Bill of Rights,
taken as a whole, is "designed to shield the defendant against state
power," and although this undeniably makes the prosecution's job much
more difficult, this principal is imperative to ensure that the defendant is
10 7
not wrongfully deprived of his individual liberty.
Jo Lauren Seavy

Id.
105. For a discussion of the investigatory advantages enjoyed by the prosecution, see
Allis, Limitations on ProsecutorialDiscovery of the Defense Case in Federal Courts: The Shield of
Confidentiality, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 461, 485-88 (1977); Note, ProsecutorialDiscovern under Proposed Rule 16, 85 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1018-19 (1972).
106. 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
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